Hatred Simmering in the Melting Pot: Hate Crime in New York City, 1995-2010 by Mills, Colleen E.
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
9-2017 
Hatred Simmering in the Melting Pot: Hate Crime in New York City, 
1995-2010 
Colleen E. Mills 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2189 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 



















HATRED SIMMERING IN THE MELTING POT: 





















A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in partial fulfillment of the 















































Colleen E. Mills 





Hatred Simmering in the Melting Pot: 




Colleen E. Mills 
 
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in 




Date Joshua D. Freilich 
 







Date Deborah Koetzle 
 Executive Officer 
 
Supervisory Committee 
Joshua D. Freilich 
Amy Adamczyk 
Jeremy R. Porter 
 
 
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
 iv 
ABSTRACT 
Hatred Simmering in the Melting Pot: Hate Crime in New York City, 1995-2010 
Colleen E. Mills 
Advisor: Joshua D. Freilich, Ph.D. 
Hate crime proves prevalent in American society, inflicting a variety of harms on victims 
as well as society at large. Scholars have long sought to understand the motivations and 
conditions behind hate crime offending. Green and his colleagues conducted the classic 
neighborhood studies examining the conditions that foster hate crime (Green, Glaser, & Rich, 
1998; Green, Strolovich, & Wong, 1998; Green, Strolovitch, Wong, & Bailey). Using data from 
the New York Police Department’s Hate Crimes Task Force, the current study replicates and 
extends Green's neighborhood studies by investigating hate crime in New York City from 1995 
to 2010. This study investigates whether Green, Strolovitch, & Wong’s (1998) findings hold true 
over an extended period of time in New York City, during which the city underwent major 
demographic changes. Using a group conflict framework (Blalock, 1967; Tolnay & Beck, 1995), 
the current study extends prior work by investigating the impact of various "threats, including 
defended neighborhoods as well as economic, political, terrorist, and gay threat, on different 
types of anti-minority hate crime, including those against racial, ethnic, and religious minorities 
as well as anti-gay hate crime.  The current study also integrates criminological frameworks, 
testing social disorganization and strain to explain hate crime. Using negative binomial 
regression analyses with a pooled cross-sectional design, the current study provides a thorough 
analysis of hate crime in New York City as well as further insight into hate crime in the context 
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DEDICATION 
This dissertation is the culmination of a sixteen-year pursuit of trying to understand hate.  Since I 
first saw a production of Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl in the fifth grade, I have 
worked to better understand the violence of hatred and it seems appropriate to acknowledge 
where this ongoing pursuit started, with the words of Anne Frank: 
It's twice as hard for us young people to hold on to our opinions at a time when 
ideals are being shattered and destroyed, when the worst side of human nature 
predominates, when everyone has come to doubt truth, justice and God. 
… 
It’s difficult in times like these: ideals, dreams and cherished hopes rise within us, 
only to be crushed by grim reality. It’s a wonder I haven't abandoned all my 
ideals, they seem so absurd and impractical. Yet I cling to them because I still 
believe, in spite of everything, that people are truly good at heart. 
It's utterly impossible for me to build my life on a foundation of chaos, suffering 
and death. I see the world being slowly transformed into a wilderness. I hear the 
approaching thunder that, one day, will destroy us too, I feel the suffering of 
millions. And yet, when I look up at the sky, I somehow feel that everything will 
change for the better, that this cruelty too will end, that peace and tranquility will 
return once more. In the meantime, I must hold on to my ideals. Perhaps the day 
will come when I'll be able to realize them! 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to the victims of hate crime and all those who face hatred every day 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The current study provides a detailed analysis of hate crimes in New York City, the 
nation’s largest urban area, from 1995 to 20101.  While the history of hate is long, in recent years 
bias crimes have, unfortunately, continued to occur and have greatly damaged society.   Levin 
(2009) traces the origins of modern hate crime laws to the passage of postbellum legislation to 
combat Ku Klux Klan violence. Developments continued to evolve through the Civil Rights era 
to the creation of specialized bias units.  In the late 20th century, federal and state legislation 
mandated the collection of hate crime statistics and included provisions calling for penalty 
enhancements for bias-motivated offenses.  Hate crimes are more brutal than similar non-hate 
hate crimes, create fear in targeted minority groups, and undermine community cohesiveness 
(Barnes & Ephross, 1994; Iganski & Lagou, 2009; Levin & McDevitt, 2002; Lim, 2009; 
McDevitt et al., 2001).  Other consequences of hate crimes include suicides of youth bullied for 
their sexual orientation, as well as mass casualties from shootings purposefully targeting racial 
and religious minorities. Indeed, as recent events (i.e. Dylann Storm Roof's 2015 shooting of 
black congregants at the Emmanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina) make clear, 
deadly hate crimes continue to occur in the United States. 
This dissertation replicates, updates, and extends Green and colleagues’ classic macro-
level (defended neighborhoods) study that used NYPD data.  It is the product of a unique 
collaborative relationship with the New York Police Department (NYPD).  As a result, the 
NYPD Hate Crimes Task Force (HCTF) provided the data and they will be briefed upon the 
dissertation’s completion.  Official and law enforcement hate crime data have been criticized 
over validity and reliability issues. Hate crimes suffer from underreporting, being under-
                                                 
1 New York’s hate crime legislation defines hate crimes as offenses motivated by biases, specifically those of “race, color, national origin, 
ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation” (Fetzer & Fernandez-Lanier, 2009).   
 2 
investigated, as well as differential compliance across departments, cities, and states (King, 
2007; King, Messner, & Baller, 2009).  The NYPD HCTF data however is more resilient to such 
criticisms.  New York City established a police unit devoted to investigating hate crimes in 1980, 
prior to the landmark Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (Martin, 1996).  The HCTF is one of the 
longest running and best trained bias crime units in the nation and it is therefore better equipped 
to respond to and investigate reported hate crime.  Thus, this dissertation’s first benefit is that it 
utilizes hate crime data from one of the nation’s leading hate crime police units (Freilich & 
Chermak, 2013). 
Scholars have investigated the etiology of hate-motivated offenses across multiple units 
of analysis, including what motivates individuals to commit hate crimes (Byers, Crider, & 
Biggers, 1999; Franklin, 2000, McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002; Phillips, 2009).  Scholars 
have also examined the larger conditions that foster hate crimes, accounting for their variation 
across neighborhoods, cities, and larger units such as states (Grattet, 2009; Green, Glaser, & 
Rich, 1998; Green, Strolovich, & Wong, 1998; Green, Strolovitch, Wong, & Bailey, 2001; 
Lyons, 2007).   These works make important contributions, but gaps remain, especially in terms 
of the context of hate crime offending.  The classic neighborhood level studies on hate crimes 
were conducted by Green and colleagues using data from the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) Bias Crimes Unit (now the HCTF).  Green published these results in a series of articles 
in leading social science journals in the late 1990s (Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998; Green, 
Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; Green et al., 2001).  These studies are all now more than 15 years 
old and used data from over 25 years ago.   
The dissertation’s second contribution is that it investigates whether Green, Strolovitch, 
& Wong’s (1998) neighborhood level findings hold true over an extended period of time in 
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NYC, during which the city underwent major demographic changes. They found that increasing 
minority populations in formerly all-white areas accounted for anti-Black, as well as anti-Asian 
and anti-Latino, hate crimes. Significantly, the current study expands upon their study by 
examining all bias intents (including religious and sexual orientation bias crimes), not just the 
anti-racial minority crimes they studied. In addition, the dissertation investigates anti-white hate 
crime to determine if changing demographics can also account for these crimes. The data 
evidence considerable demographic change with growth in the Asian and Hispanic populations 
over time in NYC (NYC Department of City Planning, Population Division, 2011).  The 
changing demographics of NYC, including interesting patterns related to gentrification, allow us 
to determine whether increases in white populations in formerly minority districts are similarly 
associated with anti-white hate crimes.  The current study also demonstrates the importance of 
disaggregating hate crimes by bias as certain predictors are shown to affect certain bias types 
differently. 
This dissertation’s third contribution is that it a theoretically driven study that tests 
hypotheses drawn from sociology and criminology.  It relies heavily on group conflict and threat 
theories, including defended neighborhoods as well as economic, political, criminal, and sacred 
traditions threat models. Further, group conflict and threat theories often overlap with 
criminological strain and social disorganization theories, and the current study thus investigates 
which theories best explain hate crime.  It also examines how the inclusion of certain predictors 
influence the threat models.  There is a consistent overlap in the use of certain variables (i.e. 
economic conditions) across the threat and criminological models, a recurring conceptual issue 
in more political offenses such as terrorism and hate crimes (Freilich & LaFree, 2015).  Research 
also shows how interactions between certain variables are consequential in explaining bias-
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motivated incidents.  The literature also demonstrates much inconsistency.  While much of the 
research regarding the impact of defended neighborhoods on bias-motivated behaviors is 
consistent, there is mixed support for economic and political threat models due to 
methodological inconsistency over how to best operationalize key conceptual predictors.  Thus, 
there is a need for more refined measures and thus, better operationalization of key predictors.  
There is little work examining the criminal/terrorist threat model as well as the etiology of anti-
gay hate crime.  The current study contributes to each of these areas to provide a better 
understanding of hate crime offending at the neighborhood level.   
 Lastly, the dissertation could impact policy and practice in the United States.  The results 
should interest scholars, law enforcement, intelligence analysts, practitioners, and the general 
public.  The project’s results could aid the NYPD’s (and other police departments’) strategies 
and policies in preventing and responding to hate crime.  Such strategies could serve as a model 
for other bias crime units in the country.  This study could also help community relations groups 
in how to best remedy neighborhood conflicts.  The study could aid the Community Relations 
Service (CRS) of the U.S. Department of Justice, which handles "community conflicts and 
tensions arising from differences of race, color, national origin, gender, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, religion, and disability" (U.S. Department of Justice, Community Relations Service).  
Other community stakeholders, such as schools, victims’ services, and other community and 
mediating services stand to benefit from the study given their investment in better understanding, 
and thus more ably responding, to hate crime. 
 This dissertation first reviews the theories (i.e., group conflict, strain and social 
disorganization) it relied upon to better understand neighborhood variation in hate crimes in 
NYC.  The literature review highlights prior research on defended neighborhoods, economic 
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conditions, political and the criminal/terrorist threat, and the threat to sacred traditions.   The data 
and methods section restates the hypotheses before describing the data, dependent and 
independent variables, the data analysis plan, as well as outlining summary statistics.  The results 
section provides a thorough examination of hate crime by bias type using the several threat 
models.  Following the results presentation, the discussion section explains the dissertation’s 
findings and its potential policy and practitioner implications. 
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CHAPTER TWO: GROUP CONFLICT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 This dissertation investigates the etiology of hate crime offending on the neighborhood 
level using police data from the NYPD's HCTF.  The following section reviews research across 
psychology and criminology, with a particular emphasis on sociology.  Based upon this review, 
the dissertation devises a series of hypotheses to explain neighborhood level variation in hate 
crime offending.  The study relies primarily on group conflict theories.  Blalock's (1967) Toward 
a Theory of Minority Group Relations is a classic text on conflict between majority and minority 
groups and hate crime scholars, including Green, Strolovitch, and Wong's (1998) "defended 
neighborhoods" study which the current study seeks to replicate, often cite to it. 
Prior to Blalock's important work, Blumer (1958) described racial prejudice as stemming 
from a sense of group position.  Articulating racial prejudice as a collective social process, he 
argues that "the sense of group position is clearly formed by a running process in which the 
dominant racial group is led to define and redefine the subordinate racial group and the relations 
between them" (p. 5).  Blumer (1958) further explains that the dominant group's perception of 
threats to their power and privileges by the minority group spurs defensive prejudices and 
behaviors by the dominant group (p. 5).  Blalock (1967) frames minority group threat as a 
function of competition for economic and political power.  Blalock (1967) explains that the 
majority reacts to minority presence differently when it comes to economic versus political 
threats.   
Whereas the political threat model hypothesizes a positive association with an increasing 
slope between minority group size and discrimination, the economic threat model posits a 
nonlinear positive association that weakens as the minority size grows (Blalock, 1967; Tolnay & 
Beck, 1995; Tolnay, Deane, & Beck, 1996).  Explaining how greater minority presence should 
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increase the motivation to discriminate against minorities, Tolnay and Beck (1995) explain that 
"although the relationship is predicted to be positive in both instances, the strength of the 
association is expected to increase with the relative size of the minority where competition is 
primarily political in nature, but to become progressively weaker when the basis for competition 
is economic" (p. 168-169).  Thus, Blalock argues that the relationship between minority presence 
and discrimination is curvilinear in the economic threat context.  Blalock (1967) asserts that 
symbolic forms of violence are one form of discrimination used in response to such threats (p. 
159).  While bias-motivated violence is not new, hate crime exists as a modern example of 
symbolic, discriminatory violence.  In response to economic and political threat, minorities are 
targeted for discrimination and aggression to reduce them (i.e., the minority group) as a 
competitive threat in an environment where there are limited means to achieve goals (i.e. 
economic stability or success). This also occurs when the minority is seen as being either the 
source of, or aligned with the source of, the aggressors' frustration (p. 49).  In the context of poor 
economic conditions, hate crime serves as both an outlet for the offender's frustration and an 
instrumental attempt to stop the competitive threat by the minority.   
 Previous literature examines intergroup conflict as an outcome of poor economic 
conditions with the majority lashing out against minorities for their perceived threat to the 
majority’s economic dominance.  Disadvantaged members in the majority group (i.e. poor 
whites) can be most frustrated by minority threat, which raises the question as to how they are 
capable of quashing such perceived threats.  These disadvantaged members prove most 
susceptible to responding to the various threats with violence because of the strains, economic 
and otherwise, they experience for which minorities are blamed.  Blalock (1967) discusses how 
those without resources may not be able to carry out actual discrimination in economic or 
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political spheres.  Hate crime, however, offers an opportunity for those without resources to still 
target minorities in an instrumental manner.  Mills et al. (2016) discuss how hate crimes are a 
cost-effective route for extremists to achieve their socio-political objectives.  This can be 
extended to all hate crime offenders since they may commit these crimes to intimidate groups to 
achieve their own goals (i.e. driving minorities out of the offender’s neighborhood).  Hate crimes 
often inflict deep psychological and emotional harms to both immediate victims and their larger 
communities, thus reducing the threat posed by minorities.   
 Research (Barnes & Ephross, 1994; Iganski & Lagou, 2009; Lim, 2009; McDevitt et al., 
2001) shows that hate crime inflicts greater psychological and emotional damage (i.e. depression 
and fear of victimization) compared to regular crime victimization.  Studies (Iganski and Lagou, 
2009; Lim, 2009) also reveal that minorities will avoid areas out of a fear of hate crime. In 
addition, hate crime victims may flee their neighborhoods in favor of a new residence.  Hate 
crimes also act as message crimes, terrorizing the larger community to which hate crime victims 
belong (Krueger and Malečková, 2002; 2003).  Hate crimes symbolize an anti-“other” attitude to 
be conveyed to larger targeted audiences.  They also serve as menacing threats to the larger 
community from “you do not belong here” to “we are coming after all of you.”  Thus, hate crime 
acts as an effective method of social control to combat minority threat. 
Blalock's (1967) explanation of majority-minority relations exists in a larger context of 
American society.  Highlighting American society’s stark divisions, Perry (2001) offers a theory 
of “doing difference,” citing the prevalence of “notions of difference that have been used to 
justify and construct intersecting hierarchies along lines of sexuality, race, gender, and class” (p. 
46).  Perry (2001) finds that the constructions of difference underlie facets of American life, 
specifically societal structures, labor, power, sexuality, and culture.  Perry (2001) summarizes 
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that “hate crime provides a context in which the perpetrator can reassert his/her hegemonic 
identity and, at the same time, punish the victim(s) for their individual or collective performance 
of identity…sustain[ing] the privilege of the dominant group, and to police the boundaries 
between groups by reminding the Other of his/her ‘place’” (p.55).  Hate crime reflects the larger 
hierarchies along "difference" and their subsequent conflicts in American society by enforcing 
majority supremacy, punishing minorities for perceived transgressions, and neutralizing threats 
to dominant economic, political, and power interests.  Having explained minority group threat 
generally, the following section reviews the theoretical and empirical works to devise a series of 
hypotheses.  The first set of hypotheses centers on the impact of defended neighborhoods, 
focusing on hate crime as an outcome of minority group size and changing demographics.  The 
second section presents hypotheses related to economic conditions.  Third, the review 
investigates the role of political factors and the economic and political nature of minority group 
threat, both of which are prominent dimensions in the intergroup conflict literature.  The fourth 
set of hypotheses focuses on the "terrorist" threat.  The last section presents hypotheses about 
anti-gay hate crime in the context of the threat to "sacred traditions."  The review concludes by 
summarizing this body of research and outlines future directions for the current study. 
  
 10 
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Defended Neighborhoods 
 The first set of hypotheses focus on community demographics and their impact on hate 
crime:  
H1: Communities with higher levels of majority presence will be associated with higher levels of 
hate crime (static);  
H2: Communities with increasing levels of minority presence will be associated with higher 
levels of hate crime (dynamic);  
H3: Predominantly majority communities seeing an influx of minority residents will experience 
increases in hate crime (dynamic; using an interaction term of the majority population by 
change in minority population); and 
H4: Communities with more Jewish buildings (i.e. synagogues) will experience more anti-Jewish 
hate crime (static).  
Group conflict theories argue that social control is used to respond to the threat posed by 
the presence of minorities to dominant interests (Blalock, 1967).  Green, Strolovitch, and Wong's 
(1998) classic study on hate crime tests the "defended neighborhoods thesis," a long-standing 
perspective in sociological literature (De Sena, 1990; Park, Burgess, & McKenzie, 1967; Rieder, 
1985; Suttles, 1972).  Green, Strolovitch, and Wong (1998) theorize that increasing minority 
populations represent a threat to the majority’s political and economic interests in a competition 
for limited resources (p. 373).  Such theories assert various conditions under which racially-
motivated attacks occur, including (1) areas with greater heterogeneity, (2) predominantly white 
areas, and (3) areas experiencing demographic change with minorities moving into 
predominantly white areas (p. 374-376).  Green and colleagues (1998) test the third of these 
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conditions by examining whether an influx of minorities into predominantly white 
neighborhoods are associated with higher rates of hate crimes. They also investigated the impact 
of economic conditions. 
Much of the research on hate crime focuses on the level of minority populations as well 
as demographic change.  Several studies (Grattet, 2009; Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998; Green, 
Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; Green et al., 2001; Lyons, 2007; Stacey, Carbone-López, & 
Rosenfeld, 2011) investigate the link between neighborhood conditions and hate crimes. These 
studies used police data on bias incidents for their analyses.  Green, Strolovitch, and Wong’s 
(1998) major finding was that anti-minority hate crimes were more common in formerly all-
white neighborhoods that were experiencing increases in minority populations.  They speculated 
that white perpetrators committed hate crimes to “defend” their neighborhood from “outsiders.”  
These findings thus highlight the need to disaggregate hate crimes. 
Grattet (2009) corroborated Green’s findings on the relationship between hate crimes 
(both generally and anti-black) and the influx of nonwhites into white neighborhoods in 
Sacramento, California.  Lyons (2007) examined Chicago neighborhoods and found an 
interesting relationship between different bias types and neighborhood demographics. Anti-Black 
crimes occurred in wealthier and white, socially organized areas seeing increases in the Black 
population, indicating an attempt to push back against “invading” minorities. Meanwhile, anti-
white hate crimes were more likely to occur in disadvantaged and disorganized areas. These 
findings also indicate the importance of disaggregating hate crimes.  Lyons (2008) replicates 
Grattet’s finding in a second study that confirms that anti-Black hate crimes occur in 
predominantly white areas with higher levels of community attachment.  The study also shows 
that anti-white crimes are prevalent in communities with even levels of white and Black 
 12 
residents.  Using a minority threat framework, Stacey et al. (2011) find that states experiencing 
an influx of Hispanic immigrants saw a rise in anti-Hispanic hate crime rates.  Lastly, Mills et al. 
(2016) show that higher levels of nonwhite populations and growing nonwhite populations over 
time are associated with increases in fatal hate crimes committed by far-right extremists. 
In addition to recent hate crime studies using American police data, several studies 
examine bias-motivated attitudes and behaviors across other periods and countries.  Investigating 
hate crime in Australia, Benier, Wickes, and Higginson (2015) show that speaking a language 
other than English increases the odds of being a hate crime victim; however, they find no 
association between neighborhoods experiencing an influx of ethnic persons and hate crime.  In a 
spatial study of Southern lynchings, Tolnay et al. (1996) find a positive association between the 
percent Black and lynchings.  Contrary to much of the intergroup conflict research, King and 
Brustein (2006) find that Jewish population levels failed to account for anti-Semitic violence in 
World War II era Germany.  Brustein and King (2004) however find that the size of the Jewish 
population was positively associated with anti-Semitism in Romania (but not in Bulgaria) prior 
to the Holocaust.  But this relationship was more complex and it is discussed more fully below in 
the political threat section. 
 King and Weiner (2007) find that African-Americans along with persons exposed to 
higher Jewish population levels (along with an interaction between these two predictors) are 
more likely to express anti-Semitic attitudes.  Such findings resonate with literature explaining 
how the middleman status of Jews has led to the perception that they have benefitted 
economically at the expense of African-Americans (Allport, 1954; Blalock, 1967; King and 
Weiner, 2007; Levin & Nolan, 2011).  Within this study's analyses, the findings suggest that 
anti-Jewish sentiments were most prevalent among African Americans and individuals residing 
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in places with larger per capita Jewish populations. Interaction models further suggest that 
African Americans residing in areas with high concentrations of Jews were particularly likely to 
harbor anti-Jewish sentiments.  Lastly, Glaser, Dixit, and Green (2002) show that advocacy of 
violence by participants in white racist internet chat rooms was strongest in response to personal 
threats by Blacks, specifically the threat of interracial marriage and the influx of Blacks into 
white neighborhoods. 
Economic Threat, Social Disorganization, and Strain 
 The second set of hypotheses focus on the relationship between economic conditions and 
hate crime.  Broadly stated, the hypotheses are as follows:  
H5: Poor economic conditions will be associated with higher levels of hate crime (static);  
H6: Communities experiencing worsening economic conditions will be associated with higher 
levels of hate crime (dynamic); and  
H7: Socially disorganized communities will experience higher levels of hate crime (static).   
 These hypotheses flow from the literature on economic competition as an explanation for 
group conflict, specifically bias-motivated violence. Blalock (1967) explains that groups engage 
in overt conflict when there is competition over limited economic resources and persons are 
blocked from access to other resources (p. 78).  Similar to Merton’s (1938) strain theory, Blalock 
emphasizes that disadvantaged persons who lack the proper resources to achieve their goals 
legitimately will be more likely to support discrimination against minorities and resort to 
illegitimate means (i.e. aggression) to achieve their goals.  In the face of a larger society that 
disapproves of their illegitimate means, such persons will seek to cast their actions as legitimate 
(p. 139-140).  For example, while American society may not approve of overt racism or bias-
 14 
motivated violence, offenders will explain why their actions are necessary, and thus legitimate, 
given their perceived victimization by minorities.   
 In an economic competition threat model, Tolnay and Beck (1995) explain that the 
economic success, however small, of Blacks in the South was portrayed as occurring at the 
expense of poor whites fighting for the same jobs.  They argue that poor whites distressed by 
their economic situation were vulnerable to Klan influence in the South and that some 
collectively lynched Blacks to remove them from the labor market (p. 70).  Middle class whites 
may similarly respond to economic downturns with hate crime against scapegoats that they view 
as responsible for their economic failures (Jenness & Grattet, 1996; Lyons, 2007, p. 821).  Thus, 
economically-strained individuals use bias-motivated violence, which is instrumental in 
combating the economic competition of minorities. 
Criminological explanations also help explain hate crime in the context of economic 
competition and group conflict.  A number of hate crime studies use a social disorganization 
theoretical framework, often integrating it with the defended neighborhoods and conflict 
perspectives (Gladfelter, Lantz, & Ruback 2015; Lyons, 2007; Grattet, 2009).  Focusing on 
urban neighborhood effects on crime, Park, Burgess, and McKenzie (1967) provide the basis of 
social ecology theories with their concentric zone theory in which delinquency arises in socially 
disorganized communities.  Social disorganization theories posit that communities experiencing 
poverty (or concentrated disadvantage), in concert with ethnic heterogeneity and residential 
transience, lack the resources to establish community cohesiveness thus leaving them vulnerable 
to crime (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Kornhauser, 1978).  Ethnic heterogeneity and residential 
transience are both said to contribute to social disorganization since they obstruct community 
efforts to achieve common goals as well as maintain solid formal and informal social controls 
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(Kornhauser, 1978; Grattet, 2009).  As a result, higher levels of social disorganization lead to an 
inability to prevent, or control, people from engaging in crime.  Lyons (2007) explains that 
"communities facing economic downturns and other social changes may be unable to exercise 
control over the dislocated, who may act on their impulses and racial prejudices" (p. 819).  As a 
result, socially disorganized communities are unable to control these "strained" individuals from 
engaging in bias-motivated crime. 
Strain theories are also relevant within this framework.  Merton (1938) explains that 
people resort to illegitimate means (i.e. crime) when they are blocked from the legitimate means 
to achieve success, usually of a financial nature.  Hate crime is a response to both the economic 
strains, as well as the presence of minorities, who amplify both economic and other strains.  
Applying strain specifically to hate crimes, Hall (2005) asserts that “hate crime is a way of 
responding to threats to the legitimate means of achieving society’s proscribed goals; minority 
groups serve to increase the perception of strain that the majority population feel, and hate crime 
is a product of, and a response to, that strain” (p. 75).  Viewing hate crimes through the lens of 
strain theory, bias-motivated acts account for illegitimate means for people to obtain their goals.  
For example, unemployed offenders may seek to resolve their employment troubles by lashing 
out at the influx of minorities in their community.  This example typifies the defensive category 
of hate crime offenders (see Levin and McDevitt, 2002; McDevitt, Levin, and Bennett, 2002), 
who see themselves as “defending their turf.”  This strain aspect is often associated with the 
frustration caused by demographic change with the influx of minorities into formerly 
homogenous neighborhoods, which motivates hate offenders by providing a target on which 
offenders can thrust blame for their problems, real or perceived (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong, 
1998; Levin and McDevitt, 2002). 
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 Perry (2001) takes issue with strain theories as an explanation for hate crime for the 
reason that economically successful members of the powerful hegemonic groups are responsible 
for a number of hate crimes.  While there is a focus on the economically disadvantaged being 
motivated to engage in bias-motivated violence against minorities, there exist several 
explanations for higher class individuals to engage in such aggression.  Walters (2010) unites 
strain theories and Perry's (2001) "doing difference" theory to explain that dominant group 
members commit hate crimes as a result of strain that manifests as either out of fear of the 
“different” group or on behalf of the disadvantaged members of the dominant group (i.e. upper 
class whites protecting lower class whites) as they experience their strain vicariously.  For 
example, the increasing status position of minority groups threatens a society structured in 
dominance in which hierarchies (i.e. racial hierarchies) exist across political, economic, and 
social institutions (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; 2014; Hall, 1980).   
Dominant groups also stand to gain from hate crimes against minorities in other ways.  
Examining the role of the white elite who profited from cheap Black labor, Tolnay and Beck 
(1995) explain that lynchings benefitted the upper classes by both maintaining control over their 
cheap labor as well as further keeping the working classes (both Black and white) divided 
amongst themselves, thus preserving the position and power of the white elite (p. 72).   
Nonwhite Majorities Reacting to Economic Threat 
 While the literature usually focuses on the threat posed by racial and ethnic minorities to 
the white majority, it is an open question whether the reverse is also true. Does group conflict 
also occur following an influx of whites into predominantly minority neighborhoods?  Such an 
influx may pose several threats to minorities regarding economic competition.  Traditional 
minority group threat explanations still hold in that ethno-racial minorities can similarly 
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experience competition for resources by the "invading" white minority.  This competition can 
manifest in a number of ways.  First, growing white presence can draw businesses that threaten 
minority-owned businesses (DeSena, 2012; DiFazio, 2012; Trekson, 2012).  Second, growing 
white presence and gentrification drive up living costs from home values and rental costs, thus 
displacing heretofore well established families of lower socio-economic status, especially low 
status ethno-racial minorities (DeSena, 2012; Gould & Louis, 2012; Mason, Morlock, & Pisano, 
2012; Trekson, 2012).  Further, these displaced minorities miss out on the benefits of 
revitalization of neighborhoods that they once inhabited (i.e. better home values, increased 
safety, cleaner environment, more services, et cetera) (Anderson, 2012; Gould & Lewis, 2012; 
Trekson, 2012).  Scholars note that economic stress similarly pushes ethno-racial minorities to 
lash out against whites (Jacobs & Wood, 1999; Lyons, 2007).  Hate crime thus may serve as a 
response to invading white minorities by neighborhoods where people of color are the majority. 
Similarly, group conflict propositions remain relevant in situations where racial and 
ethnic minorities conflict with one another, especially over resources.  Just as white immigrant 
groups conflicted with one another and with nonwhites for labor in the United States (Olzak, 
1987; Shanahan & Olzak, 1999), contemporary racial and ethnic groups (i.e. Blacks, Hispanics, 
Asians, et cetera) experience intergroup competition.  Examples of inter-minority conflict 
include the unrest in Crown Heights and in Los Angeles in 1991 and 1992 respectively (Levin & 
McDevitt, 2002).  During the unrest following the Rodney King verdict in 1992, racial tensions 
exploded in Los Angeles with conflict between Blacks and Korean-Americans reaching a 
breaking point.  Some Blacks viewed Korean-Americans as an invading minority in "their" 
communities, installing their own businesses at the expense of black-owned businesses (Levin & 
McDevitt, 2002; Mydans, 1992).  The Crown Heights unrest similarly illustrates the conflict 
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between minority groups (Jewish and Black communities).  In the Crown Heights incident, a 
perceived Jewish-on-Black hate crime led to prolonged unrest and violence between Jewish and 
Black residents.  The incident demonstrated Black resentment at the influx of Jewish persons 
into their communities, presenting an economic threat (Levin & McDevitt, 2002).   
Bell (2013) also describes the heightened tensions between Hispanics and Blacks in some 
Los Angeles neighborhoods, which has often led to move-in violence against Blacks by Hispanic 
gangs.  The Southern Poverty Law Center has documented the long-standing conflict between 
Hispanics and Blacks, noting that anti-Black hate crimes by Hispanic perpetrators were most 
prevalent in Los Angeles (Mock, 2007; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2008; 2009; Terry, 2013).  
Importantly though, Tolnay and Beck's (1995) explanation that the dominant white elite benefits 
from divisions between working class whites and Blacks can be extended to inter-minority 
conflict because it also divides the working class. The same elite incentivize ethno-racial 
minorities to blame other inter-changeable minority groups for their misfortune, economic or 
otherwise, as opposed to blaming and the socio-racial class structure.  Thus, the hierarchies 
constructed along lines of difference (as described by Perry, 2001) remain intact. 
Quantitative Findings 
In addition to demographic indicators, economic predictors are perhaps the most 
prominent in group conflict research, including hate crime studies.  In competition for resources, 
poor economic conditions can exacerbate group tensions, which can manifest with hate crime 
offending.  A wealth of research (Beck & Tolnay, 1990; Corzine, Huff-Corzine, & Creech, 1988; 
Grattet, 2009; Hovland and Sears, 1940; Jacobs and Wood, 1999; Lyons, 2007; Olzak, 1989; 
1990; Soule, 1992, Tolnay & Beck, 1995) demonstrates the impact of economic conditions on 
intergroup conflict, including hate crime, interracial violence, and lynching.  Maxwell and 
 19 
Maxwell (1995) write that “economic deprivations and social upheavals have often preceded 
unusually riotous periods in history characterized by ethnic tensions and unrest. Similarly, 
contemporary occurrences of hate crimes have often been preceded by declines in the availability 
of blue-collar jobs and the increasing economic marginality of certain groups of the white 
population” (p. 25).  Quantitative research on poor economic conditions and hate crime is, 
however, mixed. 
  Contrary to the tenets of group conflict and strain theories, Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 
(1998) find no relationship between economic conditions, specifically the white unemployment 
rate, and hate crime.  In addition to finding research examining the relationship between 
economic conditions and lynching to be weak, Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998) also show there is 
no association between poor economic conditions, measured by white unemployment, and racial, 
religious, ethnic, and homophobic hate crimes in New York City (p. 86-87).  Similarly, Stacey et 
al. (2011) find no association between economic conditions (via the per capita GDP and 
unemployment) and anti-Hispanic hate crime on the state-level.  Lyons (2007) also finds no 
relationship between white and black unemployment on anti-Black and anti-white hate crime 
respectively.  In an international context, Koopmans and Olzak (2004) find no support for 
deprivation models, using radical right-wing violence in Germany as an outcome of poor 
economic conditions, measured by GDP and unemployment.  Comparing American and German 
far-right extremist homicides, Parkin, Gruenewald, and Jandro (2017) find an increase in far-
right ideologically-motivated homicides during the Great Recession.  They also reveal that such 
violence peaked in Germany during reunification when “social dominance of White males was 
severely threatened by an influx of immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities who were viewed 
as competition for low-skill labor” (p. 17). 
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 While most studies find no relationship between economic conditions and hate crime, a 
few studies find otherwise.  Lyons (2007) finds that anti-Black hate crimes occur in wealthier 
and socially organized areas (with higher levels of informal social control), while anti-white hate 
crimes were more likely in disadvantaged and disorganized areas.  Lyons states that “norms of 
informal social control, rather than social cohesion, economic conditions, or racial composition, 
facilitate hate crimes against blacks” (p.840).  On the other hand, anti-white hate crime is 
positively associated with concentrated disadvantage and residential instability.   In another 
study looking at Chicago and levels of community attachment, Lyons (2008) however finds no 
evidence that economic conditions impact hate crime.   
Unlike Green, Strolovitch and Wong’s (1998) NYC findings, Grattet’s (2009) study of 
Sacramento communities reveals a relationship between concentrated disadvantage and hate 
crime across analyses examining all hate crime, violent hate crime, and anti-Black hate crime.  
He also finds a positive association between hate crime and residential instability; however, he 
finds no significant association between such crimes and ethnic heterogeneity.  Lastly, Mills et 
al. (2016) find fatal hate crimes by far-right extremists are associated with higher levels of 
unemployment as well as worsening poverty over time. 
 Regarding other types of bias-motivated and interracial violence, evidence shows 
similarly inconsistent results.  In a study of lynching between 1882 and 1929, Bailey, Tolnay, 
Beck, and Laird (2011) show that lynched black men were less likely to be skilled workers, and 
thus unlikely to be rooted in the economic sphere.  This finding however could suggest that poor 
whites could be frustrated by the presence of competitors for unskilled work.  Indeed, research 
shows the poor economic conditions associated with lynchings most often affected unskilled 
white laborers (Beck & Tolnay, 1990; Olzak, 1990).  Focusing on the turn of the century, Olzak 
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(1990) shows that rising wages led to a decrease in urban violence against Blacks, specifically in 
Northern cities.  Further, Olzak (1990) finds that declines in wages and periods of economic 
depression were associated with urban violence against Blacks and lynchings.  Studies (Beck & 
Tolnay, 1990; Olzak, 1990; Tolnay & Beck, 1995) using measures related to the Southern cotton 
economy similarly show that poor economic conditions were positively associated with 
lynchings. 
 In the context of pre-WWII Germany, King and Brustein (2006) also find that economic 
conditions, measured by Germany's gross domestic product, were not associated with violence 
against Jewish persons.  Examining interracial killings, Jacobs and Wood (1999) find that 
increased economic competition was associated with an increase in white killings of Blacks.  
While the total unemployment rate was not a significant predictor, they show the Black/white 
unemployment ratio to be associated with interracial homicides, showing that as Black 
unemployment approaches the white unemployment rate, interracial homicides increase as an 
outcome of greater racial economic competition.  Gladfelter et al. (2015) use data from the 
Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission, as opposed to police data, on criminal and 
noncriminal forms of bias-motivated conduct.  Using a social disorganization framework, 
Gladfelter et al. (2015) find residential instability to be the most consistent predictor of bias-
motivated incidents.  In addition to finding that anti-Black incidents are more frequent in 
unstable, homogenous (white) areas, they corroborate much of the research showing that 
homogenous and advantaged areas also see similar increases (p. 19).  Similar to Lyons (2007), 
they also show that anti-white incidents occur in unstable, disadvantaged communities.  Further, 
results show that anti-Hispanic incidents are associated with heterogeneity and instability 
(negatively and positively respectively). 
 22 
Qualitative Findings 
Qualitative research, however, generally supports the relationship between economic 
conditions and hate crime, providing insights into poor whites' resentment of minorities.  
Deutsch (1962) conducted interviews with a sample of perpetrators in a series of anti-Semitic 
property crimes.  He found that instead of anti-Semitic sentiment the prevailing prejudice 
possessed by the poorer perpetrators was actually anti-Black (p. 115).  Deutsch (1962) 
speculated that lower class white youths were thus responding to the influx of Blacks into their 
"turf" which disrupted their neighborhoods (p. 115-116).  He further explains that such social 
disruptions put pressure on such youth, fueling "feelings of insecurity and inadequacy, their 
boredom and their search for thrills. Such an atmosphere of frustration, threat, and uncertainty 
must lead to hostility, which can be funneled into juvenile delinquency, prejudice and intergroup 
hate" (p. 116).  Further, Stein and Martin (1962) found that these "swastika offenders" in New 
York City lived in neighborhoods with higher proportions of Jewish residents.  Therefore, while 
offenders were primarily frustrated by Blacks, they found Jewish persons to be a suitable target 
to vent their frustrations.  Such evidence shows the interchangeability of minority targets in that 
any minority can serve as an adequate target for white youth (and adults) no matter any bias 
against a single particular group. 
Discussing the Maxwell and Maxwell (1995) the summary of the Governor’s Task Force 
on Bias Motivated Violence (1988) survey of high-schoolers revealed similar sentiments among 
working class teens who blamed minorities for their poor economic standing (p. 29).  
Pinderhughes' (1993) interviews with white youth in Brooklyn reveal that a declining economy 
played a major role in racially-motivated violence with the youth claiming that the government 
was giving all the jobs to blacks while whites suffered unemployment and homelessness.  
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Pinderhughes (1993) further explains that white youths frame their attacks as merely a defense of 
their turf.  Similarly, Maxwell and Maxwell (1995) explain that white youth, particularly 
skinheads, often see their bias-motivated actions against the minorities they perceive as 
responsible for their economic misfortune as a way to “save” the white community. 
Ray, Smith, and Wastell’s (2004) description of English perpetrators of racist violence 
found that they cast themselves as victims neglected in favor of minorities.  These offenders 
viewed Asians especially as taking over their country by stealing all of the good jobs, taking 
successful economic opportunities from whites, and “as having obtained their success 
illegitimately” (Ray et al., 2004, p. 263).  Such findings illustrate the motivations for hate crime 
offenders to resort to illicit means to reach their goals.  In perceiving the minorities illegitimately 
successful, offenders justify their own acts in this battle of “us against them” in their own 
attempts to reach success.  Using focus group discussions with "ordinary people" in a 
predominantly white English city with high rates of anti-minority violence, Gadd and Dixon 
(2009) conclude that racist sentiment and support of violence toward minorities was often 
connected to feelings of powerlessness and loss following the disintegration of economic 
conditions (p. 91).  Following a discussion of violent encounters with minorities, Gadd and 
Dixon (2009) elaborate on the frustrations of the focus group participants, writing: 
Common to all of these stories was the feeling that the police and the criminal justice 
system were biased against white people, indifferent to "our" victimization and obsessed 
with uncovering and punishing "our" racism.  The health service, the benefits service, and 
local agencies responsible for providing social housing had also been coerced into 
favoring "them" as the only means of avoiding racism.  While pensioners, ex-servicemen, 
and hardworking mothers providing for their children on meager salaries struggled to 
survive, lazy, good-for-nothing "Asians" and "asylum seekers" were given new homes 
and money for cars, driving lessons, designer clothes, and cell phones (p. 85). 
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The majority white group often casts itself as the hardworking victim of a system that they 
perceive as privileging minority groups at their expense.  Thus, qualitative research consistently 
finds a strong relationship between poor economic conditions and hate crime.  
Political Threat 
 The third set of hypotheses highlight the relationship between political indicators and 
hate crime. The hypotheses are as follows:  
H8: Communities with higher levels of Republican Party enrollment will experience higher 
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static); and 
H9: Communities with higher levels of Republican enrollment, yet higher Democratic electoral 
votes, in their voting district in an election in which the Republican wins will experience lower 
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static). 
H10: Communities with higher levels of Republican enrollment, yet higher Democratic electoral 
votes, in their voting district in an election in which the Democrat wins wills experience higher 
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static). 
 Political competition by minorities also poses a problem for majority groups.  The rise of 
minority political power threatens the dominant majority's political power; thus the dominant 
group resorts to a variety of formal or informal social control against minority group to reduce 
the threat.  Minority political power can lead to forms of social control, including violence 
(Blalock, 1967; Jacobs and Wood, 1999; King & Brustein, 2006; Tolnay and Beck, 1995).  
Blalock (1967) contends that such social control is used to prevent subordinate minority groups 
from gaining power, thus posing a threat to dominant group interests.  Power threat dictates that 
the larger the minority population, the greater the motivation to act.  In response to the minority 
power threat, the majority group thus uses its political power, wielding their lawmaking abilities 
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to discriminate against a growing minority population and maintain the majority's political 
dominance.  Uggen, Behrens, and Manza (2005) explain how law can be used to maintain 
control over minorities; for example, they frame felon disenfranchisement laws as an outgrowth 
of former racial discriminatory policies to combat the threat of an empowered minority electorate 
(see also Behrens, Uggen, & Manza, 2003).  Informal social control, such as violence, may also 
be invoked in reaction to minority political threats.  King and Brustein (2006) frame the political 
threat model as one in which “violence is a reaction to either perceived loss of political clout by 
majority groups to vent feelings of alienation and political powerlessness” (p. 870).   
 Blalock (1967) briefly notes that those who are more politically liberal-minded are 
usually less favorable of discrimination against minorities.  Liberal progressive policies favor 
greater equality across lines of difference (i.e. affirmative action, civil rights policies, marriage 
equality) (King, 2007; King, et al., 2009).  Thus, the political threat could manifest in two 
different ways.  First, the political power of minorities generally poses a threat to the majority 
interest (Behrens et al., 2003; King and Brustein, 2006; Jacobs & Wood, 1999; Olzak, 1990; 
Tolnay and Beck, 1995; Uggen et al., 2005).  For example, increasing Black political power 
threatens the dominance of the white majority. Second, growing power among political factions 
supportive of minorities (i.e. liberal parties) can also similarly threaten the white majority as it 
advocates for progressive policies seen to benefit people of color over whites (Olzak, 1990; 
Tolnay and Beck, 1995). 
 Political competition plays an integral role in intergroup conflict research.  Blalock 
(1967) theorizes that minority political power threatens the interests of the dominant majority.  
Much of the research on political threat focuses on formal social control outcomes such as 
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restrictive voting laws and hate crime reporting compliance as well as acts of informal social 
control such as lynching, anti-Semitic attitudes and behaviors, and interracial victimization. 
Formal Social Control and Political Threat 
 Research shows that formal social control is an outcome of minority political threat.  
Behrens et al. (2003) show that states with larger nonwhite prison populations were more likely 
to pass restrictive voting laws, disenfranchising felons, and less likely to repeal such measures.  
King (2007) investigates compliance with hate crime laws in the context of minority group 
threat, asserting that while minority group size is usually associated with greater social control, it 
is also associated with a failure to enforce laws protective of minorities.  Finding regionalized 
compliance with hate crime laws, King (2007) attributes this difference to the Northeast and the 
West being more Democrat and thus more supportive of protecting minority groups' civil rights.  
He finds a strong negative association between black population size and compliance in the 
South.  Further, King et al. (2009) find that a history of lynching, in addition to a sizable black 
population, reveals diminished compliance, reporting, and prosecution of hate crimes that target 
African-Americans (p. 296). 
Informal Social Control and Political Threat 
 Research on informal social control as an outcome of minority political threat is mixed.  
Tolnay and Beck (1995) provide an overview of the literature examining the impact of Black 
political power on lynchings (Beck, Massey, & Tolnay, 1989; Corzine et al, 1983; Olzak, 1990; 
Phillips, 1987; Reed, 1972; Soule, 1992; Tolnay et al., 1989a), finding the evidence to be 
inconclusive.  Some studies (Corzine et al., 1983, Reed, 1972) testing Blalock's power threat 
hypothesis (a positive nonlinear association with an increasing slope between the minority 
population and lynching as proxies for political threat and social control) find that there is a 
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positive relationship between the Black population and lynchings in the South.  Tolnay, Beck, 
and Massey (1989) however correct for methodological problems in these studies and find no 
support for the power threat hypothesis.  Investigating various aspects of political threat, Tolnay 
and Beck (1995) find little support between political threat variables and lynchings.  Instead of 
using simply the Black population size, Tolnay and Beck (1995) operationalize political threat 
using restrictive voting laws and political strength of parties supportive of Black interests.  
Evidence shows that Black disenfranchisement had no impact on lynchings and that Republican 
and Populist strength actually protected Blacks from lynchings, contrary to the predicted 
relationship where such threats would increase lynchings (p. 198-199).  On the other hand, Olzak 
(1990) demonstrates a link between levels of Populist support, and its attendant challenge to 
white supremacy in the Democrat South, and increases in lynchings nationwide. 
 Focusing on a political threat model, King and Brustein (2006) find that the political 
success of leftist parties (often associated with the Jewish population) was associated with an 
increase anti-Semitic violence.  Brustein and King (2004) show that anti-Semitic acts increased 
with worsening economic conditions in Romania.  They also find that Jewish population levels 
were only associated with anti-Semitism when there was larger support for left-wing parties; 
therefore, they argue that population only mattered in the larger political context.  Thus, King 
and Brustein (2004) conclude that anti-Semitism increased due to these factors because the 
Romanian Jewish population comprised a larger proportion of the middle class and were 
associated with leftist (i.e. communist) parties whereas these results did not hold in Bulgaria 
where such associations were not prevalent (p. 703-704).  There also exist mixed findings 
regarding political threat and interracial crimes.  Using the black to white voting ratio as a 
measure of political threat, D’Alessio, Eitle, & Stolzenberg (2002) find that there is no 
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association between political threat and interracial and intraracial crimes, including white-on-
Black crime.  Examining interracial homicides as an outcome of political threat measured by 
political success, Jacobs and Wood (1999) find that increased economic competition and 
African-American political success (specifically with African-Americans occupying mayoral 
offices) was associated with an increase in white killings of blacks.  Further, Jacobs and Wood 
(1999) reveal that Black killings of whites were less likely in cities with African-American 
mayors. 
Fear of the “Other” Terrorist Threat 
 The next set of hypotheses focus on the terrorist threat.  The hypotheses are:  
H11: Communities with higher numbers of Islam-associated buildings will see increases in anti- 
Arab/Muslim2 hate crime (static);  
H12: There should be an increase in anti- Arab/Muslim hate crime after 2000. 
Scholars also focus on the criminal threat and related “terrorist” threat.  Contemporary 
American society perceives a terrorist threat from minorities, specifically those they perceive to 
be associated with Islamic extremism (Disha et al., 2011).  Terrorist threat has its roots in the 
criminal threat literature.  For example, Eitle, D'Alessio, and Stolzenberg (2002) explain that the 
fear of Black on white crime leads the majority to apply social control measures in response to a 
growing Black population.  Tolnay and Beck (1995) discuss such social control in a popular 
justice model in the context of fear of perceived criminal threat posed by the minority.  Blacks, 
Tolnay and Beck (1995) assert that Southern lynchings were a violent form of social control used 
                                                 
2 The current study combines anti-Arab and anti-Muslim hate crime into one bias type.  This obviously raises the 
issue that many Arab persons are not Muslim and most American Muslims not of Arab ethnicity.  Disha et al. 
similarly raise this issue and argue that many Americans essentially equate Arabs and Muslims and that both group 
have been “raced” as “terrorists (p. 28).  Thus, such hate crimes would be seen as attacking both groups as one.  The 
current study also must conflate the two bias types because there are no separate indicators for anti-Arab and anti-
Muslim hate crime in the data.  The current study uses a measure of all hate crimes recording as anti-other, other-
religion, and other-ethnicity (as well as anti-American Indian).  There is a further discussion of this measure below. 
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to both (1) dole out justice against Blacks for their social and/or criminal violations, and (2) send 
a message to the larger Black community that such behaviors would not be tolerated (p. 61).   
While the popular justice model applies criminal violations, it proves just as salient in 
explaining violent social control in response to economic or political threats by minorities, which 
are seen as violations of societal norms.  For example, minorities are seen as “stealing” jobs from 
the white majority, thus it is just punishment to attack the minorities held responsible for the 
economic misfortune of whites.  In fact, such a model extends to the use of social control as an 
expression of frustration and grievance generally.  Black (1983) explains crime as an exercise of 
both "self-help" and social control to express a grievance.  Black maintains that crime may be 
used against a subgroup of people to express another group’s grievance that results from the 
actions of one of the subgroup’s members.  Thus, hate crime offenders express their frustration 
and aggression and reinforce their control by sending a message to, and instilling fear in, the 
minority victim’s community.  
In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, there was a rise in anti-Islamic 
and -Arab hate crimes (Disha et al., 2011).  After the attacks on September 11th and the Boston 
Marathon bombing, retaliatory violence against perceived Middle Easterners was committed by 
some perpetrators who held the entire Muslim population accountable for those terrorist attacks 
even though these victims were clearly not personally involved in the strikes (Disha et al., 2011; 
Gray, 2013; Levin & McDevitt, 2002; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2013).  Lickel et al. (2006) 
examine vicarious retribution which occurs when “a member of a group commits an act of 
aggression toward members of an out-group for an assault or provocation that had no personal 
consequences for him or her, but did harm a fellow ingroup member” (p. 372-373).   This type of 
"retaliatory" hate crimes could be seen as a response to a "criminal" or "terrorist" threat. These 
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offenders blame and target individuals who belong to the same group as the criminal/terrorists. 
Attacks targeting perceived Middle Easterners following high-profile events (September 11th, 
Boston Marathon bombing, the Iran Hostage Crisis) are also "a micro level manifestation of 
broader conflicts on the international scale" (Mills et al., 2016, p. 11). 
 Research has explored how majority groups use informal social control methods to 
neutralize the “criminal” or “terrorist” threat posed by minorities.  Tolnay and Beck (1995) 
explain that lynch mobs acted both to punish accused Blacks, but also accomplish broader goals 
such as vengeance, sending a message to the Black community, as well as respond to the 
noncriminal threat posed by the Black community (p. 112-113).  Meanwhile, King and Sutton 
(2013) show that anti-white and anti-Black hate crimes spiked after the Rodney King and OJ 
Simpson verdicts respectively.  Many scholars focus on hate crimes as a response to the "terrorist 
threat" (Byers & Jones, 2007; Deloughery, King, & Asal, 2012; Disha, Cavendish, & King, 
2011; King & Sutton, 2013). While the majority of these studies look at the effect of September 
11th on anti- Arab/Muslim attacks, Deloughery et. al (2012) find a statistically significant 
increase in anti-minority hate crimes in the wake of non-right-wing terrorist attacks in general.  
Further, Mills et al. (2016) show that counties experiencing increases in non-right-wing terrorism 
also see increases in fatal hate crimes by far-right extremists.  Disha et al. (2011) also show that 
counties with higher levels of Arab and Muslim populations are likely to see higher levels of 
anti-Arab/Muslim crimes; however, they note that such victimizations occur in counties where 
the Arab/Muslim populations constitute a minority.   
Group Conflict and the Threat to "Sacred Traditions" 
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  Much of the previously discussed theoretical propositions might also explain other types 
of bias-motivated aggression.  The last set of hypotheses focus on gay presence and visibility and 
anti-gay hate crime.  The hypotheses include:  
H13: Communities with higher gay populations are associated with increases in anti-gay hate 
crime (static);  
H14: Communities experiencing an increase in gay populations are associated with increases in 
anti-gay hate crime (dynamic); and 
H15: Communities with poor economic conditions will experience higher levels of anti-gay hate 
crime (static).  
H16: Communities with worsening economic conditions will experience higher levels of anti-gay 
hate crime (dynamic).  
 Blalock (1967) discusses how the visibility of minority deviance can lead to aggression 
against the minority. Aggression results because the dominant group sees the minority deviance 
as "a threat to sacred traditions" which in turn allows the dominant group to rationalize their 
behavior in the context of a society that ignores the problems faced by the minority group, thus 
leaving them vulnerable to future victimization (p. 49-50).  While Blalock was referring to racial 
and ethnic minorities, such assertions can be extended to anti-gay hate crime.  Offenders may 
perceive their victim’s sexual orientation as "deviant" as well as an affront to their sacred 
traditions derived from gender role and heterosexist ideologies (i.e. marriage, heterosexuality, 
masculinity).  Herek (1992) defines heterosexism as an "ideological system that denies, 
denigrates and stigmatizes any non-heterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship or 
community...[and it manifests] both in societal customs and institutions’’ (p. 89).  Thus, anti-gay 
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hate crime is instrumental in sustaining heterosexist social norms in the face of transgressive 
threats to these sacred traditions. 
 Guittar (2013) relies upon Sykes and Matza's (1957) techniques of neutralization that 
explain how offenders excuse their behavior by using crime to socially control transgressors. 
Guittar writes that "such assailants may even see themselves as a sort of sexuality-based Robin 
Hood: robbing sexual minorities to feed the appeasement of the heterosexual majority." (p. 168).  
Blalock (1967) adds that the violence against minorities manifests when there is no powerful 
third party (i.e. the government) with an interest in protecting the minority group.  This is 
particularly relevant in examining American anti-gay violence as the government until recently 
discriminated against LGBT persons in a variety of ways (for e.g., "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 
marriage, and failure to include LGBT persons as protected classes in hate crime and 
discrimination legislation).  Anti-gay hate crime may express the majority sentiment against 
sexual minorities, punishing those who transgress against heterosexist social norms. 
 Franklin (2000) reveals that common anti-gay offender motivations include amusement 
and social norms enforcement.  These offenders seek to stop “different” expressions of sexuality.  
People utilize "difference" as a way to demonize the less powerful group as abnormal. Such 
behaviors allow people to blame the less powerful group for society’s problems.  In the case of 
LGBT persons, biased individuals blame them for a variety of social problems, including the 
breakdown of the "traditional" family, sexual promiscuity, the spread of AIDS and other 
diseases, and drugs.  Some extremist Christians and others even blame the LGBT community for 
natural and man-made disasters, ranging from hurricanes and tsunamis to September 11th and 
economic collapses (Garcia, 2012; McMurry, 2014).  Further, some segments of society still cast 
homosexuality as a threat to the "sanctity of marriage" as well as traditional notions of sexuality, 
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masculinity, and femininity.  Franklin (2000) finds that offenders designate homosexuals as a 
threat to their own sexuality. These offenders thus lash out to prove their heterosexuality.   
 In the context of responding to threats to traditional masculinity, poor economic 
conditions might also explain anti-gay hate crime.  Perry (2001) discusses Goffman's (1963) 
picture of masculinity that: "identified the ideal - or 'hegemonic' - masculinity as a 'young, 
married, white, urban, northern, heterosexual Protestant father, of college education, fully 
employed....Any male who fails to qualify in any of these ways is likely to view himself - during 
moments at least - as an unworthy, incomplete and inferior'" (Goffman, 1963 as cited in Perry, 
2001, p. 106).  Thus, personal economic failures (i.e. unemployment) can adversely affect self-
esteem.  Men in particular may see such failures as a threat to their masculinity in that they 
cannot provide for themselves or families (Gibson, 1994).  Such individuals may feel a 
compound threat to their masculinity by the presence of LGBT persons in the context of poor 
economic conditions.  Anti-gay hate is used to reassert one's masculinity and "[demonstrate] the 
most salient features of manliness: aggression, domination, and heterosexuality" (p. 108).  
Similarly, Alden and Parker (2005) explain how homophobia is linked to ideologies about 
gender roles.  Anti-gay hate crime not only allows offenders to assert their masculinity, but also 
maintain the dominant gender role norms that establish "normal" masculinity and femininity (p. 
324).  Thus, anti-gay hate crime sustains the heterosexist patriarchy and punishes sexual 
minorities for their transgressions against such norms.   
 Anti-gay violence also can be used instrumentally to keep sexual minorities out of the 
perpetrators' neighborhoods (Berk, Boyd, & Hammer, 1992).  Herek, Cogan, and Gillis (2002) 
highlight the negative consequences of anti-gay victimization, including fear of future 
victimization as well as psychological distress that is exacerbated by not only surviving an anti-
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gay attack, but also the stigma associated with being gay.  Relatedly, scholars (Herek & Berrill, 
1990a; 1990b; 1990c; 1992; Swank, Fahs, & Frost, 2013) explain that sexual minorities 
experience employment discrimination and gay hate crime victims run the risk of being "outed" 
and thus are exposed to further secondary victimization, including possibly losing their jobs and 
housing.  Herek and Berrill (1990a) also emphasize that the very law enforcement institutions 
charged with investigating anti-gay hate crime also operate with heterosexist bias, which can 
affect their response to such crimes (p. 418-419).  Herek and Berrill (1990c) explain that law 
enforcement response as a form of secondary victimization so much so that the majority of gay 
and lesbian hate crime victims refrain from reporting their victimization to the police for reasons 
ranging from distrust of the police to fear that the police would harm them as well. 
 There is a paucity of research examining determinants of anti-gay hate crime; however, 
existing research shows interesting findings regarding economic conditions, demographics, 
attitudes, and marriage equality victories.  Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998) also found no 
association between economic conditions, via the white unemployment rate, and homophobic 
hate crimes in New York City (p. 86-87).  Similarly, Alden and Parker (2005) find a negative 
relationship between poverty and anti-gay hate crime.  In a state level analysis however, Van 
Dyke, Soule, and Widom (2001) find that economic strain, measured by per capita income and 
unemployment, is associated with increases in anti-gay hate crime.  Unlike anti-racial/ethnic 
minority hate crimes (where dynamic changes were at play, i.e., increasing minority populations 
over time), Green et al. (2001) determine that (the static finding of) population density of 
homosexuals is strongly linked to anti-homosexual hate crimes in New York City.  Relatedly, 
Comstock's (1991) descriptive study shows that the gay and lesbian hate crime victims were 
most frequently targeted in “gay areas,” such as gay bars and known “gay” neighborhoods. He 
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also finds that victims were also targeted at their homes as well as in predominantly “straight” 
neighborhoods.  Examining anti-gay hate crime in response to civil rights victories, King and 
Sutton (2013) find no temporal association between appellate court victories for marriage 
equality and anti-gay hate crime.  They note however a few limitations, including that their data 
is from Massachusetts, a well-known liberal state.  On the other hand, Van Dyke et al. (2001) 
show that states where the LGBTQ community has made political gains experience higher levels 
of anti-gay hate crime.  Linking attitudinal data from the General Social Survey to macro-level 
hate crime, Alden and Parker (2005) find that homophobic attitudes, as well as greater levels of 
gender equality, percent white, and religiosity, are positively associated with anti-gay and anti-
lesbian hate crime in U.S. cities.  They explain that greater levels of gender inequality prevent 
heterosexual men from needing to assert their masculinity through anti-gay offending.  
Interestingly, they find positive associations between college education and support for gay civil 
rights and anti-gay hate crime.  They refer to Green et al.'s (2001) study showing a link between 
gay population density and anti-gay crime, thus gay population levels, which would also be 
associated with support for gay rights, would be positively associated with anti-gay crime (p. 
337).  In an exploratory study investigating a "noncriminal" population, Franklin (2000) 
uncovers the motivations behind harassment and violence toward sexual minorities.  She finds 
that assailants used anti-gay harassment and violence to enforce anti-gay social norms, pursue 
thrills, and defend themselves against perceived attacks on their masculinity and heterosexuality. 
 Aside from hate crime research, several studies investigate the links between anti-gay 
attitudes and behaviors.  Cowan et al. (2005) uncover positive correlations between both old-
fashioned and modern heterosexism and approval of hate crimes against sexual minorities; 
however, they find that only old-fashioned heterosexism predicted hate crime approval in 
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regression models.  Investigating anti-gay attitudes and behaviors, Lottes and Grollman (2010) 
show that there are significant gender differences with men engaging in more hostile anti-gay 
behaviors.  Further, their results evidence that there is a positive, yet weak, association between 
anti-gay and anti-lesbian attitudes and harmful anti-gay and anti-lesbian behaviors.  Examining 
heterosexist discrimination, Swank, Fahs, and Frost (2013) show that rural and small town 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) persons experience more discrimination, including property 
damage and intimidation (being chased by strangers) respectively, than urban sexual minorities.  
They also show that white LGBs are less likely to be the victim of violent heterosexist 
victimization.  
Conclusions and Directions for the Current Study 
 The research on minority group threat and its various threat models provides interesting 
insights on group conflict, but also demonstrates the need for further research.  In sum, there 
appears to be a consensus that increasing minority presence impacts anti-minority hate crime.  
The defended neighborhoods thesis in particular receives much support in American 
neighborhood level studies.  Mixed support exists for the economic threat model; however, the 
qualitative evidence largely validates notions of white frustration at minorities in the context of 
poor economic conditions.  While the quantitative evidence remains inconsistent, this could be 
due to disagreement over how to measure economic conditions.   
 It also must be noted that these similar threat models may involve multiple causes at play 
and some of these threat indicators could be "owned" by multiple frameworks (Freilich et al., 
2015; Freilich & LaFree, 2015; Tolnay & Beck, 1995).  For example, the level of minority 
presence is an integral predictor across all of the threat models; however, its effects could work 
in different ways.  In their discussion of Blalock's minority group threat models, Tolnay and 
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Beck (1995) acknowledge that it is difficult to determine which threats motivate offenders to 
engage in bias motivated violence.  While threat models hypothesize positive associations 
between minority presence and hate crime, these associations however prove more nuanced.  
When discussing economic or criminal threats, the positive relationship between minority 
presence and hate crime may begin to decline as the minority presence reaches high 
concentrations.   
On the other hand, hate crimes motivated by political threat are anticipated to continue to 
increase as these minorities reach high concentrations.  The influence of minority presence may 
also be most important when it involves the interaction between the white population and the 
subsequent growth in minority populations though as the influx of minorities into formerly white 
neighborhoods appears to be a more important predictor than simply the level of minority 
presence.  While this predictor may be relevant across the threat models, it may prove most 
powerful in explaining the defended neighborhoods perspective.  Whereas minority presence 
crosses all the threat models, predictors like Republican enrollment and political success, the 
number of mosques, and gay population indicators should correspond with only the political, 
terrorist, and gay threat models respectively.  The dissertation's results should provide for an 
interesting discussion to expand upon how these different predictors influence threat models and 
their impact on hate crime. 
 This dissertation extends the literature, particularly Green and colleagues' studies to 
examine all hate crimes in NYC between 1995 and 2010, not just racially motivated offenses.  
The current study will test the relationship between hate crime and a variety of macro-level 
demographic and visibility indicators as well as economic, political, and crime variables.  Green 
previously found this association with anti-minority hate crimes in formerly all-white 
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neighborhoods; the current study will test if this association persisted through time.  The 
changing demographics of New York City present an interesting case for study as the city 
experienced growth in minority populations over time. The trend of gentrification in certain 
areas, however, will allow us to study if increases in white populations in formerly minority 
districts are also associated with anti-white hate crimes. Further, it is important to see how 
macro-level factors impact other types of bias crime (i.e. anti-gay and anti-Arab/Muslim hate 
crimes). 
 While Green focused on defended neighborhoods and economic threat, the current study 
will extend Green's studies to account for other types of threats, including political, terrorist, and 
transgressive threats.  The political threat evidence also is inconsistent.  One reason is that it too 
could be due to the varied measurement of the independent variable: political threat.  In the 
current study, it will be interesting to see whether political threat holds much weight in New 
York City, a known liberal stronghold.  The extant research on modern hate crime offending 
often does not account for political threat (Disha et al., 2011 uses political context measures with 
few significant results), something the current study investigates.   
The terrorist threat evidence appears fairly consistent as well.  The current study extends 
the literature on anti-Islamic hate crime by investigating such crimes in the NYC context, 
including examining the impact of 9/11 on such crimes.  Lastly, the evidence on anti-gay hate 
crime is also limited.  Using a minority group threat framework, the current study extends 
previous work examining anti-gay hate crime as an outcome of neighborhood level factors, 
taking advantage of better measures to capture the gay population.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND METHODS 
Hypotheses  
This dissertation seeks to provide a portrait of hate crime in New York City by testing a 
number of hypotheses. The following restates the hypotheses to be tested (Please see Appendix 
One for a longer listing of this dissertation’s hypotheses). 
Defended Neighborhoods 
H1: Communities with higher levels of majority presence will be associated with higher levels of 
hate crime (static). 
H2: Communities with increasing levels of minority presence will be associated with higher 
levels of hate crime (dynamic).   
H3: Predominantly majority communities seeing an influx of minority residents will experience 
increases in hate crime (dynamic). 
H4: Communities with more synagogues will experience more anti-Jewish hate crime (static). 
Economic Threat, Social Disorganization, and Strain 
H5: Poor economic conditions will be associated with higher levels of hate crime (static). 
H6: Communities experiencing worsening economic conditions will be associated with higher 
levels of hate crime (dynamic). 
H7: Socially disorganized communities will experience higher levels of hate crime (static).  
Political Threat 
H8: Communities with higher levels of Republican party enrollment will experience higher 
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static). 
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H9: Communities with higher levels of Republican enrollment, yet higher Democratic electoral 
votes, in their voting district in an election in which the Republican wins will experience lower 
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static). 
H10: Communities with higher levels of Republican enrollment, yet higher Democratic electoral 
votes, in their voting district in an election in which the Democrat wins wills experience higher 
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static). 
"Other" "Criminal/Terrorist" Threat 
H11: Communities with higher numbers of Islam-associated buildings will see increases in anti-
Arab/Muslim hate crime (static). 
H12: There should be an increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime after 2000. 
"Gay Threat" 
H13: Communities with higher gay populations are associated with increases in anti-gay hate 
crime (static). 
H14: Communities experiencing an increase in gay populations are associated with increases in 
anti-gay hate crime (dynamic). 
H15: Communities with poor economic conditions will experience higher levels of anti-gay hate 
crime (static). 
H16: Communities with worsening economic conditions will experience higher levels of anti-
gay hate crime (dynamic).  
Data 
Dependent Variables 
The current study innovatively examines hate crimes in New York City from 1995 to 
2010 using data from the New York City Police Department’s Hate Crimes Task Force (HCTF).  
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The NYPD first formed a dedicated bias crime unit (first known as the Bias Incident 
Investigating Unit or BIIU) in December 1980, a detective unit focusing on responding to, 
following up on and solving hate crimes as opposed to more community-oriented policing 
activities (Martin, 1996).  When investigating bias-motivated offenses (even if the offense is 
motivated "in part" by bias), Martin (1996) explains that responding officers notify their superior 
when they suspect a bias motivation with the BIIU taking on the case. The BIIU must also 
complete a review if they determine that the crime was not bias-motivated.  Martin (1996) also 
outlines the NYPD's guidelines in determining bias motivation: 
(1) the perpetrator's motivation; (2) the absence of any other motive; (3) the perception of 
the victim(s); (4) the display of offensive symbols, words, or acts; (5) the date and time of 
occurrence (corresponding to a significant holiday such as Hanukkah or Martin Luther 
King's birthday)l (6) statements made by the perpetrator; and (7) a commonsense review 
of the circumstances surrounding the incident (p. 460-461). 
 
In an older study examining 1987-1988, Martin (1996) found that the BIIU detectives were more 
likely to complete follow-up reports on hate crimes compared to non-bias incidents and that 
arrests for certain crimes (i.e. property crimes or harassment) were more likely if they were bias-
motivated (p. 471-473).  Providing an overview of the HCTF's history, Levin and Amster (2007) 
explain that the unit evolved from BIIU detectives working with respective precinct detectives to 
the HCTF unit taking sole responsibility for suspected bias crimes that is subject to intense 
supervision.  They write that all NYPD officers are "trained to recognize that he or she had 
responsibility of initial notification, investigation, and response through academy training, in-
service training, and headquarters’ advisories" (p. 337).  While there were only 18 BIIU 
detectives during Martin's (1996) study, Levin and Amster (2007) reveal that the unit grew by 
over 30%  by the year 2000, writing: 
funding and staffing of the unit was increased, a monitoring database was created, a new 
24-hour hotline was created, and an increased concentration on internal department 
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training and special investigations was established....by the summer of 2001, it consisted 
of an inspector, a captain, three sergeants, and 24 detectives (p. 337).   
 
Further, the HCTF works with victim, advocacy and community outreach groups.  Levin and 
Amster (2007) report that not only does the HCTF validate reported hate crimes at a greater rate 
than police nationally, but it also clears a greater percentage of hate crimes by arrest compared to 
the national-level statistics.   
Turning to the data, the HCTF identified 6,219 hate crimes that occurred in NYC 
between 1995 and 2010, recording the year, precincts, boroughs, bias type, and types of criminal 
activities for such crimes. The NYPD HCTF is widely acknowledged to be one of the best in the 
nation in terms of its response to hate crimes and to the seriousness with which it treats these 
crimes (Freilich and Chermak, 2013). The NYPD provided these data for the purpose of this 
dissertation.  This neighborhood level analysis will replicate Green’s (1998) study of racially 
motivated anti-minority hate crimes which used the NYPD’s Bias Crime Unit’s incident reports 
from 1987 to 1995.  He obtained the precinct location of offenses and aggregated the data to the 
community district level (59 in NYC).  Expanding upon Green’s study, this study, however, will 
examine all hate crimes between 1995 and 2010, not just racially motivated offenses. The HCTF 
data for all hate crimes in this time period includes incident data indicating the precinct of bias 
incidents, the year of occurrence, and the bias motivation.  Like Green’s earlier study, the 
current study uses these HCTF data on  the location of hate crimes to aggregate each  to the 
community district level (N= 59) to test the relationship between hate crime and macro-level 
factors including economic and demographic variables.   
The dependent variables for this study include: hate crime against nonwhites generally as 
well as anti-Black, anti-Hispanic, anti-white, anti-Jewish, anti-Arab/Muslim, and anti-gay, 
specifically.  Each of these outcome variables will be measured as a count; the number of crimes 
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in that precinct (please see Table 1).  Due to a recording issue regarding anti-Arab/Muslim hate 
crime, the categories of "anti-Religion," "anti-Other," and "anti-Ethnic" will be collapsed into a 
proxy measure for anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.3  Disha et al. (2011) similarly use this strategy 
to capture such hate crimes. 
Table 1.1: Variables of Interest 
Variable Coding Data Source 










Counts per Precinct  
aggregated to community 
district (n-= 59) 
NYPD 
IV: Defended Neighborhoods   
• Levels of Majority Presence 
• Change in Levels of Minority Presence 
Over Time  
• Predominantly Majority Communities 
Seeing an Influx of Minority Residents 
Jewish Buildings - Synagogues  
• Percent Majority4 
• Absolute Change (Y2 – 
Y1) 
• Percent Majority in 
Y1*Change in Minority 

















• Worsening Change in Economic 
Conditions (Unemployment & Poverty) 
Over Time 
• Social disorganization 
• Concentrated disadvantage 
o Number of Female-Headed 
households5 
o Unemployed Persons 
o Non-Hispanic Blacks 
o Persons below the Poverty Level 
• Percent unemployed7 
 
• Percent below Poverty 
Level 




• Index (0 to 1) 
o Count 
 
o Percent Unemployed 
o Percent Black 




                                                 
3 Anti-American Indian hate crime is also included in the proxy and this inclusion is discussed in more detail in the Limitations section. 
4 In this case, majority refers to the group of interest for particular analyses (including non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, non-
Hispanic Asian, and nonwhite).  For example, the majority presence indicator in analyses examining the outcome of anti-Black hate crime is the 
percent non-Hispanic white.  In analyses investigating anti-white hate crime, the majority presence predictor is the percent non-Hispanic Black. 
5 The component excludes single female-headed households.  Given current times, it seems inappropriate to consider female-headed households 
with no children as a marker of disadvantage as it seems more indicative of success than disadvantage (as it indicates the ability to own/rent a 
residence in the expensive housing market of New York City without the help of a spouse or a roommate). 
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o Males under the Age of 17. 
• Diversity6 
Residential Instability 
• Index (0 to 1) 
• Percent of New 
Residents by Year of 
Move 
IV: Political Threat   
• Republican Party Enrollment 
• Political Threat 
 
• Percent Republican 
• Republican Enrollment 
*Percent Democratic 
Vote (Mayoral/ 
Presidential) Election  
NYC Election 
Atlas; NYC BOE; 
NY State BOE 
(PUMA) 
IV: "Other" Terrorist Threat  














IV: "Gay Threat"  
• Gay Population 
• Change in Gay Population Over Time 
• Same-Sex Couple 
Households 








 A variety of predictors will be used across the different threat models for the dependent 
variables of hate crimes by bias type.  Census tract and NYPD precinct data will be aggregated to 
the community district level where necessary.  Table 1 shows a complete listing of the predictor 
variables and their respective data source.  The first set of independent variables include 
defended neighborhoods (demographics or minority visibility).  Levels of majority presence 
(across all major race/ethnic groups) will be used from the U.S. Census Bureau, and the change 
in minority presence over time will be calculated.  An interaction term to capture predominantly 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 This is calculated using the percent unemployed out of the labor force population, 16 years old and above, and the unemployed include "people 
are classified as unemployed if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work" 
(U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). 
6 Diversity was calculated in a similar fashion used by the U.S. Census Bureau (see U.S. Census Bureau, 2001).  The diversity index is expressed 
as a ratio and includes the following groups: (1) non-Hispanic White, (2) Black or African-American alone, (3) American Indian or Alaskan 
Native alone, (4) Asian or Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (NHOPI) alone, (5) Non-Hispanic Some other race, or Two or more races, and (6) 
Hispanic (which includes only Hispanic White and Hispanic Other Race or Two or More Races and not those who identify as Black/African-
American, American Indian or Alaskan Native, or Asian/NHOPI as they are included in their race group alone).  Due to data availability, these 
six groups were used instead of the eight outlined in the U.S. Census Bureau’s (2001) calculation.  Using these six groups’ percent presence as a 
ratio, the ratios for each group were (1) squared, (2) with the squares summed, and (3) the sum of squares subtracted from 1.   
8 All independent variables listed as coming from the U.S. Census Bureau were downloaded from the IPUMS National Historical Geographic 
Information System (NHGIS) via https://www.nhgis.org. 
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majority communities seeing an influx of minority residents over time will also be calculated 
from this data.  As the study uses a long form dataset with community district hate crime data 
divided into three time periods (1995-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010), the static majority 
population levels are drawn from the 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census with a midpoint average 
calculated to capture 1995.9  Thus, the static population levels for 1990, 1995, and 2000 
correspond to the community district time periods of 1995-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010 
respectively.  The change variables are calculated using five-year time periods, which also 
necessitated the use of the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey for 2008 to 2012 as an 
indicator for 2010 population levels to calculate a 2005 midpoint for the appropriate change 
variable.  The change variables for the three time periods are thus calculated as 1995-1990, 
2000-1995, and 2005-2000 respectively.  The change indicators take place before the start of the 
hate crime data time period (i.e. Community District 1, 1995-2000 uses a static majority 
presence from 1990, the minority change over time from 1990 to 1995).  The presence of Jewish 
buildings (i.e. synagogues) is drawn from Mavensearch.com: Jewish Web Directory (and 
supplemented with Google Maps data). 
 All variables that capture economic threat, social disorganization, and strain are taken 
from the U.S. Census Bureau.  Static variables are drawn from the 1990 and 2000 Decennial 
Census with a calculated midpoint for 1995.  These predictors include unemployment, poverty, 
and the change in time in these variables is calculated to account for worsening economic 
conditions.10  Concentrated disadvantage, diversity, and residential instability will account for 
social disorganization.  Concentrated disadvantage is an index score based on the following 
variables: number of female-headed households, unemployed persons, non-Hispanic blacks, 
                                                 
9 All 1995 variables computed as 1995=(1990+2000)/2 
10 Worsening economic conditions require change variables just as used with demographic change variables.  Thus, the 2000 to 2005 change 
variable is calculated using unemployment and poverty data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey 2008-2012, so a 2005 
midpoint can be calculated.  
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persons below the poverty level, and males under the age of 17 (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 
1997 as cited in Grattet, 2009, p. 139).  Diversity is calculated using a method similar to the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s (2001) method.  Residential instability is measured by using the percent of 
residents who did not live in their residence five year prior. 
 The third set of variables includes political threat.  The New York City Board of 
Elections (BOE) provides community-level data on party enrollment as well as the general 
election results for Presidential and mayoral races.  Given the data is not available at the 
community district level, theses analyses will be done at the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) 
level.  While there are 59 community districts, there are 55 PUMAs in New York City, with a 
few districts being consolidated into the same PUMA; however, the PUMA boundaries largely 
correspond with the community district boundaries (Center for Urban Research, 2016; New York 
City, Department of City Planning, 2010).  At this time, data is only available for the 2012 party 
enrollment, and the 2009 mayoral and the 2012 Presidential elections; thus the analysis will be 
limited to a shorter time period.  The 2012 election occurs after the study's time frame; however, 
it is assumed that voting patterns in the 2012 general election would mirror the results in the 
2008 general election.11 
 The fourth set of predictors capture the "terrorist" threat, including Islam-associated 
buildings.  The Hartford Institute for Religious Research has a list compiled in 2013 of all 
masjids, mosques, and Islamic centers in New York City, which will be used to serve as an 
indicator of Islam-associated buildings.  As there was a growth in the number of mosques from 
2000 to 2010, the analyses using the independent variable indicating the number of mosques will 
be limited to 2005-2010 (Carnes, 2010).  Given the importance of triggering events (see 
                                                 
11 The following statistics demonstrate the slight county-level changes in the percentage voting for Barack Obama in 2008 versus 2012: Bronx: 
88.2% v. 91.2%; Brooklyn: 78.9% v. 81.4%; New York: 85.1% v. 84.2%; Queens: 74.4% v. 78.8%; Richmond: 47.2% v. 49.9% (Barack Obama 
did take Richmond county in 2012 whereas McCain took the county in 2008) (The New York Times, 2012; Politico, 2012).  It is assumed that the 
districts did not change much overall in the city regarding their voting patterns. 
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McDevitt et al., 2002), it is important to investigate the impact of the September 11th terrorist 
attacks on hate crime in New York City.  Studies (Byers & Jones, 2007; Disha et al., 2011; 
Gerstenfeld, 2002; King & Sutton 2013) have shown that 9/11 had a substantial impact on anti-
Arab/Muslim hate crime.  Thus, analyses will also investigate whether anti-Arab/Muslim hate 
crimes increased after 2000 (to account for post-9/11 hate crimes occurring in 2001).   
 The last set of independent variables relies on "gay threat".  The U.S. Census Bureau 
uses a measure to capture households with same-sex couples.  While this measure fails to 
account for single gay and lesbian householders, it is the best available measure for the gay 
population that currently exists.  It is also an improvement over the previously-used Census 
tabulation that estimated same-sex couples by using households with two unrelated males, or two 
unrelated, nonstudent females, living together over the age of 30 (Green et al., 2001, p. 284-285).    
The change in the population of households with same-sex couples is calculated.12 
Data Analysis Plan 
This dissertation's neighborhood analysis replicates Green, Strolovitch, and Wong's 
(1998) analyses from the 1980s, but expands upon it to examine all bias motivations by using 
data on all hate crime incidents from 1995-2010 (n=  6,219).   
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for this study is the community district (n= 59) (except for the 
political threat models which will use Public-Use Microdata Areas (n=55)).  It must be noted that 
the NYC community districts are often comprised of multiple sub-neighborhoods (i.e. while 
Community District 10 contains only Central Harlem, others contain many smaller 
neighborhoods) (NYC Department of City Planning, 2016).  Green et al. (1998) note that the 
                                                 
12 As these analyses are restricted to the 2006-2010 time period, the static gay population variable is drawn from the 2000 Decennial Census and 
the change variable is calculated by using the calculated midpoint for 2005 (using the 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census). 
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community districts are meant to be similar in population size (p. 384).  Similarly, Lyons (2007; 
2008) followed this strategy and mapped police beat hate crimes data to the 77 community areas 
in Chicago. While it may have been preferable to analyze hate crime at the sub-neighborhood 
level, the NYPD data is not available at this smaller level. We thus follow Green, Lyons and 
others and aggregate the precinct-level data to the community district level.  Importantly though, 
the community district level is smaller than counties and states that many others (aside from 
Green and his colleagues) have used to operationalize “community-level” measures. 
Since there are only 59 community districts in New York City I used a post-hoc power 
analysis to calculate the minimum effect size that these analyses can detect using this sample 
size.  Power analysis tests the probability of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis when the 
alternative hypothesis is true.  Based on an analysis using the Optimal Design Software (see 
Spybrook et al., 2011), Figure 1 shows that with a power of 0.80, the minimum detectable effect 
size (MDES) for n=59 is 0.80.  
Figure 1: Power Analysis for n=59 
 
Based on these results, the analysis has enough power to detect large effects, but not 
medium or small effects.  To remedy this, the data was stacked into a long form dataset to 
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multiply the sample size (i.e. Community District 1 1995-2000, Community District 1 2001-
2005, Community District 1 2006-2010, thus multiplying the 59 community districts by three - 
for these three time periods - in a single model).  The final sample size for all models (aside from 
the Political Threat and Gay Threat models) is 177 community districts.  Using n=177, Figure 2 
shows a power analysis that demonstrates that the analyses can detect a medium effect size with 
a power of 0.90 as well as a small effect size with a power 0.50.   
Figure 2: Power Analysis for n=177 and n=55 
 
 
This significantly improves upon the use of a sample size of 59.  Due to limited data 
availability, the Political Threat models are limited to 2006 to 2010 and are thus limited to 
sample size of 55 PUMAs.  Figure 2 shows a power analysis that demonstrates that with a power 
of 0.80, the minimum detectable effect size (MDES) for n=55 is 0.80.  Thus, the analysis only 
has the power to detect large effects.  Due to data availability, the Gay Threat models use hate 
crime data from 2006-2010, so they are confined to using an n=59, meaning that it can only 




Table 1.2: Summary Statistics (N=177) 
 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Dependent Variables: Hate Crime By Bias Type13 
Anti-Black 5.44 6.09 
Anti-Hispanic 1.42 2.83 
Anti-Nonwhite 14.06 10.71 
Anti-Asian 1.01 1.44 
Anti-Jewish 13.22 13.64 
Anti-Arab/Muslim 6.19 4.78 
Anti-White 1.72 2.35 
Anti-Gay 6.01 8.25 
Independent Variables 
  Defended Neighborhoods 
  
Percent (Non-Hispanic) White 38.37 28.72 
Percent Non(Non-Hispanic) White 61.63 28.72 
Percent (Non-Hispanic) Black 25.19 25.56 
Percent Hispanic 26.61 20.06 
Percent (Non-Hispanic) Asian 7.72 7.82 
Change in White Population -2.79 4.13 
Change in Nonwhite Population 2.79 4.13 
Change in Black Population -0.59 2.54 
Change in Hispanic Population 1.12 2.12 
Change in Asian Population 1.41 1.72 
Jewish Buildings 6.05 6.16 
Gay Presence 
  
Percent Gay Households 0.86 0.55 
Change in Gay Households -0.06 0.16 
Social Disorganization 
  
Concentrated Disadvantage 0.40 0.24 
Residential Instability 40.81 5.54 
Diversity 0.52 0.15 
Economic Threat, Strain 
  
Unemployment Rate 10.47 5.02 
Change in Unemployment 0.24 1.17 
Poverty Rate 21.56 12.53 
Change in Poverty 0.26 1.71 
                                                 
13 Analyses showed a number of outliers across the dependent variables; however, there was no compelling reason to remove them from the 




Total Population 129694.30 43810.18 
 
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics for Political Threat Models (N=55) 
 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Dependent Variables: Hate Crime By Bias Type 
Anti-Black 3.18 3.31 
Anti-Hispanic 0.98 2.90 
Anti-Nonwhite 9.47 8.26 
Anti-Asian 0.71 1.52 
Anti-Arab/Muslim 4.60 3.77 
Anti-Gay 5.31 5.76 
Independent Variables 
  Defended Neighborhoods 
  
Percent (Non-Hispanic) White 34.39 26.76 
Change in Nonwhite Population 0.69 3.41 
Change in Black Population -0.99 2.28 
Change in Hispanic Population 0.82 1.93 
Change in Asian Population 1.48 1.70 
Gay Presence 
  
Percent Gay Households 0.81 0.44 
Change in Gay Households -0.07 0.15 
Political Threat 
  
Republican Party Enrollment 13.63 7.92 
Percent Vote Democrat (Mayoral) 49.42 19.49 
Percent Vote Democrat (Presidential) 80.80 16.39 
Population (unlogged) 
  








                                                 




Table 1.4: Summary Statistics for Gay Threat Models (N=59) 
 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Dependent Variables: Anti-Gay Hate Crime 
Anti-Gay 4.95 4.37 
Independent Variables 
  Gay Presence 
  
Percent Gay Households 0.86 0.55 
Change in Gay Households -0.06 0.16 
Social Disorganization 
Concentrated Disadvantage 0.42 0.24 
Residential Instability 43.37 5.15 
Diversity 0.53 0.14 
Economic Threat, Strain 
  
Unemployment Rate 10.90 5.53 
Change in Unemployment -0.15 1.63 
Poverty Rate 22.36 11.75 
Change in Poverty -0.81 1.30 
Population (unlogged) 
  
Total Population 135516.61 45855.71 
 
The current study tests a series of theoretically-driven hypotheses ( see Appendix One).  
These hypotheses stem from both intergroup conflict and criminological theories, examining the 
relationship between hate crime and neighborhood characteristics.  Again, the dependent variable 
is the count of hate crimes that occurred in a community district for each of the three time 
periods. Similar to Green, the location of each hate crime is aggregated from the precinct to the 
community district level.  The independent variables (detailed in the above Data section) are 
coded to measure each of these hypotheses' predictors on the community district level.15  All 
variables were consolidated into a dataset and exported into SPSS for data management and 
                                                 
15 For those precincts and census tracts that overlapped on community district boundaries, the centroid method was used in QGIS to determine 
where the majority of each precinct/tract fell and they were assigned to the appropriate census tract.  Using NYC government lists, every 
precinct/tract was also verified that it was correctly sorted into the correct community district.  
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descriptive analyses and into STATA for negative binomial regression analyses.  I conducted 
descriptive analyses for the dependent variables (by bias type, year, and precinct) as well as for 
the predictors.  Descriptive analyses are presented in Tables 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.   
As previously stated, the data were stacked into a long-form dataset to avoid issues with 
power, thus expanding the sample size from n=59 to n=177.  In doing so, the analysis relies on a 
data structure called pooled cross-sectional design (Dielman, 1983; Wooldridge, 2015).  Dielman 
(1983) describes pooled data as “any data base describing each of a number of individuals across 
a sequence of time periods” (p. 111).  He further elaborates that “a pooled data base thus blends 
characteristics of both cross-sectional and time series data. Like cross-sectional data, it describes 
each of a number of individuals. Like time series data, it describes each single individual through 
time. Pooled data are important to the analyst because they contain the information necessary to 
deal with both the intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of the entities being 
investigated” (p. 111).  Scholars have previously used pooled cross-sectional design to study 
suicide rates (Phillips, 2012; Piatkowska, Raffalovich, & Messner, 2016), the impact of 
economic conditions on robbery and property crime (Rosenfeld & Fornango, 2007), and the 
relationship between immigration and violent crime (Stowell, Messner, McGeever, & 
Raffalovich, 2009).  Previous work (Miller, Azrael, & Hemenway, 2000; Robison, Crenshaw, & 
Jenkins, 2006; Schatzman, 2005) also uses pooled cross-sectional design when conducting 
negative binomial regression analyses.  Much of these works structure their data similar to the 
current study by using a unit of analysis like metropolitan area/year, state /year, or country /year 
to expand their sample size.  
Using pooled cross-sectional design, the current study structures the data in this format 
by using each community district for three different time periods (using 1995-2000, 2001-2005, 
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and 2006-2010) with hate crime counts by community district/time period.  Each unit includes 
time-specific predictors with a number of models using predictors that specifically accounts for 
change over time.  While the current study does not control for time period, the inclusion of 
time-specific predictors controls for structural variations that may have occurred over time.  To 
investigate if there were any differences between models with and without controlling for time, 
additional models were run with dummy variables for the three time period and these analyses 
showed fairly similar results across all of the models.16   
The current study also tests for the presence of multicollinearity.  In Appendix Three, 
Table 8.1 presents the bivariate correlations for the predictor variables with the correlations for 
the political threat models presented separately in Table 8.2.  The bivariate correlations show 
some significantly high correlations between a few variables, so the models were tested for 
multicollinearity and all analyses of Tolerance and VIF statistics showed no issues.  All models 
were run as OLS regressions with accompanying VIF and Tolerance scores.  With the exception 
of the political threat models, all models returned VIF scores below 10 and Tolerance scores 
above 0.1, thus evidencing no issues with multicollinearity for models in the first four chapters 
of results.  As for the political threat models, tests show that some models that included both 
defended neighborhoods and political threat predictors had VIF scores above 10 and Tolerance 
scores below 0.1, indicating issues with multicollinearity; however, these models include 
interaction terms between defended neighborhoods and political threat indicators and may 
account for the higher VIF and lower Tolerance scores. 
Since the dependent variables are event count data, negative binomial regression is the 
appropriate multivariate technique to investigate “spaces of hate” (Disha et al., 2011).  Scholars 
                                                 
16 For the most part, results were similar when models included dummy variables to control for time; however, the current study presents the 
results without controlling for time as the significance of results is somewhat stronger in a small number of models (i.e. p≤0.05 versus p≤0.1).  
The most significant difference between the models with and without controlling for time is that models controlling for time show that residential 
instability completely loses significance (p>0.1) in a number of models. 
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regularly use negative binomial regression analyses to investigate hate crime on the county and 
neighborhood levels (Disha et al. 2009; Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; Grattet, 2009; Lyons, 
2007; 2008).  Negative binomial regression relaxes the assumptions of Poisson regression, which 
models “event count processes but presupposes the statistical independence of distinct events, an 
assumption that would be violated if [hate crime] incidents trigger reprisals or if our model omits 
causative features of community districts” (Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998, pp. 384-385).  
Table 1.5 provides the hate crime counts by bias type for 1995-2010. 
Table 1.5: Hate Crime Counts by 
Bias Type17 










Analyses confirm that negative binomial regression is appropriate for the models as 
opposed to the alternative Poisson method.  First, histograms evidence Poisson distributions 
across the different bias types.  Second, analyses ran the Stata ‘estat gof’ goodness of fit tests, 
showing significant results across all models for both Pearson and Deviance goodness of fit tests, 
indicating negative binomial regression analyses are more appropriate.  Lastly, all models were 
first run without robust standard errors to check Likelihood-ratio test of alpha, which were all 
significant, confirming overdispersion in the dependent variables and thus better suited to 
                                                 
17 This includes all hate crime included in the negative binomial regression analyses.  A miniscule number of hate crimes were excluded because 
they could not be assigned to a community district.  This analysis also excludes the nine hate crimes committed against disabled persons. 
18 This includes the sum of the anti-Black, -Hispanic, -Asian, and –Arab/Muslim hate crimes. 
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negative binomial regression modeling technique.  The current study presents all models with 
robust standard errors.  Each of the following chapters discusses these models by hate crime 
outcomes by theoretical model and by bias type.1920 
 
  
                                                 
19 All models presented control for the unlogged Total Population, but are not included in the tables.  
20 The models do not include indicators for time period.  Analyses demonstrated similar results when time period indicators were included in the 
models; however, the models were not as strong when such indicators were included.  Even when excluding the time period indicators, the 
models still account for changes over time by including time-specific static and dynamic predictors. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DEFENDED NEIGHBORHOODS RESULTS 
The first Results chapter investigates the impact of defended neighborhoods on hate 
crime.  The chapter aims to tests the first four hypotheses regarding the influence of demographic 
indicators, including majority presence (i.e. white population levels), minority population growth 
and the in-migration predictor, an interaction between majority presence and minority population 
growth.  Testing Hypothesis 4, this chapter also examines the influence of Jewish visibility via 
the presence of Jewish buildings on anti-Jewish hate crime.  This chapter’s goal is to determine 
whether defended neighborhoods explains neighborhood level variation in hate crime in NYC.  
Anti-Racial/Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in White Defended Neighborhoods 
Table 2.1 presents the results for the baseline models testing defended neighborhoods to 
explain anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (anti-Black, -Hispanic, -Asian, -Nonwhite, and –
Arab) in white neighborhoods.  All models in Table 2.1 are significant (p<.001).  
Anti-Black Hate Crime 
Model 1 shows a significant positive association between the percent non-Hispanic white 
population and anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. =1.018, p<.001).  Evidencing defended 
neighborhoods, the interaction between percent white and the change in Black population also 
yields significant positive association with anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. = 1.002, p<.05).   
Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime 
Model 2 shows the baseline similarly uncovers a significant positive association between 
the percent non-Hispanic white population and anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. =1.011, p<.001).  
Increasing Hispanic populations over time is also significantly associated with a 21% increase in 
anti-Hispanic hate crime.  The interaction between percent White and the change in Hispanic 
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population also yields significant positive association with anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. = 
1.005, p<.05), supporting defended neighborhoods. 
Anti-Asian Hate Crime 
Model 3 demonstrates a significant positive association between the percent non-
Hispanic white population and anti-Asian hate crime (I.R.R. =1.015, p<.001).  The in-migration 
predictor is non-significant, providing no support for defended neighborhoods.   
Table 2.1 Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Racial/Ethnic Minority Hate Crime with White Defended 
Neighborhoods 
 














Independent Variables I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White 1.018*** 1.011*** 1.015*** 1.015*** 1.012*** 1.013*** 
 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Change in Black Population 1.041 
     
 
0.028 
     White*Change Black Pop. 1.002* 
     
 
0.001 
     Change in Hispanic Pop. 
 
1.213** 
    
  
0.076 




    
  
0.002 
    Change in Asian Population 
  
1.071 
   
   
0.096 
   White*Change Asian Pop. 
  
1.002 
   
   
0.003 
   Change in Nonwhite Pop. 
   
1.042*** 1.049*** 1.055*** 
    
0.010 0.014 0.013 
White*Change Nonwhite 
Pop. 
   
1.001⁺ 0.999 0.999 
    
0.000 0.001 0.001 
Post-2000 
     
1.432*** 
      
0.154 
Constant 2.142** 0.605 0.251*** 5.149*** 2.478*** 1.902*** 
 
0.568 0.220 0.088 0.798 0.468 0.369 
Wald χ₂ 72.890*** 29.19*** 37.97*** 151.53*** 88.46*** 106.54*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -458.668 -235.274 -232.251 -583.501 -464.487 -459.093 
N=177 
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⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
     I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
 
Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime 
Model 4 shows the baseline defended neighborhoods model showing a significant 
positive association between the percent non-Hispanic white population and anti-nonwhite hate 
crime (I.R.R. =1.015, p<.001).  Increasing nonwhite populations over time is also significantly 
associated with a 4% increase in anti-nonwhite hate crime.  The interaction between percent 
White and the change in nonwhite population also yields significant positive association with 
anti-nonwhite hate crime (I.R.R. = 1.001, p<.1), providing evidence for defended neighborhoods. 
Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime  
Turning to anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime, Models 1 and 2 present baseline defended 
neighborhoods models, showing a significant positive association between the percent non-
Hispanic white population and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  Nonwhite population growth is 
also significantly associated with an approximately 5% increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  
Model 2 accounts for the effect of 9/11, showing a significant increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate 
crime in post-2000 period. 
Anti-Jewish and Anti-White Hate Crime in Defended Neighborhoods 
Table 2.2 tests defended neighborhoods to explain anti-Jewish and –White hate crime.  
These analyses explore a variety of defended neighborhoods contexts to determine which 






Table 2.2: Negative Binomial Regressions for Anti-Jewish and Anti-White Hate Crime with Defended Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 
Anti-Jewish Anti-Jewish Anti-Jewish Anti-Jewish Anti-Jewish Anti-Jewish Anti-White Anti-White Anti-White 
Independent Variables I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White  1.031*** 1.019*** 
       
 
0.003 0.003 
       Change in Nonwhite Population 0.935*** 0.969* 
       
 
0.017 0.014 
       White*Change Nonwhite Pop. 1.002* 1.002* 
       
 
0.001 0.001 






























  Percent Nonwhite 









 Change in White Population 









 Nonwhite*Change White Pop. 









 Percent Hispanic  
        
0.981*** 
         
0.005 
Change in White Population 
        
1.013 
         
0.023 
Hispanic*Change White Pop. 
        
1.000 
















   Constant 1.691* 2.194*** 10.861*** 6.286*** 38.667*** 14.661*** 1.828⁺ 2.757** 4.011*** 
 
0.453 0.470 2.746 1.252 8.485 3.031 0.637 1.091 1.491 
Wald χ₂ 97.99*** 206.75*** 21.03*** 139.31*** 97.99*** 206.72*** 13.03* 1.510 13.80** 
Log pseudolikelihood -591.561 -554.119 -625.841 -570.469 -591.561 554.119 -310.835 -315.382 -309.551 
N=177; ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
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Anti-Jewish Hate Crime 
Models 1 and 2 examine anti-Jewish hate crime as an outcome of white defended 
neighborhoods.  Model 1 shows the baseline defended neighborhoods model showing a 
significant positive association between the percent non-Hispanic white population and anti-
Jewish hate crime (I.R.R. =1.023, p<.001).  Growing nonwhite populations are also significantly 
associated with an 8% reduction in anti-Jewish hate crime.  Evidencing defended neighborhoods, 
the interaction between percent White and the change in the nonwhite population also yields 
significant positive association with anti-Jewish hate crime (I.R.R. = 1.003, p<.05).  These 
findings persist in Model 2, which shows that the presence of Jewish buildings is associated with 
a 10% increase in such hate crimes. 
Models 3 and 4 explore anti-Jewish hate crime in the context of Black defended 
neighborhoods.  Model 3 presents the baseline defended neighborhoods model showing a 
significant negative association between the percent non-Hispanic Black population and anti-
Jewish hate crime (I.R.R. =0.980, p<.001).  Thus, anti-Jewish hate crime proves less prevalent in 
Black neighborhoods.  The interaction between percent Black and white population change 
however yields significant positive association with anti-Jewish hate crime (I.R.R. = 1.002, 
p<.05).  In addition to occurring in white defended neighborhoods, anti-Jewish hate crime also 
manifests in the context of Black defended neighborhoods.  These findings persist in Model 2, 
which also shows that the presence of Jewish buildings is associated with a 13% increase in such 
hate crimes. 
Models 5 and 6 investigate anti-Jewish hate crime in the context of nonwhite defended 
neighborhoods.  Model 3 presents the baseline defended neighborhoods model showing a 
significant negative association between the percent nonwhite population and anti-Jewish hate 
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crime (I.R.R. =0.969, p<.001).  Thus, nonwhite neighborhoods experience less anti-Jewish hate 
crime.  The interaction between percent nonwhite and white population change however yields 
significant positive association with anti-Jewish hate crime (I.R.R. = 1.002, p<.05).  Just as in 
white and Black defended neighborhoods, nonwhite neighborhoods also react defensively to the 
influx of a minority, which results in higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime.  These findings 
persist in Model 2, which also shows that the presence of Jewish buildings is associated with a 
13% increase in such hate crimes. 
Anti-White Hate Crime 
Turning to anti-white hate crime, the last three models investigate three defended 
neighborhoods contexts: Black, nonwhite, and Hispanic neighborhoods.  First examining Black 
neighborhoods, Model 7 shows the baseline defended neighborhoods model showing a 
significant positive association between the percent non-Hispanic Black population and anti-
white hate crime (I.R.R. =1.015, p<.001).  Thus, Black neighborhoods see higher levels of anti-
white hate crime.  Model 7 also reveals that white population growth into Black neighborhoods 
is associated with a significant decrease in anti-white hate crime.  This contradicts defended 
neighborhoods thesis since an influx of white residents into Black neighborhoods is shown to 
results in less anti-white hate crime. 
Model 8 tests nonwhite defended neighborhoods predictors, using the percent nonwhite, 
white population growth, and an interaction between percent nonwhite and white population 
change over time.  Model 8 shows that defended neighborhoods predictors using percent 
nonwhite fail to significantly explain anti-white hate crime.   
Lastly, Model 9 examines anti-white hate crime in Hispanic defended neighborhoods.  
The results show that increases in the Hispanic population are associated with less anti-white 
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hate crime (I.R.R. =0.981, p<.001).  The in-migration predictor fails to achieve significance, 
providing no support for defended neighborhoods in Hispanic neighborhoods. 
Anti-Racial/Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in Nonwhite Defended Neighborhoods 
 Having examined hate crime against racial/ethnic minorities in the context of white 
defended neighborhoods in Table 2.1, Table 2.3 investigates hate crime against racial/ethnic 
minorities in nonwhite neighborhoods. 
Anti-Black Hate Crime 
Examining anti-Black hate crime in the context of Asian defended neighborhoods, Model 
1 shows the baseline model, revealing that an increase Black population growth is associated 
with a 10% increase in anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. =1.096, p<.1).  Model 2 shows results for 
anti-Black hate crime in the context of Hispanic neighborhoods.  There is a significant 
association between Hispanic population levels and anti-Black hate crime.  Thus, anti-Black hate 
crime proves less prevalent in Hispanic neighborhoods.  It also demonstrates that Black 
population growth is associated with a 7% increase in anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. =1.066, 
p<.1).  While both models show that Black population growth over time is associated with 
increases in anti-Black hate crime, they provide no support for defended neighborhoods as the 
influx of Black residents into Asian and Hispanic neighborhoods fails to account for higher 








Table 2.3: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Racial/Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in Nonwhite 
Defended Neighborhoods 
 














Independent Variables I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic Asian 0.996 
     
 
0.009 
     Change in Black Pop. 1.096⁺ 
     
 
0.061 
     Asian*Change Black Pop. 0.995 
     
 
0.012 
     Percent Hispanic 
 
0.973*** 
    
  
0.004 
    Change in Black Pop. 
 
1.066⁺ 
    
  
0.037 
    Hispanic*Change Black Pop. 
 
0.998 
    
  
0.002 
    Percent Non-Hispanic Asian 
  
0.979 
   
   
0.016 
   Change in Hispanic Pop. 
  
1.249*** 
   
   
0.073 
   Asian*Change Hispanic Pop. 
  
0.984* 
   
   
0.007 
   Percent Non-Hispanic Black 
   
0.991* 
  
    
0.004 
  Change in Hispanic Pop. 
   
1.297*** 
  
    
0.078 
  Black*Change Hispanic Pop. 
   
1.003 
  
    
0.002 
  Percent Non-Hispanic Black 
    
0.979** 
 
     
0.008 
 Change in Asian Pop. 
    
0.896 
 
     
0.115 
 Black*Change Asian Pop. 
    
0.989* 
 
     
0.005 
 Percent Hispanic 
     
0.978*** 
      
0.006 
Change in Asian Pop. 
     
1.185⁺ 
      
0.113 
Hispanic*Change Asian Pop. 
     
1.004 
      
0.005 
Constant 6.156*** 10.865*** 0.820 0.925 0.876 0.865 
 
1.616 2.813 0.286 0.341 0.310 0.261 
Wald χ₂ 20.27*** 72.78*** 21.66*** 24.56*** 33.14*** 30.15*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -482.491 -459.973 -268.614 -270.024 -234.706 -231.005 
N=177; ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
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Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime 
Model 3 first investigates anti-Hispanic hate crime in the context of Asian defended 
neighborhoods.  Model 1 shows the baseline model, revealing that an increase Hispanic 
population growth is associated with a 25% increase in anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. =1.249, 
p<.001) and this finding persists across all of the models.  Model 3 also shows a significant 
negative association between Asian neighborhoods experiencing an influx of Hispanic 
populations and anti-Hispanic hate crime.  While Hispanic population growth is associated with 
increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime, there is no evidence to support defended neighborhoods in 
the context of Asian neighborhoods as Hispanic in-migration into Asian neighborhoods is 
associated with less, not more, anti-Hispanic hate crime. 
Model 4 shows results for anti-Hispanic hate crime in the context of Black 
neighborhoods.  This baseline defended neighborhoods model shows that increases in the Black 
population are associated with decreases in anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. =.991; p<.05).  Thus, 
Black neighborhoods experience less anti-Hispanic hate crime.  Hispanic population growth is 
associated with a 30% increase in anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. =1.297, p<.001).  Though 
Hispanic population growth leads to more anti-Hispanic hate crime, defended neighborhoods 
fails to explain such crimes in Black neighborhoods. 
Anti-Asian Hate Crime 
Model 5 examines anti-Asian hate crime in Black defended neighborhoods.  It reveals a 
significant negative relationship between Black population levels and anti-Asian hate crime.  
Thus, anti-Asian hate crime is less common in Black neighborhoods.  Model 1 also shows a 
significant negative association between Black neighborhoods experiencing Asian population 
growth and anti-Asian hate crime, evidencing no support for defended neighborhoods. 
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Model 6 looks at anti-Asian hate crime in Hispanic neighborhoods.  Results show that 
increases in the Hispanic population are associated with less anti-Asian hate crime (I.R.R. 
=0.978, p<.001).  Asian population growth over time is associated with a significant increase in 
anti-Asian hate crime.  The model however fails to show a defensive response to Asian in-
migration into Hispanic neighborhoods. 
Summary 
This chapter presents baseline models investigating the impact of defended 
neighborhoods on hate crime.  The first section examines anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime 
in the context of white defended neighborhoods.  The results find support for defended 
neighborhoods in explaining anti-Black, anti-Hispanic, anti-nonwhite hate crime as white 
neighborhoods experience influxes of these populations.  The second section tests anti-Jewish 
and –white hate crime as an outcome of defended neighborhoods in a variety of contexts.  The 
results demonstrate that defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-white hate crime in Black, 
nonwhite, and Hispanic neighborhoods.  If anything, white in-migration is associated with less 
anti-white hate crime.  The results also show interesting patterns in explaining anti-Jewish hate 
crime.  The influx of nonwhite residents into white neighborhoods, as well as white in-migration 
into Black and nonwhite neighborhoods, is significantly associated with higher levels of anti-
Jewish hate crime.  Lastly, the third section investigates anti-Black, -Hispanic, and –Asian hate 
crime in the context of nonwhite defended neighborhoods.   While the first section showed a 
defensive response in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of minority groups, the last 
section’s results reveal that there is no similar response in Asian, Hispanic, or Black 
neighborhoods experiencing an influx of another minority group. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DEFENDED AND DISORGANIZED NEIGHBORHOODS RESULTS 
This chapter presents results testing combined defended neighborhoods and social 
disorganization models.  This chapter investigates whether defended neighborhoods persists in 
explaining hate crime when social disorganization predictors are considered.  In addition to 
further examining the impact of defended neighborhoods, this chapter tests Hypothesis 7, which 
asserts that socially disorganized communities will experience higher levels of hate crime.  These 
models test whether neighborhoods with higher levels of concentrated disadvantage, residential 
instability, and diversity experience more hate crime.  The following section presents results by 
bias type, including baseline and full models for each bias type.  The tables also include the 
baseline defended neighborhoods models per bias type for comparison purposes. 
Anti-Racial/Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in White Defended and Disorganized 
Neighborhoods 
The first section examines anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime, specifically anti-Black, 
-Hispanic, -Asian, and –nonwhite hate crime, in the context of white defended and disorganized 
neighborhoods. 21 
Anti-Black Hate Crime 
Table 3.1 presents results testing anti-Black hate crime as an outcome of white defended 
and disorganized neighborhoods.  All models in Table 3.1 are significant (p<.001).  As 
established in the previous chapter, results show anti-Black hate crime occurs in white defended 
neighborhoods.  Model 2 is a baseline model that examines all three social disorganization 
predictors apart from the defended neighborhoods predictors.  There are significant negative 
associations between all three predictors, concentrated disadvantage (I.R.R. =.084, p<.001), 
                                                 
21 Full models examining anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime are further discussed in the Terrorist Threat section. 
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residential instability (I.R.R. =.944, p<.001), and diversity (I.R.R. =.369, p<.05), and anti-Black 
hate crime.   
The next three models (Models 3 to 5) combine defended neighborhoods and social 
disorganization predictors.  All three models show the persistent positive relationship between 
percent white and the in-migration interaction term and anti-Black hate crime.  When defended 
neighborhoods predictors are introduced, concentrated disadvantage and diversity are no longer 
significant, while residential instability remains significant and negatively associated with anti-
Black hate crime.  Thus, anti-Black hate crime occurs in more socially organized communities.  
The results demonstrate the persistent effect of defended neighborhoods in explaining increases 
in anti-Black hate crime. 
Table 3.1: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with White Defended & Disorganized 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White 1.018*** 
 




0.006 0.005 0.006 
Change in Black Population 1.041 
 




0.028 0.024 0.025 
White*Change Black Pop. 1.002* 
 




0.001 0.001 0.001 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.084*** 0.603 0.402 0.321 
  



















Constant 2.142** 294.511*** 3.083* 40.775*** 58.454*** 
 
0.568 204.673 1.760 38.118 66.572 
Wald χ₂ 72.890*** 85.73*** 73.000*** 148.72*** 151.80*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -458.668 -456.019 -458.409 -449.467 -449.109 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 




Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime 
Table 3.2: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with White Defended & 
Disorganized Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White 1.011*** 
 




0.009 0.009 0.012 
Change in Hispanic Population 1.213** 
 




0.075 0.073 0.068 
White*Change Hispanic Pop. 1.005* 
 




0.002 0.002 0.002 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.207** 4.086 2.565 4.452 
  



















Constant 0.605 93.470* 0.206⁺ 4.034 1.953 
 
0.220 168.499 0.193 7.412 4.131 
Wald χ₂ 29.19*** 14.13** 30.09*** 56.91*** 59.76*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -235.274 -273.018 -264.444 -259.722 -259.149 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
   
Table 3.2 shows anti-Hispanic hate crime as an outcome in white defended and 
disorganized neighborhoods.  All models in Table 3.2 are significant (p<.001).  The previous 
chapter revealed support for defended neighborhoods in explaining anti-Hispanic hate crime in 
white neighborhoods.  Model 2 is a baseline model that examines all three social disorganization 
predictors apart from the defended neighborhoods predictors.  There are significant negative 
associations between concentrated disadvantage (I.R.R. =.207, p<.01) and residential instability 
(I.R.R. =.919, p<.01) and anti- Hispanic hate crime.  The next three models (Models 3 to 5) 
combine defended neighborhoods and social disorganization predictors.  All three models show 
the persistent positive relationship between percent white, change in the Hispanic population, 
and the in-migration interaction term and anti-Hispanic hate crime with the exception of the 
interaction term losing significance in the full Model 5.  Across all three models, concentrated 
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disadvantage is no longer significant when defended neighborhoods predictors are introduced, 
while residential instability remains significant and negatively associated with anti-Hispanic hate 
crime with an approximately 6% reduction in hate crime.  On the whole, the results evidence 
support for defended and organized neighborhoods in explaining anti-Hispanic hate crime. 
Anti-Asian Hate Crime 
Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with White Defended & Disorganized 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White 1.015*** 
 




0.009 0.009 0.009 
Change in Asian Population 1.071 
 




0.112 0.107 0.136 
White*Change Asian Pop. 1.002 
 




0.004 0.003 0.004 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.061*** 0.065⁺ 0.033* 0.018** 
  



















Constant 0.251*** 24.901*** 1.470 21.067* 60.679** 
 
0.088 20.580 1.431 30.155 91.435 
Wald χ₂ 37.97*** 57.95*** 36.71*** 52.68*** 58.79*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -232.251 -226.048 -229.143 -225.555 -224.463 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
   
Table 3.3 investigates the impact of white defended and disorganized neighborhoods on 
anti-Asian hate crime.  All models in Table 3.3 are significant (p<.001).  As demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, defended neighborhoods fails to account for anti-Asian hate crime.  Model 2 is 
a baseline social disorganization model.  There are significant negative associations between 
concentrated disadvantage (I.R.R. =.061, p<.001) and residential instability (I.R.R. =.949, p<.01) 
and anti-Asian hate crime.  The next three models (Models 3 to 5) combine defended 
neighborhoods and social disorganization predictors.  With the introduction of social 
 71 
disorganization variables, percent white loses significance.  Across all models, concentrated 
disadvantage and residential instability remain significant and negatively associated with anti-
Asian hate crime.  Thus, socially organized communities see more anti-Asian hate crime.  Just as 
in the baseline model, defended neighborhoods fails to account for anti-Asian hate crime. 
Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime 
Table 3.4: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime with White Defended & 
Disorganized Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White 1.015*** 
 




0.004 0.003 0.004 
Change in Nonwhite Population 1.042*** 
 




0.011 0.011 0.011 
White*Change Nonwhite Pop. 1.001⁺ 
 




0.000 0.000 0.000 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.101*** 0.450⁺ 0.324* 0.358* 
  



















Constant 5.149*** 261.189*** 8.918*** 58.235*** 48.267*** 
 
0.798 127.819 3.225 36.717 36.510 
Wald χ₂ 151.53*** 170.71*** 159.95*** 216.55*** 218.81*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -583.501 -581.239 -582.099 -573.111 -572.817 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
   
Table 3.4 examines anti-nonwhite hate crime in the context of white defended and 
disorganized hate crime.  All models in Table 3.4 are significant (p<.001).  As established in the 
previous chapter, evidence demonstrates that anti-nonwhite hate crime occurs in white defended 
neighborhoods.  Model 2 is a baseline model that examines all three social disorganization 
predictors apart from the defended neighborhoods predictors.  There are significant negative 
associations between concentrated disadvantage (I.R.R. =.101, p<.001) and residential instability 
(I.R.R. =.954, p<.001) and anti-nonwhite hate crime.  The next three models (Models 3 to 5) 
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combine defended neighborhoods and social disorganization predictors.  All three models show 
the persistent positive effect of percent white and the change in the nonwhite population on anti-
nonwhite hate crime; however, the in-migration interaction term only remains significant in 
Model 3 (I.R.R. =1.001, p<.05).  Across all models, concentrated disadvantage and residential 
instability remain significant and negatively associated with anti-nonwhite hate crime.  While 
defended neighborhoods does not explain anti-nonwhite hate crime as strongly as anti-Black or –
Hispanic hate crime, it still accounts for increases in such crimes when only concentrated 
disadvantage is considered.  The results also demonstrate that socially organized communities 
experience higher levels of anti-nonwhite hate crime. 
Anti-Jewish and Anti-White Hate Crime in Defended and Disorganized Neighborhoods 
The second section first examines anti-Jewish hate crime in the context of defended and 
disorganized neighborhoods, specifically white, Black, and nonwhite neighborhoods.  Models 
further test the effect of Jewish visibility via the presence of Jewish buildings on anti-Jewish hate 
crime.  The section then presents analyses investigating anti-white hate crime as an outcome of 
defended and disorganized neighborhoods in Black, nonwhite, and Hispanic neighborhoods. 
Anti-Jewish Hate Crime 
Table 3.5 first presents baseline social disorganization models, with and without the 
presence of Jewish buildings.  Both models in Table 3.5 are significant (p<.001).  Model 1 is a 
baseline model that examines all three social disorganization predictors apart from defended 
neighborhoods predictors.  There is a significant negative association between concentrated 
disadvantage and anti-Jewish hate crime (I.R.R. =0.049, p<.001).  Residential instability is also 
associated with a 6% reduction in anti-Jewish hate crime.  These findings hold in Model 2, which 
also shows that the presence of Jewish buildings is also associated with increases in such crimes. 
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Table 3.5: Negative Binomial Regressions for Anti-Jewish 
Hate Crime with Social Disorganization 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Concentrated Disadvantage 0.049*** 0.130*** 
 
0.018 0.041 
Residential Instability 0.937*** 0.967*** 
 
0.012 0.009 








Constant 593.925*** 65.876*** 
 
459.678 36.269 
Wald χ₂ 103.13*** 180.64*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -603.547 -556.547 
N=177 
  ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
 
Table 3.6 presents the combined defended neighborhoods and social disorganization 
predictors and all models are significant (p<.001).  As discussed in the previous chapter, white 
defended neighborhoods explains increases in anti-Jewish hate crime.  Across the full defended 
and disorganized models, percent white, the interaction term, and the presence of Jewish 
buildings persist in accounting for increases in anti-Jewish hate crime.  Thus, defended 
neighborhoods continues to be a consistent predictor of higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime in 
white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of nonwhite residents.  Increases in nonwhite 
populations over time also continue to explain reductions in such crimes.  The presence of 
Jewish buildings also continues to account for significant increases in anti-Jewish hate crime, 
evidencing that greater Jewish visibility accounts for higher levels of such crimes.  When the 
Jewish property predictor is included (Models 6 and 8), concentrated disadvantage remains a 
significant predictor of decreases in anti-Jewish hate crime.  Residential instability also accounts 
for significant reductions in such crimes.  Lastly, the full models show that diversity becomes a 





Table 3.6: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Jewish Hate Crime with White Defended & Disorganized Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 1.031*** 1.019*** 1.031*** 1.012* 1.029*** 1.012** 1.034*** 1.017** 
 
0.003 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.006 
Change in Nonwhite Population 0.935*** 0.969* 0.934*** 0.960* 0.919*** 0.947*** 0.903*** 0.936*** 
 
0.017 0.014 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.016 0.020 0.016 
White*Change Nonwhite Pop. 1.002* 1.002* 1.002* 1.002** 1.002⁺ 1.002* 1.002* 1.002** 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
  
0.853 0.316⁺ 0.421 0.221** 0.587 0.289⁺ 
   
0.634 0.196 0.290 0.130 0.447 0.187 
Residential Instability 
    
0.932*** 0.961*** 0.929*** 0.959*** 
     
0.013 0.009 0.013 0.009 
Diversity Index 
      
3.680⁺ 2.233⁺ 



















Constant 1.691* 2.194*** 1.876 4.776*** 78.462*** 36.194*** 32.486* 20.084*** 
 
0.453 0.470 1.014 2.132 76.147 25.658 44.530 18.131 
Wald χ₂ 97.99*** 206.75*** 98.25*** 216.30*** 178.53*** 233.14*** 205.78*** 264.17*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -591.561 -554.119 -591.538 -552.278 -577.876 -546.177 -574.273 -544.189 
N=177 
        ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 





Table 3.7: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Jewish Hate Crime with Black Defended & Disorganized Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Black (%) 0.980*** 0.986*** 1.001 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.999 0.999 
 
0.005 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.003 
Change in White Population 1.016 1.001 1.051* 1.021 1.075*** 1.038* 1.076** 1.040* 
 
0.018 0.012 0.021 0.013 0.024 0.016 0.025 0.017 
Black*Change White Pop. 1.002* 1.002*** 1.002⁺ 1.002*** 1.001 1.002** 1.001 1.002** 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
  
0.028*** 0.105*** 0.018*** 0.075*** 0.017*** 0.069*** 
   
0.015 0.042 0.008 0.029 0.008 0.027 
Residential Instability 
    
0.922*** 0.959*** 0.922*** 0.959*** 
     
0.013 0.009 0.013 0.009 
Diversity Index 
      
1.138 1.238 



















Constant 10.861*** 6.286*** 23.812*** 11.251*** 1386.525*** 94.368*** 1330.513*** 87.780*** 
 
2.746 1.252 5.789 2.182 1061.342 55.975 1044.382 53.751 
Wald χ₂ 21.03*** 139.31*** 95.71*** 201.37*** 179.11*** 213.45*** 181.17*** 217.30*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -625.841 -570.469 -607.831 -555.866 -593.459 -549.772 -593.430 -549.626 
N=177 
        ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
       I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error 
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Table 3.7 investigates anti-Jewish hate crime in the context of Black defended and 
disorganized neighborhoods and all models are significant (p<.001).  As previously stated, 
results show that higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime occur in Black defended neighborhoods.  
Across the full models, percent Black is no longer a significant predictor of less anti-Jewish hate 
crime while most models show that increases in the white population over time accounts for 
significant increases in such hate crimes The presence of Jewish buildings also persists as a 
significant predictor of increases in anti-Jewish hate crime.  The white in-migration interaction 
term remains significant in models including the Jewish buildings indicator.  Thus, results show 
the persistent effect of Black defended neighborhoods in explaining increases in anti-Jewish hate 
crime.  Furthermore, the baseline social disorganization models demonstrate that concentrated 
disadvantage and residential instability account for decreases in hate crime.  Models 3 to 8 
combine defended neighborhoods and social disorganization predictors.  Across all models, 
concentrated disadvantage and residential instability continue to be associated with reductions in 
anti-Jewish hate crime. 
Table 3.8 examines anti-Jewish hate crime as an outcome of nonwhite defended and 
disorganized neighborhoods.  As shown in the previous chapter, nonwhite neighborhoods 
experiencing an influx of white residents experience more anti-Jewish hate crime, supporting 
defended neighborhoods.  Models 3 to 8 combine defended neighborhoods and social 
disorganization predictors.  The significance and direction of the defended neighborhoods 
predictors, as well as the presence of Jewish buildings indicator, similarly holds across the 
models.   Thus, the results show that defended neighborhoods proves to be a consistent predictor 
of anti-Jewish hate crime in nonwhite neighborhoods.  Further, Jewish visibility similarly 





Table 3.8: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Jewish Hate Crime with Nonwhite Defended & Disorganized Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Nonwhite (%) 0.969*** 0.981*** 0.970*** 0.989* 0.972*** 0.988** 0.967*** 0.984** 
 
0.003 0.003 0.005 0.017 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 
Change in White Population 1.069*** 1.032* 1.071*** 1.041* 1.088*** 1.056*** 1.108*** 1.069*** 
 
0.019 0.015 0.022 0.017 0.023 0.018 0.025 0.019 
Nonwhite*Change White Pop. 1.002* 1.002* 1.002* 1.002** 1.002⁺ 1.002* 1.002* 1.002** 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
  
0.853 0.316⁺ 0.421 0.221** 0.587 0.289⁺ 
   
0.634 0.196 0.290 0.130 0.447 0.187 
Residential Instability 
    
0.932*** 0.961*** 0.929*** 0.959*** 
     
0.013 0.009 0.013 0.009 
Diversity Index 
      
3.680⁺ 2.233⁺ 



















Constant 38.667*** 14.661*** 38.987*** 15.122*** 1347.146*** 118.620*** 901.717*** 99.441*** 
 
8.485 3.031 8.564 3.061 1012.190 65.334 826.985 57.834 
Wald χ₂ 97.99*** 206.72*** 98.25*** 216.30*** 178.53*** 233.14*** 205.78*** 264.17*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -591.561 554.119 -591.538 -552.278 -577.876 -546.177 -574.273 -544.188 
N=177 
        ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
       I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error 
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As previously stated, the baseline social disorganization models show significant negative 
associations between concentrated disadvantage and residential instability and anti-Jewish hate 
crime.  When accounting for the presence of Jewish buildings, there is a significant negative 
association between concentrated disadvantage and anti-Jewish hate crime.  Across all models, 
residential instability continues to be associated with reductions in anti-Jewish hate crime.  As in 
Table 3.6, diversity also explains higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime.  On the whole, all four 
tables show that anti-Jewish hate crime is more prevalent in socially organized communities. 
Anti-White Hate Crime 
Table 3.9: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-White Hate Crime with Black Defended & Disorganized 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Black (%) 1.014** 
 




0.006 0.006 0.006 
Change in White Population 0.969 
 




0.021 0.025 0.025 
Black*Change White Pop. 0.997* 
 




0.001 0.001 0.001 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.344** 0.067*** 0.048*** 0.063*** 
  



















Constant 1.828⁺ 169.432*** 4.106*** 122.969*** 166.187*** 
 
0.637 157.223 1.371 112.892 156.763 
Wald χ₂ 13.03* 26.41*** 30.54*** 44.32*** 47.65*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -310.835 -305.249 -302.191 -295.733 -295.087 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
   
Table 3.9 presents the results examining anti-white hate crime as an outcome of Black 
defended and disorganized neighborhoods.  The models in Table 3.9 are all significant.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Black neighborhoods seeing an influx of white residents 
actually experience less anti-white hate crime, refuting defended neighborhoods in the context of 
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Black neighborhoods.  Across Table 3.9, the full models continue to show how white in-
migration into Black neighborhoods accounts for less anti-white crime.  The full models however 
do continue to show that higher Black population levels are associated with higher levels of anti-
white hate crime.  Model 2 is a baseline model that examines all three social disorganization 
predictors apart from the defended neighborhoods predictors.  There are significant negative 
associations between all three social disorganization predictors and anti-white hate crime. 
Table 3.10: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-White Hate Crime with Nonwhite Defended & 
Disorganized Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Nonwhite (%) 0.997 
 




0.008 0.007 0.008 
Change in White Population 1.005 
 




0.029 0.034 0.035 
Nonwhite*Change White Pop. 0.999 
 




0.001 0.001 0.001 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.344** 0.687 0.351 0.159⁺ 
  



















Constant 2.757** 169.432*** 2.823** 169.105*** 259.628*** 
 
1.091 157.223 1.118 178.260 267.338 
Wald χ₂ 1.510 26.41*** 1.680 24.25*** 30.06*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -315.382 -305.249 -315.328 -306.803 -303.564 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
   
Table 3.10 presents results testing nonwhite defended and disorganized neighborhoods to 
explain anti-white hate crime.  Across all models, the defended neighborhoods predictors using 
percent nonwhite fail to significantly explain anti-white hate crime.  In Models 3 to 5, residential 
instability and diversity are both significantly and negatively associated with such hate crimes. 
Table 3.11 investigates anti-white hate crime in the context of Hispanic defended and 
disorganized neighborhoods.  All models in the table are significant.  As previously stated, 
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defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-white hate crime in the context of Hispanic 
neighborhoods.  The full models in Table 3.11 continue to support the conclusion that Hispanic 
neighborhoods do not react defensively to an influx of white residents into the neighborhood. 
Results show that increases in the Hispanic population and in residential instability continue to 
be associated with decreases in anti-white hate crime.  Results across the three contexts thus 
demonstrate that socially organized communities see higher levels of anti-white hate crime. 
Table 3.11: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-White Hate Crime with Hispanic Defended & 
Disorganized Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Hispanic (%) 0.981*** 
 




0.007 0.006 0.008 
Change in White Population 1.013 
 




0.025 0.028 0.028 
Hispanic*Change White Pop. 1.000 
 




0.002 0.002 0.002 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.344** 1.490 0.600 0.539 
  



















Constant 4.011*** 169.432*** 3.488*** 102.727*** 120.557*** 
 
1.491 157.223 1.349 98.327 126.058 
Wald χ₂ 13.80** 26.41*** 14.04* 31.98*** 32.61*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -309.551 -305.249 -309.239 -303.324 -303.214 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
    
Anti-Racial Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in Nonwhite Defended and Disorganized 
Neighborhoods 
Lastly, the third section examines anti-racial/ethnic hate crime, specifically anti-Black, -
Hispanic, and –Asian hate crime, in nonwhite defended and disorganized neighborhoods.  Tables 
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include the baseline models for defended neighborhoods and social disorganization presented 
previously for comparison purposes. 
Anti-Black Hate Crime 
Table 3.12: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with Asian Defended & Disorganized 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Asian (%) 0.996 
 




0.012 0.010 0.011 
Change in Black Population 1.096⁺ 
 




0.053 0.047 0.046 
Asian*Change Black Pop. 0.995 
 




0.011 0.011 0.011 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.081*** 0.074*** 0.061*** 0.072*** 
  



















Constant 6.156*** 294.758*** 17.226*** 218.582*** 268.850*** 
 
1.616 207.706 4.443 149.662 185.427 
Wald χ₂ 20.27*** 82.64*** 61.78*** 97.77*** 106.96*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -482.491 -456.609 -459.836 -450.629 -449.346 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
    
 Table 3.12 investigates anti-Black hate crime in the context of Asian defended and 
disorganized communities and all models are significant (p<.001).  As stated in the previous 
chapter, there is no support for defended neighborhoods in the baseline model.  Across the rest of 
the full model, this finding persists as Black in-migration into Asian neighborhoods fails to 
account for anti-Black hate crime.  Thus, defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-Black 
hate crime in Asian neighborhoods.  Additionally, full models show that Asian population levels 
are significantly associated with less anti-Black hate crime.  As for social disorganization, results 
for the full models show that both concentrated disadvantage and residential instability continue 
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to be associated with less anti-Black hate crime.  Diversity however loses significance when 
defended neighborhoods predictors considered in the full model in Model 6. 
Table 3.13: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with Hispanic Defended & 
Disorganized Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Hispanic (%) 0.973*** 
 




0.005 0.004 0.005 
Change in Black Population 1.066⁺ 
 




0.036 0.034 0.033 
Hispanic*Change Black Pop. 0.998 
 




0.002 0.002 0.002 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.081*** 0.331** 0.211*** 0.205*** 
  



















Constant 10.865*** 294.758*** 14.033*** 148.778*** 156.766*** 
 
2.813 207.706 3.493 92.921 103.604 
Wald χ₂ 72.78*** 82.64*** 94.77*** 131.14*** 133.13*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -459.973 -456.609 -455.526 -447.323 -447.284 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
     I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
    
 Table 3.13 turns to anti-Black hate crime as an outcome of Hispanic defended and 
disorganized communities.  All models are significant (p<.001).  As previously stated, results 
provide no support for defended neighborhoods in explaining anti-Black hate crime in Hispanic 
neighborhoods.  Table 3.13 shows that Black in-migration into Hispanic neighborhood continues 
to be an insignificant predictor of anti-Black hate crime.  Therefore, defended neighborhoods 
fails to account for anti-Black hate crime in Hispanic neighborhoods.  The full models also 
reveal that Hispanic population levels continue to be associated with less anti-Black hate crime.  
Thus, Hispanic neighborhoods experience lower levels of such crimes.  Table 3.13 also shows 
that concentrated disadvantage and residential instability remain as significant predictors of less 
anti-Black hate crime.  Diversity however loses significance when defended neighborhoods 
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predictors are considered in the full model in Model 6.  Tables 3.12 and 3.13 both show that anti-
Black hate crime is more prevalent in socially organized communities. 
 
Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime 
Table 3.14: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with Asian Defended & 
Disorganized Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Asian (%) 0.979 
 




0.022 0.022 0.024 
Change in Hispanic Population 1.249*** 
 




0.073 0.075 0.072 
Asian*Change Hispanic Pop. 0.984* 
 




0.009 0.009 0.009 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.209** 0.176*** 0.159*** 0.150*** 
  



















Constant 0.820 93.133* 2.149 26.703* 24.47* 
 
0.286 171.128 0.929 37.693 35.170 
Wald χ₂ 21.66*** 13.58** 27.00*** 44.51*** 45.73*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -268.614 -273.034 -263.825 -259.941 -259.806 
N=177; ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
 
Table 3.14 presents results for anti-Hispanic hate crime in the context of Asian defended 
and disorganized communities.  As previously stated, defended neighborhoods fails to explain 
anti-Hispanic hate crime in Asian neighborhoods. In fact, an influx of Hispanic residents into 
Asian neighborhoods is associated with significantly less hate crime.  The full models show this 
finding persists when social disorganization predictors are considered.  Thus, results demonstrate 
that Asian neighborhoods do not respond defensively to Hispanic in-migration.  Hispanic 
population growth over time however continues to explain higher levels of anti-Hispanic hate 
crime.  As for social disorganization, full models evidence the persistent significantly negative 
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relationship between concentrated disadvantage and residential instability and anti-Hispanic hate 
crime.  Socially organized communities thus see higher levels of anti-Hispanic hate crime. 
Table 3.15: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with Black Defended & 
Disorganized Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Black (%) 0.991* 
 




0.007 0.007 0.008 
Change in Hispanic Population 1.297*** 
 




0.079 0.086 0.086 
Black*Change Hispanic Pop. 1.003 
 




0.002 0.002 0.002 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.209** 0.353 0.426 0.478 
  



















Constant 0.925 93.133* 1.249 40.344* 46.742* 
 
0.341 171.128 0.496 59.309 75.158 
Wald χ₂ 24.56*** 13.58** 25.39*** 54.20*** 57.13*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -270.024 -273.034 -269.144 -262.016 -261.876 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
   
 Table 3.15 investigates anti-Hispanic hate crime in the context of Black defended and 
disorganized neighborhoods.  As shown in the previous chapter, defended neighborhoods fails to 
account for anti-Hispanic hate crime in Black neighborhoods.  The full models show that Black 
in-migration into Hispanic neighborhoods persists in failing to explain anti-Hispanic hate crime.  
Thus, results fail to show that Black neighborhoods react defensively with hate crime in response 
to an influx of Hispanic residents.  The full models do demonstrate that Hispanic population 
growth continues to be associated with significant increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime.  
Regarding social disorganization, full models show that concentrated disadvantage is no longer a 
significant predictor of anti-Hispanic hate crime.  Residential instability however continues to 
explain significant reductions in such crimes. 
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Anti-Asian Hate Crime 
Table 3.16: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with Black Defended & Disorganized 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Black (%) 0.979** 
 




0.009 0.009 0.009 
Change in Asian Population 0.896 
 




0.099 0.091 0.120 
Black*Change Asian Pop. 0.989* 
 




0.005 0.004 0.005 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.059*** 0.043*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 
  



















Constant 0.876 24.628*** 2.291* 28.54*** 28.754*** 
 
0.310 20.669 0.807 25.301 24.885 
Wald χ₂ 33.14*** 56.02*** 56.72*** 67.77*** 68.34*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -234.706 -226.277 -225.957 -221.862 -221.858 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
  
 
Table 3.16 examines anti-Asian hate crime as an outcome of Black defended and 
disorganized communities.  As previously stated, the baseline defended neighborhoods model 
fails to explain anti-Asian hate crime as a result of Black defended neighborhoods and that Asian 
in-migration into Black neighborhoods actually results in less anti-Asian hate crime.  When 
social disorganization predictors are considered, this finding persists across the full models.  
Thus, Black neighborhoods do not react defensively to an influx of Asian residents and there is 
less anti-Asian hate crime in these neighborhoods.  The full models also show that Asian 
population growth is a significant predictor of less anti-Asian hate crime.  As for social 
disorganization, the defended and disorganized models evidence the persistent significant 
negative association between concentrated disadvantage and residential instability and anti-Asian 
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hate crime.  Thus, anti-Asian hate crime proves more prevalent in socially organized 
communities. 
Table 3.17: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with Hispanic Defended & 
Disorganized Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Hispanic (%) .978*** 
 




0.008 0.008 0.009 
Change in Asian Population 1.185⁺ 
 




0.117 0.113 0.136 
Hispanic*Change Asian Pop. 1.004 
 




0.005 0.005 0.006 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
.059*** .219* .129** .118*** 
  



















Constant 0.865 24.628*** 1.372 13.144** 15.318*** 
 
0.261 20.669 0.443 11.167 12.659 
Wald χ₂ 30.15*** 56.02*** 40.02*** 47.33*** 50.71*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -231.005 -226.277 -227.646 -224.462 -224.306 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
   
Table 3.17 presents results for models testing anti-Asian hate crime as an outcome of 
Hispanic defended and disorganized communities.  As shown in the previous chapter, defended 
neighborhoods do not account for anti-Asian hate crime in Hispanic neighborhoods.  Accounting 
for social disorganization, the full models show that Asian in-migration into Hispanic 
neighborhoods persistently fails to explain anti-Asian hate crime.  Therefore, results fail to 
uncover a defended neighborhoods response in Hispanic neighborhoods when there is an influx 
of Asian residents.  The results also show that concentrated disadvantage and residential 
instability continue to be significantly associated with lower levels of anti-Asian hate crime.  




This chapter aimed to investigate the impact of defended and disorganized neighborhoods 
on hate crime.  The first section examined anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime in the context of 
defended and disorganized communities in white neighborhoods.  The results show that 
defended neighborhoods remains a consistent predictor of anti-Black, -Hispanic, and -nonwhite 
hate crime when social disorganization indicators are considered, though this finding is strongest 
when explaining anti-Black hate crime.  The findings also consistently reveal that anti-Black, -
Hispanic, -Asian, and –nonwhite hate crime is more likely to occur in socially organized, rather 
than disorganized, communities.  Hate crimes against Black and Hispanic persons take place in 
more residentially stable neighborhoods while those against Asian and nonwhite persons 
generally manifest in stable and advantaged neighborhoods.   
The second section scrutinized anti-Jewish and -white hate crime in a variety of defended 
and disorganized contexts.  The results show that defended neighborhoods proves consistently 
able to predict higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime in white, Black, and nonwhite 
neighborhoods.  This finding is strongest in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of 
nonwhite residents and nonwhite neighborhoods undergoing white in-migration.  White 
population growth over time is also associated with increases in anti-Jewish hate crime.  Jewish 
visibility remains a consistent predictor of significantly greater levels of anti-Jewish hate crime.  
The effect of defended neighborhoods persists even when accounting for the impact of social 
disorganization.  On the whole, anti-Jewish hate crime occurs in socially organized communities 
that are generally more advantaged and more stable.  Diversity however does result in higher 
levels of anti-Jewish hate crime when examining white and nonwhite neighborhoods.   
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As for anti-white hate crime, defended neighborhoods consistently fails to explain such 
hate crimes in the context of Black, nonwhite, and Hispanic neighborhoods.  The result reveal 
that white in-migration into Black neighborhoods actually results in less anti-white hate crime.  
While white neighborhoods react defensively to an influx of minorities, nonwhite neighborhoods 
do not share this defensive reaction when experiencing white in-migration.  Anti-white hate 
crimes also prove more prevalent in socially organized communities, particularly those that are 
residentially stable. 
Finally, the third section examined anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime in the context of 
Asian, Hispanic, and Black defended and disorganized communities.  As the results demonstrate, 
defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime when such 
neighborhoods experience an influx of another racial/ethnic minority even when considering 
social disorganization predictors.  The results conform to the trend of hate crime occurring in 











CHAPTER SEVEN: DEFENDED AND STRAINED NEIGHBORHOODS RESULTS 
This chapter aims to test hypotheses stemming from defended neighborhoods and strain 
or economic threat models.  This chapter investigates whether defended neighborhoods findings 
persist when considering indicators of strain or economic threat.  Further, the chapter presents 
results testing Hypotheses 7 and 8, which assert that neighborhoods experiencing poor or 
worsening economic conditions will experience increases in hate crime.  The following section 
presents results by bias type, including baseline and full models for each bias type.  
Anti-Racial/Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in White Defended and Strained Neighborhoods 
The first section examines anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime, specifically anti-Black, 
-Hispanic, -Asian, and –nonwhite hate crime, in the context of white defended and strained 
neighborhoods.22  The tables also include the baseline defended neighborhoods models per bias 
type for comparison purposes. 
Anti-Black Hate Crime 
Table 4.1 presents results testing anti-Black hate crime as an outcome of white defended 
and strained neighborhoods.  All models in Table 3.1 are significant (p<.001).  As established in 
the previous chapters, results show anti-Black hate crime occurs in white defended 
neighborhoods.  In Table 4.1, the full models show the persistent significant effect of Black in-
migration into white neighborhoods on anti-Black hate crime.  Thus, the results provide further 
support to defended neighborhoods, demonstrating that white neighborhoods react defensively to 
an influx of Black residents.  Anti-Black hate crime also occurs in neighborhoods with higher 
white population levels.  Combined with defended neighborhoods predictors, the last four 
models (Models 2 to 5) also examine the impact of poor economic conditions on anti-Black hate 
crime.  While unemployment is not significant in Model 2, Model 3 shows that increases in 
                                                 
22 Full models examining anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime are further discussed in the Terrorist Threat section. 
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unemployment are associated with less anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. =.939, p<.05).  In the last 
two models, poverty proves negatively associated with anti-Black hate crime with Model 5 
evidencing a 2% reduction in anti-Black hate crime.  Model 5 also shows that increasing poverty 
over time is associated with increases in anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. =1.088, p<.1).  With the 
exception of worsening poverty over time, neighborhoods marked by poorer economic 
conditions actually experience less anti-Black hate crime. 
Table 4.1: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with White Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 1.018*** 1.0125* 1.009⁺ 1.009* 1.011** 
 
0.003 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
Change in Black Population 1.041 1.033 1.038 1.019 1.005 
 
0.028 0.026 0.027 0.024 0.025 
White*Change Black Pop. 1.002* 1.003** 1.003** 1.003** 1.003** 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 










   
0.055 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
0.971** 0.977* 
    
0.009 0.009 
Change in Poverty 
    
1.088⁺ 
     
0.055 
Constant 2.142** 4.762* 6.789** 6.335*** 5.272*** 
 
0.568 3.051 4.619 2.979 2.468 
Wald χ₂ 72.890*** 85.59*** 91.12*** 102.02*** 115.22*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -458.668 -457.398 -456.555 -453.473 -451.921 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
    
Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime 
Table 4.2 shows anti-Hispanic hate crime as an outcome in white defended and strained 
neighborhoods.  All models in Table 3.2 are significant (p<.001).  The previous chapters 
revealed support for defended neighborhoods in explaining anti-Hispanic hate crime in white 
neighborhoods.  In Table 4.2, the full models show the persistent significant effect of Hispanic 
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in-migration into white neighborhoods on anti-Hispanic hate crime.  Thus, the results evidence a 
defended neighborhoods response in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of Hispanic 
residents.  Anti-Hispanic hate crime also occurs in neighborhoods with higher white population 
levels as well as neighborhoods experiencing Hispanic population growth.  Testing defended and 
strained neighborhoods, the last four models (Models 2 to 5) examine the impact of poor 
economic conditions on anti-Hispanic hate crime.  The impact of unemployment and worsening 
unemployment over time fail to significantly explain anti-Hispanic hate crime.  Model 9 
demonstrates a positive association between poverty and anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. 
=1.031, p<.1).  The results evidence that worsening economic conditions weakly explains 
increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime. 
Table 4.2: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with White Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 1.011*** 1.019** 1.016* 1.018** 1.019** 
 
0.003 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Change in Hispanic Population 1.213** 1.215** 1.229*** 1.229*** 1.208*** 
 
0.076 0.075 0.079 0.071 0.070 
White*Change Hispanic Pop. 1.005* 1.005* 1.005* 1.005* 1.005* 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 










   
0.09 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
1.022 1.031⁺ 
    
0.017 0.019 
Change in Poverty 
    
1.119 
     
0.093 
Constant 0.605 0.213⁺ 0.307 0.238⁺ 0.203* 
 
0.220 0.172 0.269 0.189 0.165 
Wald χ₂ 29.19*** 29.85*** 32.42*** 31.43*** 32.40*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -235.274 -264.602 -264.159 -264.372 -263.567 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
     I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
    
Anti-Asian Hate Crime 
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Table 4.3: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with White Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 1.015*** 1.004 1.000 1.022* 1.012* 
 
0.003 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005 
Change in Asian Population 1.071 0.997 0.977 1.048 1.054 
 
0.096 0.105 0.105 0.095 0.101 
White*Change Asian Pop. 1.002 1.004 1.005 1.002 1.002 
 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 










   
0.104 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
0.986 0.989 
    
0.015 0.016 
Change in Poverty 
    
1.045 
     
0.0918 
Constant 0.251*** 1.421 2.499 0.422 0.387 
 
0.088 1.332 2.739 0.263 0.238 
Wald χ₂ 37.97*** 35.33*** 35.27*** 36.57*** 37.00*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -232.251 -229.932 -228.811 -231.745 -231.563 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
     I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
    
Table 4.3 investigates the impact of white defended and disorganized neighborhoods on 
anti-Asian hate crime.  All models in Table 4.3 are significant (p<.001).  As demonstrated in the 
previous chapters, defended neighborhoods fails to account for anti-Asian hate crime.  The rest 
of the models in Table 4.3 consistently show that defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-
Asian hate crime.  Thus, white neighborhoods do not react defensively to an influx of Asian 
residents.  Examining defended and strained neighborhoods, the last four models (Models 2 to 5) 
examine the impact of poor economic conditions on anti-Asian hate crime.  The first two models 
show the significant negative association between unemployment and anti-Asian hate crime.  
Model 3 demonstrates that increases in unemployment are associated with a 12% decrease in 
anti-Asian hate crime.  Thus, neighborhoods experiencing poorer economic conditions actually 
experience less anti-Asian hate crime. 
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Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime 
Table 4.4: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime with White Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 1.015*** 1.011*** 1.008** 1.011*** 1.012*** 
 
0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
Change in Nonwhite Population 1.042*** 1.034** 1.040*** 1.029** 1.011 
 
0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.014 
White*Change Nonwhite Pop. 1.001⁺ 1.001* 1.001⁺ 1.001* 1.001* 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 










   
0.038 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
0.986* 0.989⁺ 
    
0.006 0.006 
Change in Poverty 
    
1.079* 
     
0.041 
Constant 5.149*** 9.326*** 12.439*** 8.705*** 8.376*** 
 
0.798 3.603 4.985 2.395 2.279 
Wald χ₂ 151.53*** 156.84*** 160.39*** 160.77*** 166.14*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -583.501 -582.069 -579.316 -581.153 -579.044 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
    
Table 4.4 examines anti-nonwhite hate crime in the context of white defended and 
disorganized hate crime.  All models in Table 4.4 are significant (p<.001).  As established in the 
previous chapters, evidence demonstrates that anti-nonwhite hate crime occurs in white defended 
neighborhoods.  In Table 4.4, the full models show the persistent significant effect of nonwhite 
in-migration into white neighborhoods on anti-nonwhite hate crime.  Thus, the results evidence a 
defended neighborhoods response in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of nonwhite 
residents.  Anti-nonwhite hate crime also occurs in neighborhoods with higher white population 
levels as well as those neighborhoods experiencing nonwhite population growth.  Investigating 
defended and strained neighborhoods, the last four models (Models 2 to 5) examine the impact of 
poor economic conditions on anti-nonwhite hate crime.  The first two models show the 
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significant negative association between unemployment and anti-nonwhite hate crime.  In Model 
3, unemployment and worsening unemployment are associated with a 5% and a 10% reduction 
in anti-nonwhite hate crime respectively.  In the last two models, poverty proves negatively 
associated with anti-nonwhite hate crime.  Model 9 shows that increasing poverty over time is 
associated with an 8% increase in such crimes.  With the exception of worsening poverty over 
time, neighborhoods marked by poorer economic conditions actually experience less anti-
nonwhite hate crime. 
Anti-Jewish and Anti-White Hate Crime in Defended and Strained Neighborhoods 
The second section first examines anti-Jewish hate crime in the context of defended and 
strained neighborhoods, specifically white, Black, and nonwhite neighborhoods.  Models further 
test the effect of Jewish visibility via the presence of Jewish buildings on anti-Jewish hate crime.  
The section then presents analyses investigating anti-white hate crime as an outcome of defended 
and strained neighborhoods in Black, nonwhite, and Hispanic neighborhoods. 
Anti-Jewish Hate Crime 
Table 4.5 investigates white defended and strained neighborhoods and all models are 
significant (p<.001).  As discussed in the previous chapter, white defended neighborhoods 
explains increases in anti-Jewish hate crime.  Across the full models, percent white, the 
interaction term, and the presence of Jewish buildings persist in accounting for increases in anti-
Jewish hate crime.  Thus, defended neighborhoods is a consistent predictor of higher levels of 
anti-Jewish hate crime in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of nonwhite residents.  
Increases in nonwhite populations over time also continue to explain reductions in such crimes.  
The presence of Jewish buildings further accounts for significant increases in anti-Jewish hate 





Table 4.5: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Jewish Hate Crime with White Defended & Strained Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 1.023*** 1.013*** 1.025*** 1.013** 1.029*** 1.017*** 1.033*** 1.019*** 
 
0.006 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Change in Nonwhite Population 0.921*** 0.959** 0.917*** 0.961* 0.927*** 0.962* 0.892*** 0.944*** 
 
0.019 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.021 0.016 0.023 0.017 
White*Change Nonwhite Population 1.003** 1.002** 1.003** 1.002** 1.002* 1.002* 1.003** 1.002** 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Unemployment Rate (%) 0.923* 0.949⁺ 0.933⁺ 0.946* 
    
 
0.035 0.026 0.034 0.026 
    Change in Unemployment Rate 
  
1.064 0.976 
    
   
0.072 0.053 
    Poverty Rate (%) 
    
0.989 0.991 1.000 0.995 
     
0.012 0.008 0.009 0.008 
Change in Poverty Rate 
      
1.225*** 1.084 















Constant 6.429* 5.314*** 5.038* 5.777*** 2.426⁺ 3.045** 1.912 2.794** 
 
4.733 2.719 3.471 3.034 1.297 1.117 0.857 1.004 
Wald χ₂ 134.88*** 225.61*** 133.21*** 225.35*** 110.73*** 216.07*** 151.89*** 215.13*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -587.913 -551.817 -587.461 -551.712 -590.839 -553.378 -582.866 -551.805 
N=177 
        ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
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Combining defended and strained neighborhoods, Table 4.5 also shows results 
demonstrating the impact of poor economic conditions on anti-Jewish hate crime.  Models 1 to 4 
show that unemployment is associated with a reduction in anti-Jewish hate crime.  Model 7 
shows that worsening poverty over time accounts for a 23% increase in anti-Jewish hate crime; 
however, its significance disappears when Model 8 accounts for the presence of Jewish 
buildings.  Thus, the results demonstrate weak support for strained neighborhoods, impacted by 
worsening poverty, experiencing higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime. 
Table 4.6 examines anti-Jewish hate crime in the context of Black defended and strained 
neighborhoods and all models are significant (p<.001).  As previously stated, results show that 
higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime occur in Black defended neighborhoods.  Across the full 
models, percent Black is generally a significant predictor of less anti-Jewish hate crime while 
most models show that increases in the white population over time accounts for significant 
increases in such hate crimes The presence of Jewish buildings also persists as a significant 
predictor of increases in anti-Jewish hate crime.  The white in-migration interaction term remains 
significant in models including the Jewish buildings indicator.  Therefore, the results generally 
support defended neighborhoods even when considering economic threat predictors.  Black 
neighborhoods react defensively to an influx of white residents by targeting Jewish victims.  
Combining defended and strained neighborhoods, Table 4.6 also shows the impact of poor 
economic conditions on anti-Jewish hate crime.  The first four models show that unemployment 
is associated with a reduction in such hate crime.  Model 7 shows that worsening poverty over 
time accounts for a 17% increase in anti-Jewish hate crime; however, its significance disappears 
when Model 8 accounts for the presence of Jewish buildings.  With the exception of worsening 





Table 4.6: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Jewish Hate Crime with Black Defended & Strained Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Black (%) 0.993 0.993* 0.995 0.995 0.985** 0.989*** 0.983*** 0.989*** 
 
0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 
Change in White Population 1.055** 1.024⁺ 1.049* 1.018 1.068** 1.031* 1.095** 1.037⁺ 
 
0.022 0.014 0.022 0.013 0.024 0.015 0.032 0.019 
Black*Change White Population 1.002* 1.002*** 1.002⁺ 1.002** 1.002 1.002*** 1.001 1.002** 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Unemployment Rate (%) 0.848*** 0.914*** 0.841*** 0.907*** 
    
 
0.018 0.017 0.018 0.016 
    Change in Unemployment Rate 
  
0.907 0.911 
    
   
0.060 0.053 
    Poverty Rate (%) 
    
0.955*** 0.972*** 0.960*** 0.973*** 
     
0.009 0.006 0.008 0.006 
Change in Poverty Rate 
      
1.172* 1.029 



















Constant 53.582*** 16.368*** 57.925*** 17.401*** 28.185*** 12.138*** 31.214*** 12.485*** 
 
16.179 4.248 17.427 4.571 8.317 2.777 10.175 2.965 
Wald χ₂ 117.07*** 197.88*** 142.35*** 206.95*** 73.76*** 179.13*** 85.80*** 180.51*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -602.203 -557.787 -601.194 -556.27 -612.669 -560.813 -608.681 -560.626 
N=177 
        ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
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Table 4.7 examines anti-Jewish hate crime as an outcome of nonwhite defended and 
strained neighborhoods.  As shown in the previous chapters, nonwhite neighborhoods 
experiencing an influx of white residents experience more anti-Jewish hate crime, supporting 
defended neighborhoods.  Across the full models, nonwhite population level significantly 
predicts less anti-Jewish hate crime while models show that white population growth over time 
accounts for significant increases in such hate crimes. The significance and direction of the white 
in-migration predictor, as well as the presence of Jewish buildings indicator, similarly holds 
across the models.   Therefore, the results generally support defended neighborhoods even when 
considering economic threat predictors.  Nonwhite neighborhoods react defensively to an influx 
of white residents by targeting Jewish victims.  Thus, the results show that defended 
neighborhoods proves to be a consistent predictor of anti-Jewish hate crime in nonwhite 
neighborhoods.  Further, Jewish visibility similarly persists in account for higher levels of anti-
Jewish hate crime.  Examining defended and strained neighborhoods, results also demonstrate 
the impact of poor economic conditions on anti-Jewish hate crime.  The first four models show 
that unemployment is associated with a reduction in anti-Jewish hate crime.  Model 7 shows that 
worsening poverty over time accounts for a 22.5% increase in anti-Jewish hate crime; however, 
this predictor’s significance disappears when Model 8 accounts for the presence of Jewish 
buildings.  Despite the weak support for worsening poverty being associated with anti-Jewish 
hate crime, the evidence more strongly refutes the hypothesis that neighborhoods with poorer 






Table 4.7: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Jewish Hate Crime with Nonwhite Defended & Strained Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Nonwhite (%) 0.978*** 0.987*** 0.976*** 0.987** 0.971*** 0.983*** 0.968*** 0.982*** 
 
0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Change in White Population 1.086*** 1.043** 1.090*** 1.04* 1.079*** 1.039* 1.121*** 1.059*** 
 
0.023 0.016 0.023 0.016 0.024 0.017 0.029 0.019 
Nonwhite*Change White Population 1.003** 1.002** 1.003** 1.002** 1.002* 1.002* 1.003** 1.002** 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Unemployment Rate (%) 0.923* 0.949⁺ 0.933⁺ 0.946* 
    
 
0.035 0.026 0.034 0.026 
    Change in Unemployment Rate 
  
1.064 0.976 
    
   
0.072 0.053 
    Poverty Rate (%) 
    
0.989 0.991 1.000 0.995 
     
0.012 0.008 0.009 0.008 
Change in Poverty Rate 
      
1.225*** 1.084 



















Constant 61.900*** 20.244*** 59.616*** 20.358*** 44.139*** 16.298*** 49.515*** 18.067*** 
 
20.236 5.369 18.714 5.435 11.980 3.683 14.652 4.202 
Wald χ₂ 134.88*** 225.61*** 133.21*** 225.35*** 110.73*** 216.07*** 151.89*** 215.13*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -587.913 -551.817 -587.461 -551.712 -590.839 -553.378 -582.866 -551.805 
N=177 
        ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
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Anti-White Hate Crime23 
Table 4.8: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-White Hate Crime with Black Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Black (%) 1.014** 1.023*** 1.023*** 1.019*** 1.019*** 
 
0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 
Change in White Population 0.969 0.99 0.991 0.996 0.989 
 
0.020 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.026 
Black*Change White Pop. 0.997* 0.997* 0.997* 0.997* 0.997* 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 










   
0.085 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
0.974** 0.973** 
    
0.009 0.010 
Change in Poverty Rate 
    
0.966 
     
0.078 
Constant 1.828⁺ 4.997*** 4.976*** 3.626** 3.559** 
 
0.637 2.088 2.084 1.512 1.458 
Wald χ₂ 13.03* 24.27*** 24.34*** 19.42** 19.96** 
Log pseudolikelihood -310.835 -305.674 -305.671 -307.539 -307.449 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
    
Table 4.8 presents the results examining anti-white hate crime as an outcome of Black 
defended and disorganized neighborhoods.  The models in Table 4.8 are all significant.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Black neighborhoods seeing an influx of white residents 
actually experience less anti-white hate crime, refuting defended neighborhoods in the context of 
Black neighborhoods.  Across Table 4.8, the full models continue to show how white in-
migration into Black neighborhoods accounts for less anti-white crime.  The full models however 
do continue to show that higher Black population levels are associated with higher levels of anti-
                                                 
23 The first model across the three tables includes the baseline defended neighborhoods model for comparison 
purposes. 
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white hate crime.  Combing defended and strained neighborhoods, Models 2 to 5 examine the 
impact of poor economic conditions on anti-white hate crime.  The first two models show that 
unemployment is associated with a 9% reduction in anti-white hate crime.  The last two models 
evidence a significant negative association between poverty and anti-white hate crime.  Thus, 
anti-white hate crime proves more prevalent in neighborhoods experiencing better economic 
conditions. 
Table 4.9: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-White Hate Crime with Nonwhite Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Nonwhite(%) 0.997 1.002 0.998 1.001 1.000 
 
0.004 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 
Change in White Population 1.005 1.015 1.029 1.019 1.028 
 
0.028 0.029 0.032 0.031 0.039 
Nonwhite*Change White Pop. 0.999 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.000 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 










   
0.096 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
0.984 0.986 
    
0.014 0.015 
Change in Poverty Rate 
    
1.036 
     
0.086 
Constant 2.757** 3.642** 3.489** 3.510** 3.592** 
 
1.091 1.709 1.623 1.522 1.588 
Wald χ₂ 1.510 2.570 5.71 2.89 2.910 
Log pseudolikelihood -315.382 -314.969 -313.764 -314.777 -314.693 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
    
Table 4.9 presents results testing nonwhite defended and strained neighborhoods to 
explain anti-white hate crime.  Across all models, the defended neighborhoods predictors using 




Table 4.10: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-White Hate Crime with Hispanic Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Hispanic (%) 0.981*** 0.978** 0.976*** 0.975** 0.975** 
 
0.005 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 
Change in White Population 1.013 1.001 1.011 0.990 1.000 
 
0.023 0.025 0.027 0.027 0.035 
Hispanic*Change White Pop. 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.999 1.000 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 










   
0.093 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
1.017 1.018 
    
0.015 0.015 
Change in Poverty Rate 
    
1.037 
     
0.086 
Constant 4.011*** 2.937* 2.877* 2.783* 2.895* 
 
1.491 1.344 1.302 1.201 1.278 
Wald χ₂ 13.80** 14.22* 17.26** 14.91* 15.26* 
Log pseudolikelihood -309.551 -309.023 -307.556 -308.681 -308.586 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
    
Table 4.10 investigates anti-white hate crime in the context of Hispanic defended and 
strained neighborhoods.  All models in the table are significant.  As previously stated, defended 
neighborhoods fails to explain anti-white hate crime in the context of Hispanic neighborhoods.  
The full models in Table 4.10 continue to support the conclusion that Hispanic neighborhoods do 
not react defensively to an influx of white residents into the neighborhood. Results show that 
increases in the Hispanic population continue to be associated with decreases in anti-white hate 
crime.  In the combined Hispanic defended and strained neighborhoods models, economic threat 
variables largely fail to significantly explain anti-white hate crime.  Model 3 however shows that 
worsening unemployment over time is associated with a 17% increase in anti-white hate crime 
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(p<.1).  Thus, there is weak evidence demonstrating that anti-white hate crime occurs in 
neighborhoods undergoing worsening economic conditions. 
Anti-Racial Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in Nonwhite Defended and Strained 
Neighborhoods 
Lastly, the third section examines anti-racial/ethnic hate crime, specifically anti-Black, -
Hispanic, and –Asian hate crime, in nonwhite defended and strained neighborhoods.  Tables 
include the baseline models for defended neighborhoods and strain presented previously for 
comparison purposes. 
Anti-Black Hate Crime 
Table 4.11: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with Asian Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Asian (%) 0.996 0.970** 0.968** 0.978⁺ 0.978⁺ 
 
0.009 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 
Change in Black Population 1.096⁺ 1.052 1.057 1.049 1.049 
 
0.061 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.054 
Asian*Change Black Pop. 0.995 1.002 1.002 1.003 1.004 
 
0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012 










   
0.047 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
0.952*** 0.954 
    
0.007 0.007 
Change in Poverty 
    
1.036 
     
0.051 
Constant 6.156*** 25.878*** 29.311*** 18.799*** 18.357*** 
 
1.616 8.114 9.029 5.486 5.500 
Wald χ₂ 20.27*** 54.96*** 75.91*** 63.96*** 64.02*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -482.491 -461.865 -457.949 -458.547 -458.282 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
   
Table 4.11 investigates anti-Black hate crime in the context of Asian defended and 
strained communities and all models are significant (p<.001).  As stated in the previous chapters, 
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there is no support for defended neighborhoods in the baseline model.  Across the rest of the full 
model, this finding persists as Black in-migration into Asian neighborhoods fails to account for 
anti-Black hate crime.  Thus, defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-Black hate crime in 
Asian neighborhoods.  Additionally, full models show that Asian population levels are 
significantly associated with less anti-Black hate crime.  Models 2 to 5 present results for the 
combined defended and strained neighborhoods models.  The first two models show that 
unemployment and worsening unemployment over time are negatively associated with anti-
Black hate crime.  Model 4 shows a significant negative relationship between poverty and such 
crimes; however, that finding loses significance when worsening poverty over time is added to 
Model 5.   
Table 4.12: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with Hispanic Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Hispanic (%) 0.973*** 0.979*** 0.981*** 0.983** 0.983** 
 
0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 
Change in Black Population 1.066⁺ 1.035 1.039 1.023 1.008 
 
0.037 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.036 
Hispanic*Change Black Pop. 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.997 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 










   
0.048 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
0.974** 0.978* 
    
0.009 0.009 
Change in Poverty 
    
1.062 
     
0.051 
Constant 10.865*** 16.021*** 17.662*** 15.223*** 14.537*** 
 
2.813 4.593 5.120 4.062 4.045 
Wald χ₂ 72.78*** 85.67*** 91.07*** 89.68*** 91.43*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -459.973 -457.370 -454.732 -455.695 -454.939 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
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Table 4.12 turns to anti-Black hate crime as an outcome of Hispanic defended and 
strained communities.  All models are significant (p<.001).  As previously stated, results provide 
no support for defended neighborhoods in explaining anti-Black hate crime in Hispanic 
neighborhoods.  Table 4.12 shows that Black in-migration into Hispanic neighborhood continues 
to be an insignificant predictor of anti-Black hate crime.  Therefore, defended neighborhoods 
fails to account for anti-Black hate crime in Hispanic neighborhoods.  The full models also 
reveal that Hispanic population levels continue to be associated with less anti-Black hate crime.  
Thus, Hispanic neighborhoods experience lower levels of such crimes.  When economic threat 
variables are added to the models (Models 2 to 5), results show that poor and worsening 
economic conditions lead to lower levels of anti-Black hate crime.  In Models 2 and 3, results 
show that higher unemployment and worsening unemployment over time account for reductions 
in such crimes.  The last two models evidence a significant negative association between poverty 
and anti-Black hate crime. Thus, the results in Tables 4.11 and 4.12 both show that anti-Black 
hate crime occurs in neighborhoods with better economic conditions. 
Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime 
Table 4.13 presents results for anti-Hispanic hate crime in the context of Asian defended 
and strained communities.  As previously stated, defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-
Hispanic hate crime in Asian neighborhoods. In fact, an influx of Hispanic residents into Asian 
neighborhoods is associated with significantly less hate crime.  The full models show this finding 
persists when economic threat predictors are considered.  Thus, results demonstrate that Asian 
neighborhoods do not respond defensively to Hispanic in-migration.  Hispanic population growth 
over time however continues to explain higher levels of anti-Hispanic hate crime.  Models 2 to 5 
present results for the combined defended and strained neighborhoods models.  The first two 
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models show that unemployment and worsening unemployment over time are negatively 
associated with anti-Hispanic hate crime.  Model 4 shows a significant negative relationship 
between poverty and such crimes; however, that finding loses significance when worsening 
poverty over time is added to Model 5.  Model 5 also shows that worsening poverty over time is 
associated with a 16% increase in anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. =1.158, p<.1).   
Table 4.13: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with Asian Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Asian (%) 0.979 0.962⁺ 0.957⁺ 0.967⁺ 0.964⁺ 
 
0.016 0.020 0.021 0.019 0.019 
Change in Hispanic Population 1.249*** 1.221*** 1.246*** 1.204** 1.170** 
 
0.073 0.072 0.074 0.071 0.071 
Asian*Change Hispanic Pop. 0.984* 0.982* 0.981* 0.981* 0.979* 
 
0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 










   
0.071 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
0.973** 0.981 
    
0.010 0.011 
Change in Poverty 
    
1.158⁺ 
      Constant 0.820 2.611* 3.124* 2.050 1.930 
 
0.286 1.278 1.524 0.928 0.902 
Wald χ₂ 21.66*** 25.56*** 32.50*** 20.66*** 23.06*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -268.614 -264.584 -261.438 -264.929 -263.492 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
     I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
    
Table 4.14 investigates anti-Hispanic hate crime in the context of Black defended and 
disorganized neighborhoods.  As shown in the previous chapters, defended neighborhoods fails 
to account for anti-Hispanic hate crime in Black neighborhoods.  The full models show that 
Black in-migration into Hispanic neighborhoods persists in failing to explain anti-Hispanic hate 
crime.  Thus, there is some evidence that Black neighborhoods do react defensively with hate 
crime in response to an influx of Hispanic residents; however this is the weakest of the findings 
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supporting defended neighborhoods as all findings are only significant at the 0.1 level.  The full 
models do demonstrate that Hispanic population growth continues to be associated with 
significant increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime.  When economic threat variables are added to 
the models (Models 2 to 5), poor and worsening economic conditions are shown to lead to lower 
levels of anti-Hispanic hate crime.  Model 6 shows that higher unemployment and worsening 
unemployment over time account for reductions in such crimes.  Model 8 also shows that 
worsening poverty over time is associated with an 18% increase in anti-Hispanic hate crime 
(I.R.R. =1.184, p<.1).  Despite weak evidence demonstrating that neighborhoods experiencing 
worsening poverty see increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime, Tables 4.13 and 4.14 both show 
that such hate crimes generally occur in neighborhoods with better economic conditions.  
Table 4.14: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with Black Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Black (%) 0.991* 0.997 1.001 0.995 0.994 
 
0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 
Change in Hispanic Population 1.297*** 1.298*** 1.330*** 1.290*** 1.271*** 
 
0.078 0.077 0.083 0.076 0.075 
Black*Change in Hispanic Pop. 1.003 1.003 1.004⁺ 1.004⁺ 1.005⁺ 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 










   
0.083 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
0.982 0.992 
    
0.012 0.014 
Change in Poverty 
    
1.184⁺ 
     
0.112 
Constant 0.925 1.518 1.817 1.389 1.252 
 
0.341 0.677 0.787 0.579 0.549 
Wald χ₂ 24.56*** 25.76*** 26.65*** 25.53*** 28.11*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -270.024 -269.003 -267.027 -268.865 -2667.295 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 




Anti-Asian Hate Crime 
Table 4.15: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with Black Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Black (%) 0.979** 0.986 0.988 0.981* 0.981* 
 
0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 
Change in Asian Population 0.896 0.811⁺ 0.785⁺ .817⁺ 0.818⁺ 
 
0.115 0.099 0.099 0.098 0.099 
Black*Change Asian Pop. 0.989* 0.986** 0.985** 0.986** 0.986** 
 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 










   
0.080 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
.969** .969** 
    
0.011 0.011 
Change in Poverty 
    
1.005 
     
0.082 
Constant 0.876 3.235** 4.045*** 1.946⁺ 1.932⁺ 
 
0.310 1.338 1.696 0.752 0.746 
Wald χ₂ 33.14*** 46.63*** 49.57*** 35.38*** 38.72*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -234.706 -227.894 -226.038 -229.992 -229.989 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
  
 
Table 4.15 examines anti-Asian hate crime as an outcome of Black defended and strained 
communities.  As previously stated, the baseline defended neighborhoods model fails to explain 
anti-Asian hate crime as a result of Black defended neighborhoods and that Asian in-migration 
into Black neighborhoods actually results in less anti-Asian hate crime.  When social 
disorganization predictors are considered, this finding persists across the full models.  Thus, 
Black neighborhoods do not react defensively to an influx of Asian residents and there is less 
anti-Asian hate crime in these neighborhoods.  The full models also show that Asian population 
growth is a significant predictor of less anti-Asian hate crime (p<.1).  Models 2 to 5 present 
results for the combined defended and strained neighborhoods models.  The first two models 
show that unemployment and worsening unemployment over time are negatively associated with 
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anti-Asian hate crime.  The last two models reveals that increases in poverty levels are 
significantly associated with a 3% reduction in anti-Asian hate crime (I.R.R. =0.969, p<.01). 
Table 4.16: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with Hispanic Defended & Strained 
Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Hispanic (%) .978*** .985⁺ .985⁺ .981* .980* 
 
0.006 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 
Change in Asian Population 1.185⁺ 1.121 1.103 1.164 1.164 
 
0.113 0.119 0.119 0.111 0.110 
Hispanic*Change Asian Pop. 1.004 1.003 1.002 1.004 1.004 
 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 










   
0.087 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
   
0.991 0.995 
    
0.014 0.014 
Change in Poverty 
    
1.058 
     
0.089 
Constant 0.865 1.605 1.794 1.008 0.959 
 
0.261 0.687 0.793 0.375 0.356 
Wald χ₂ 30.15*** 39.12*** 37.26*** 31.13*** 33.13*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -231.005 -229.127 -228.179 -230.746 -230.434 
N=177 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
    I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors 
   
Table 4.16 presents results for models testing anti-Asian hate crime as an outcome of 
Hispanic defended and strained communities.  As shown in the previous chapters, defended 
neighborhoods does not account for anti-Asian hate crime in Hispanic neighborhoods.  
Accounting for social disorganization, the full models show that Asian in-migration into 
Hispanic neighborhoods persistently fails to explain anti-Asian hate crime.  Therefore, results 
fail to uncover a defended neighborhoods response in Hispanic neighborhoods when there is an 
influx of Asian residents.  When economic threat variables are added (Models 2 to 5), Model 3 
shows the only significant finding demonstrating that higher unemployment is associated with 
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less anti-Asian hate crime (p<.1).  Both Tables 4.15 and 4.16 generally show that neighborhoods 
experiencing better economic conditions witness higher levels of anti-Asian hate crime. 
Summary 
This chapter aimed to test hate crime as an outcome of defended and strained 
neighborhoods models.  The first section examines anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime in the 
context of white defended and strained neighborhoods.  The results show that defended 
neighborhoods remains a consistent predictor of anti-Black, -Hispanic, and -nonwhite hate crime 
when economic threat indicators are considered.  The findings also consistently reveal that anti-
Black, -Asian, and –nonwhite hate crime is generally more likely to occur in neighborhoods with 
better economic conditions.   
The second section investigates anti-Jewish and –white hate crime in the context of a 
variety of defended and strained contexts.  The results show that defended neighborhoods proves 
consistently predict higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime in white, Black, and nonwhite 
neighborhoods.  This finding is strongest in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of 
nonwhite residents and nonwhite neighborhoods undergoing white in-migration.  White 
population growth over time is also associated with increases in anti-Jewish hate crime.  Jewish 
visibility remains a consistent predictor of significantly greater levels of anti-Jewish hate crime.  
The effect of defended neighborhoods persists even when accounting for the impact of economic 
threat.  The results also generally show that anti-Jewish hate crime is more common in 
neighborhoods experiencing better economic conditions.   
As for anti-white hate crime, defended neighborhoods consistently fails to explain such 
hate crimes in the context of Black, nonwhite, and Hispanic neighborhoods.  The result reveal 
that white in-migration into Black neighborhoods consistently results in less anti-white hate 
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crime.  While white neighborhoods react defensively to an influx of minorities, nonwhite 
neighborhoods do not share this defensive reaction when experiencing white in-migration.  As 
for economic threat, there is stronger support refuting the hypothesis that neighborhoods with 
poorer economic conditions will experience more anti-white hate crime.   
The third section ends with analyses testing anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime as an 
outcome of defended and strained neighborhoods in Asian, Hispanic, and Black neighborhoods. 
As the results generally demonstrate, defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-racial/ethnic 
minority hate crime when such neighborhoods experience an influx of another racial/ethnic 
minority even when considering social disorganization predictors.  The results conform to the 
trend of hate crime generally occurring in communities with better economic conditions no 
matter bias type or neighborhood context.      
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CHAPTER EIGHT: TERRORIST THREAT RESULTS: ANTI-ARAB MUSLIM HATE 
CRIME IN DEFENDED, DISORGANIZED, AND STRAINED NEIGHBORHOODS 
This chapter aims to test a variety of models to explain anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.24  
Testing Hypothesis 11, both sections investigate terrorist threat models by testing the impact of 
the September 11th attacks in 2001 on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime in the time period after.25  
Using anti-Arab/Muslim as the dependent variable, the first section tests hypotheses stemming 
from defended neighborhoods and social disorganization theories.  The second section examines 
anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime in the context of defended and strained neighborhoods. 
Defended and Disorganized Neighborhoods 
Table 5.1: Negative Binomial Regressions for Anti-
Arab/Muslim Hate Crime with Social Disorganization 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Concentrated Disadvantage 0.113*** 0.099*** 
 
0.027 0.023 
Residential Instability 0.974** 0.961*** 
 
0.009 0.009 








Constant 26.395*** 42.940*** 
 
13.298 21.966 
Wald χ₂ 91.02*** 110.79*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -461.289 -455.721 
N=177 
  ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
 
Table 5.1 provides the baseline models that examine social disorganization predictors 
apart from defended neighborhoods predictors.  There are significant negative associations 
                                                 
24 As stated previously, this measure follows Disha et al.’s (2011) study, using a proxy measure for anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  This proxy 
measure contains all crimes labelled by the NYPD as anti-Other, anti-Ethnic, anti-Religion, and anti-American Indian.  Analyses were run with 
and without the anti-American Indian hate crime and the results remained largely the same with the exception of the Post-2000 indicator failing to 
reach significance in the analyses without anti-American Indian hate crime.  See Limitations for a further discussion of this measure. 
25 Models were run with the Islamic buildings indicator to test Hypothesis 11; however the predictor never achieved significance, so those models 
are not presented.   
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between concentrated disadvantage (I.R.R. =.113, p<.001) and residential instability (I.R.R. 
=.974, p<.01) and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  Diversity is also associated with large increases 
in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime (I.R.R. =2.043, p<.05).  Model 2 includes a Post-2000 indicator 
to capture the effect of 9/11 and shows a 47% increase in anti-Arab/Muslim crime after 9/11.  
Table 5.2 combines social disorganization and defended neighborhoods predictors, 
examining white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of nonwhite residents.  All models are 
significant (p<.001).  As discussed in the first chapter, the first two baseline defended 
neighborhoods models provide no support for defended neighborhoods.  The full models in 
Table 5.2 continue to show no association between non-white in-migration into white 
neighborhoods and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  Thus, anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime does not 
occur in white neighborhoods undergoing nonwhite in-migration.  The models do show the 
persistent positive effect of nonwhite population change on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime, with 
the exception of Model 9.  The full models also continue to show significantly large increases in 
anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime after 2000.  Across all models, concentrated disadvantage remains 
significant and negatively associated with such crimes.  The significant negative relationship 
between residential instability and hate crime persists, but only in models accounting for the 
post-2000 period.  While diversity is shown to be associated with more anti-Arab/Muslim hate 






Table 5.2: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime with White Defended & Disorganized Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 1.012*** 1.013*** 1.004 1.005 1.004 1.005 1.009* 1.009* 
 
0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Change in Nonwhite Population 1.049*** 1.055*** 1.035** 1.041*** 1.030* 1.034** 1.016 1.021⁺ 
 
0.014 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.012 
White*Change Nonwhite Pop. 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 1.001 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
  
0.274* 0.304* 0.232** 0.229** 0.355* 0.334* 
   
0.144 0.153 0.121 0.111 0.185 0.166 
Residential Instability 
    
0.985 0.972** 0.985 0.973** 
     
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Diversity Index 
      
3.145** 2.702* 



















Constant 2.478*** 1.902*** 5.941*** 4.292*** 13.608*** 18.348*** 5.005* 7.469** 
 
0.468 0.369 2.398 1.666*** 8.800 11.055 3.919 5.758 
Wald χ₂ 88.46*** 106.54*** 97.59*** 116.70*** 101.86*** 126.30*** 101.55*** 120.91*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -464.487 -459.093 -461.714 -456.640 -460.608 -452.959 -456.668 -449.846 
N=177 
        ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 






Table 5.3: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime with White Defended & Strained Neighborhoods 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 1.009** 1.009** 1.006⁺ 1.007* 1.010*** 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.012*** 
 
0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Change in Nonwhite Population 1.042** 1.048*** 1.050*** 1.055*** 1.042** 1.048*** 1.023 1.022 
 
0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.0149 0.014 0.017 0.016 
White*Change Nonwhite Pop. 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 1.000 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Unemployment Rate (%) 0.973 0.975 0.957⁺ 0.960⁺ 
    
 
0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 
    Change in Unemployment Rate 
  
0.869* 0.878* 
    
   
0.05 0.049 
    Poverty Rate (%) 
    
0.992 0.993 0.995 0.997 
     
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Change in Poverty Rate 
      
1.083⁺ 1.119** 



















Constant 3.981** 2.956* 5.636*** 4.150** 3.276*** 2.439** 3.308*** 2.366** 
 
1.738 1.280 2.578 1.916 1.046 0.800 1.056 0.769 
Wald χ₂ 88.87*** 109.61*** 92.06*** 115.44*** 89.33*** 109.75*** 96.19*** 125.92*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -463.812 -458.482 -459.801 -454.941 -463.980 -458.679 -462.307 -455.293 
N=177 
        ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
       I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error 
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Defended and Strained Neighborhoods 
Table 5.3 examines the impact of poor economic conditions on anti-Arab/Muslim hate 
crime.  Across all models, percent white continues to be significant and positively associated 
with hate crime.  Increasing nonwhite populations over time persists as a significant positive 
predictor of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime across most models.  Defended neighborhoods 
however fails to explain to such crimes.  Once again, the post-2000 indicator accounts for a large 
increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime after 9/11 in all models.  Models 3 and 4 show 
significant negative associations between unemployment and hate crime.  In Model 4, 
unemployment and worsening unemployment are associated with a 4% and a 12% reduction in 
such hate crimes respectively.  In Models 7 and 8, worsening poverty over time proves 
negatively associated with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  Model 8 shows that increasing poverty 
over time is associated with a 12% increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  Thus, the impact of 
poor and worsening economic conditions on anti-Arab/Muslim is decidedly mixed. 
Summary 
 This chapter examined anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime in defended, disorganized, and 
strained neighborhoods in the larger terrorist threat context.  Both sections show overwhelming 
support for the terrorist threat model, evidencing a substantial increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate 
crime after 2000.  Both sections further demonstrate no support for defended neighborhoods.  
Examining defended and disorganized communities, the first section shows socially organized 
communities experience more anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  Testing defended and strained 
neighborhoods, the second section provides more mixed evidence on the effect of economic 
threat on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime, though there is stronger evidence to suggest 
neighborhoods with better economic conditions experience higher levels of such crimes. 
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CHAPTER NINE: GAY THREAT RESULTS: ANTI-GAY HATE CRIME IN 
DISORGANIZED AND STRAINED NEIGHBORHOODS 
This chapter presents results testing hypotheses 13 to 16.  First, results examine whether 
gay population levels and gay population growth over time are associated with increases in anti-
gay hate crime.  The second section investigates gay threat in the context of social 
disorganization.  The third section presents results testing gay threat in the context of strained 
neighborhoods.  All results are shown in Table 6.1 and all models are significant.   
Gay Threat 
Model 1 shows the baseline “gay threat” model showing a significant positive association 
between the percent gay population and anti-gay hate crime, demonstrating a 75% increase in 
such crimes.  Model 2 is a baseline model that examines all three social disorganization 
predictors apart from the gay demographic variables.  There is a significant negative association 
between concentrated disadvantage and anti-gay hate crime (I.R.R. =.309, p<.001).   
Gay Threat and Disorganized Neighborhoods 
The next three models (Models 3 to 5) combine gay demographic and social 
disorganization predictors.  All three models show the persistent positive effect of percent gay.  
Gay population change also becomes significant with an increase in the gay population over time 
being associated with large increases in anti-gay hate crime.  Across all models, concentrated 
disadvantage is a significant predictor of anti-gay hate crime; however, it is now associated with 
large increases in anti-gay hate crime.  It bears noting that Model 2 has an N=177 while the other 







Table 6.1: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Gay Hate Crime with Gay Threat, Disorganization, & Economic Threat 
 
Model 1 Model 2ª Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Independent Variables I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) 
Percent Gay (%) 1.753*** 
 




0.429 0.430 0.425 0.399 0.365 0.364 0.353 
Change in Gay Population 2.903 
 




3.138 2.741 2.418 2.692 2.509 2.301 2.279 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
 
0.309*** 3.547*** 3.676** 3.529** 
    
  
0.112 1.387 1.608 1.576 




















    Unemployment Rate (%) 
     
1.059** 1.034 
  
      
0.02 0.031 
  Change in Unemployment Rate 
      
0.906 
  
       
0.08 
  Poverty Rate (%) 
       
1.025** 1.019⁺ 
        
0.009 0.010 
Change in Poverty Rate 
        
0.936 
         
0.083 
Constant 1.792 19.735*** 0.653 0.429 0.485 0.530 0.648 0.673 0.739 
 
0.679 17.909 0.352 0.546 0.628 0.328 0.416 0.407 0.445 
Wald χ₂ 50.22*** 12.42* 38.16*** 42.14*** 53.91*** 38.37*** 50.26*** 38.64*** 39.18*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -142.262 -497.020 -138.024 -137.939 -137.857 -138.001 -137.465 -138.249 -137.962 
N=59 
         ª Model 2: N=177 
         ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
        I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error 
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Gay Threat and Strained Neighborhoods 
The last four models (Models 6 to 9) examine the impact of poor economic conditions on 
anti-gay hate crime.  Across all four models, both gay demographic predictors remain significant 
and positively associated with anti-gay hate crime.  Model 6 shows that unemployment 
significantly explains a 5% increase in anti-gay hate crime; however, this effect loses 
significance in Model 7.  Models 8 and 9 demonstrate that poverty proves negatively associated 
with anti-gay hate crime, with a 3% and 2% increase in anti-gay hate crime respectively.  Thus 
anti-gay hate crime is more prevalent in neighborhoods with poorer economic conditions. 
Summary 
 This chapter aimed to investigate antigay hate crime in disorganized and strained 
neighborhoods in the larger context of gay threat.  Across all sections, gay demographics are 
shown to consistently predict higher levels of anti-gay hate crime.  The second section shows 
that anti-gay hate crime occurs in more disadvantaged communities.  While the previous chapters 
demonstrate that most hate crime occurs in socially organized communities, results demonstrate 
that social disorganization impacts anti-gay hate crime differently.  The last section also shows 
that anti-gay hate crime occurs in neighborhoods marked by poorer economic conditions.  Thus, 
economic conditions also influence anti-gay hate crime differently compared to other bias types.  
 
 120 
CHAPTER TEN: POLITICAL THREAT RESULTS 
The final chapter presents analyses testing hypotheses 8 to 10, stemming from political 
threat models while accounting for defended neighborhoods variables as well.  The political 
threat models examine the impact of the percent of registered Republicans (and other 
conservative parties), the percent vote for a Democrat in a mayoral and a presidential election, 
and the interaction terms between percent Republican and percent Democratic electoral vote.  To 
reiterate, the mayoral election resulted in a Republican candidate winning reelection, while the 
presidential election resulted in a Democratic candidate winning reelection.  Each of the 
following sections discusses these models by hate crime outcomes by bias type. 
Table 7.1: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with Political Threat 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 
  
1.012 1.028* 1.010 
   
0.009 0.013 0.009 
Change in Black Population 
  
1.099 1.018 1.089 
   
0.104 0.074 0.104 
White*Change Black Pop. 
  
1.005 1.005 1.006⁺ 
   
0.003 0.003 0.004 
Percent Republican (%) 1.095* 1.054 0.982 1.099* 1.033 
 
0.051 0.047 0.033 0.047 0.049 


































Constant 0.718 1.907 4.352 0.0436⁺ 0.849 
 
1.120 4.109 2.969 0.079 1.862 
Wald χ₂ 8.10⁺ 4.150 8.650 14.33* 9.960 
Log pseudolikelihood -123.508 -124.078 -123.084 -119.989 -122.224 
N=55 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
     I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error 
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Anti-Black Hate Crime 
Table 7.1 shows results for political threat models, along with defended neighborhoods 
predictors, with anti-Black hate crime as the dependent variable.  The only significant models 
were Model 1 (p<.1) and Model 4 (p<.05).  Model 1 is a baseline model that includes only the 
political threat variables related to the mayoral election.  The results show that an increase in the 
percent of registered Republicans is associated with approximately a 10% increase in anti-Black 
hate crime.  There is also a significant positive association between the interaction term between 
percent Republican and the percent vote for a Democratic candidate and hate crime (I.R.R. 
=1.003, p<.1).  When defended neighborhoods variables are added, the results similarly persist; 
however, the percent Democratic vote is now significant and positively associated with hate 
crime as shown in Model 4 (I.R.R. =1.056, p<.05).  Of the defended neighborhoods variables in 
the political threat models, only percent non-Hispanic white maintains significance. 
Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime 
Table 7.2 shows results for political threat models, along with defended neighborhoods 
predictors, with anti-Hispanic hate crime as the dependent variable.  In Table 27, all models are 
significant.  Model 1 is a baseline model that includes only the political threat variables related to 
the mayoral election.  The results show that an increase in the percent of registered Republicans 
and the percent vote for the Democratic mayoral candidate is associated with a 45% and 15% 
increase in anti-Hispanic hate crime respectively.  There is also a significant positive association 
between the interaction term between percent Republican and the percent vote for a Democratic 
candidate and anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. =1.008, p<.001).  When defended neighborhoods 
variables are added to the models, the significance and direction of the predictors in the mayoral 
political threat model remain the same as shown in Model 4.  Of the defended neighborhoods 
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variables in the political threat models, only Hispanic population change maintains significance, 
accounting for large increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime in Models 3 and 5. 
Table 7.2: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with Political Threat 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 
  
0.997 1.035 1.008 
   
0.024 0.029 0.025 
Change in Hispanic Population 
  
1.528** 1.178 1.451** 
   
0.211 0.127 0.176 
White*Change Hispanic Pop. 
  
1.006 0.998 1.006 
   
0.006 0.006 0.006 
Percent Republican (%) 1.451*** 1.409 1.025 1.362*** 1.242 
 
0.121 0.306 0.063 0.132 0.309 


































Constant .000** 0.000 1.524 0.000*** 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 1.994 0.000 0.000 
Wald χ₂ 25.66*** 9.60* 15.85** 35.65*** 22.64** 
Log pseudolikelihood -58.149 -61.863 -60.809 -56.954 -59.106 
N=55 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
     I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error 
 
Anti-Asian Hate Crime 
Table 7.3 shows the results for political threat models, along with defended 
neighborhoods predictors, with anti-Asian hate crime as the dependent variable.  In Table 29, all 
models are significant.  Model 1 and Model 2 are baseline models that include only the political 
threat variables related to the mayoral and presidential election respectively.  Model 1 shows 
there is a significant positive association between the mayoral interaction term and anti-nonwhite 
hate crime (I.R.R. =1.003, p<.1).  In Model 2, the results show that an increase in the percent of 
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registered Republicans is associated with an 11% increase in such hate crime.  There is also a 
significant positive relationship between the presidential interaction term and anti-Asian hate 
crime (I.R.R. =1.002, p<.05).  When defended neighborhoods variables are added to the models, 
the significance and direction of the predictors in the baseline models similarly persist; however, 
percent Republican is now a significant predictor of increases in anti-nonwhite hate crime in the 
full presidential political threat model as shown in Model 5.  Of the defended neighborhoods 
variables in the political threat models, only the in-migration interaction term is significant 
(I.R.R. =1.013, p<.1) in Model 4. 
Table 7.3: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with Political Threat 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 
  
1.013 0.978 1.003 
   
0.012 0.028 0.014 
Change in Asian Population 
  
0.923 0.755 0.835 
   
0.188 0.212 0.194 
White*Change Asian Pop. 
  
1.007 1.013⁺ 1.009 
   
0.007 0.007 0.007 
Percent Republican (%) 1.083 1.112⁺ 1.019 1.13* 1.154* 
 
0.069 0.068 0.028 0.065 0.069 


































Constant 0.107 0.018 0.048*** 0.526 0.004* 
 
0.185 0.047 0.045 1.899 0.010 
Wald χ₂ 11.05* 14.97** 14.24*** 15.10* 20.51** 
Log pseudolikelihood -58.233 -59.103 -59.135 -56.401 -57.993 
N=55 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
      
Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime 
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Table 7.4: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime with Political Threat 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 
  
1.013 1.022* 1.008 
   
0.008 0.009 0.009 
Change in Nonwhite Population 
  
0.997 0.951 0.948 
   
0.035 0.033 0.036 
White*Change Nonwhite Pop. 
  
1.001 1.002 1.001 
   
0.002 0.001 0.001 
Percent Republican (%) 1.091* 1.076⁺ 0.996 1.117** 1.085 
 
0.040 0.043 0.032 0.043 0.059 
































Constant 2.039 0.000 5.735*** .118⁺ 0.458 
 
2.413 3.510 2.561 0.137 0.919 
Wald χ₂ 15.46*** 9.39⁺ 9.160 26.84*** 12.26⁺ 
Log pseudolikelihood -169.158 -170.255 -171.039 -164.140 -168.138 
N=55 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
     I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error 
 
Table 7.4 shows the results for political threat models, along with defended 
neighborhoods predictors, with anti-nonwhite hate crime as the dependent variable.  In Table 28, 
all models, with the exception of Model 3, are significant.  Model 1 is a baseline model that 
includes only the political threat variables related to the mayoral election, while Model 2 is a 
baseline model that includes only the political threat variables related to the presidential election.  
Both models show that an increase in the percent of registered Republicans is associated with 
significant increases in anti-nonwhite hate crime.  There is also a significant positive association 
between the mayoral interaction term and anti-nonwhite hate crime (I.R.R. =1.003, p<.01).  In 
Model 2, there is a significant positive association between the presidential interaction term and 
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anti-nonwhite hate crime (I.R.R. =1.001, p<.05).  When defended neighborhoods variables are 
added to the models, the results similarly persist; however, the percent vote for a Democratic 
candidate is now significant and positively associated with anti-nonwhite hate crime as shown in 
Model 4 (I.R.R. =1.047, p<.001).  In Model 5, only the presidential interaction term maintains 
significance as a positive predictor of anti-nonwhite hate crime.  Of the defended neighborhoods 
variables in the political threat models, only percent white remains significant in Model 4. 
Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime 
Table 7.5: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime with Political Threat 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) 
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%) 
  
1.016* 1.021* 1.012 
   
0.007 0.009 0.009 
Change in Nonwhite Population 
  
0.982 0.954 0.948 
   
0.030 0.030 0.032 
White*Change Nonwhite Pop. 
  
0.998 0.999 0.999 
   
0.001 0.001 0.001 
Percent Republican (%) 1.027 1.048 0.985 1.059⁺ 1.047 
 
0.034 0.039 0.023 0.037 0.052 


































Constant 4.979 0.000 3.008** 0.315 0.638 
 
5.689 4.436 1.289 0.361 1.226 
Wald χ₂ 14.19** 10.56* 13.90* 25.96*** 18.69** 
Log pseudolikelihood -132.239 -133.226 -130.135 -127.685 -128.713 
N=55 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
     I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error 
 
Table 7.5 shows the results for political threat models, along with defended 
neighborhoods predictors, with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime as the dependent variable.  In Table 
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30, all models are significant.  Model 1 is a baseline model that includes only the political threat 
variables related to the mayoral election, while Model 2 is a baseline model that includes only 
the political threat variables related to the presidential election.  In Model 1, the mayoral 
interaction term is positively associated with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime (I.R.R. =1.002, p<.1).  
Model 2 shows a significant positive association between the presidential interaction term and 
anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime (I.R.R. =1.001, p<.01).  There is also a significant positive 
association between the mayoral interaction term and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime (I.R.R. 
=1.003, p<.01).  In Model 2, there is a significant positive association between the presidential 
interaction term and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime (I.R.R. =1.001, p<.05).  When defended 
neighborhoods variables are added to the models, change.  While the presidential interaction 
term loses significance in Model 5, the mayoral interaction term remains a significant positive 
predictor of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime in Model 4.  Model 4 also shows that increases in 
percent Republican and percent Democratic mayoral vote now account for a 6% and a 3% 
increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime respectively.  In Model 5, only the presidential 
interaction term maintains significance as a positive predictor of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  
Of the defended neighborhoods variables in the political threat models, only percent white 
remains significant in Models 3 and 4.26 
Anti-Gay Hate Crime 
Table 7.6 shows the results for political threat models, along with gay demographic 
predictors, with anti-gay hate crime as the dependent variable.  In Table 31, all models are 
significant, except Model 1.  Model 2 is a baseline models that only includes the political threat 
variables related to the presidential election.  In Model 2, the results show that increases in the 
                                                 
26 For the models for anti-Black, -Hispanic, -Asian, -Nonwhite, and –Arab/Muslim hate crime, the inclusion of defended neighborhoods 
predictors led to higher VIF/lower Tolerance scores, which might indicate issues with multicollinearity.  
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percent of registered Republicans and the percent vote for the Democratic presidential candidate 
are associated with a 9% and a 6% increase in anti-gay hate crime respectively.  When gay 
demographic variables are added to the models (and mayoral and presidential indicators are not 
included), the direction of the percent Republican changes and is now negatively associated with 
anti-gay hate crime in Model 3 (I.R.R. =0.969, p<.1).   The percent vote for the Democratic 
mayoral candidate is also now significant, accounting for a 3% increase in such hate crime.  In 
the presidential political threat model, percent Republican and percent presidential vote are no 
longer significant as they were in the baseline Model 2.  Of the gay demographic variables in the 
political threat models, only percent gay maintains significance and direction across the models. 
Table 7.6: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Gay Hate Crime with Political Threat 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R.(SE) 
Percent Gay (%) 
  
2.279*** 3.031*** 2.366*** 
   
0.404 0.508 0.475 
Change in Gay Population 
  
2.229 2.419 2.140 
   
1.354 1.622 1.339 
Percent Republican (%) 0.958 1.094⁺ 0.969⁺ 1.039 1.009 
 
0.044 0.056 0.016 0.038 0.039 


































Constant 14.021⁺ 0.014 2.230⁺ 0.109* 0.099 
 
22.253 .029* 0.916 0.123 0.187 
Wald χ₂ 4.230 13.77** 49.11*** 142.90*** 61.35*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -146.921 -143.201 -131.279 -126.273 -128.429 
N=55 
     ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 





This chapter aimed to test political threat models.  The first hypothesis asserts that hate 
crime would be more prevalent in neighborhoods with higher Republican enrollments.  Analyses 
support this hypothesis showing that higher Republican Party enrollment is associated with 
increases in anti-Black, -Hispanic, -Asian, -Arab/Muslim, and –Nonwhite hate crime, though this 
finding is weakest when it comes to anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  Results also provide mixed 
support when studying anti-gay hate crime with Republican enrollment weakly significant with 
both higher and lower levels of such crimes. 
The second political threat hypothesis claims that communities with greater Republican 
enrollment that experience higher Democrat electoral support in an election in which the 
Republican wins will experience lower levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime.  Results 
refute this hypothesis, finding that higher Democratic electoral support in Republican 
communities is associated with increases in anti-Black, -Hispanic, -Asian, -Arab/Muslim, and –
nonwhite hate crime.  Results indicate a backlash against threatening groups even when the 
conservatives triumph. 
The last political threat hypothesis holds that communities with greater Republican 
enrollment that witness higher Democrat electoral support in an election in which the Republican 
loses will experience higher levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime.  Results support this 
hypothesis, showing that Democratic electoral support in Republican communities is associated 
with increases in anti-Asian, -Arab/Muslim, and –Nonwhite hate crime.  Communities thus also 
experience a backlash against threatening groups when conservatives lose.  
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: DISCUSSION 
This section presents a detailed discussion of the study’s results and how they contribute 
to the literature on hate crime.  The current study’s most obvious implication is that there is no 
“one size fits all” explanation of hate crime.  Rather, this study demonstrates the importance of 
work that disaggregates hate crime by bias type as different types of hate crime occur in varying 
contexts.  Limitations and policy implications are also addressed toward the end of the 
discussion. 
Defended Neighborhoods 
Perhaps the most noteworthy finding, this study provides further support for defended 
neighborhoods in explaining anti-Black, anti-Hispanic, anti-nonwhite, and interestingly, anti-
Jewish hate crime.  Prior work (Grattet, 2009, Green et al., 1998; Lyons, 2008) consistently 
shows that hate crimes against Black and Hispanic victims are associated with the influx of 
minority residents into white neighborhoods.  The current study similarly finds that such crimes, 
including hate crime against nonwhites generally, occur in response to a growing minority threat 
in white areas.  Contrary to Green et al.’s (1998) study, analyses demonstrate that anti-Asian hate 
crime is not associated with defended neighborhoods.  As discussed in later sections, defended 
neighborhoods is the most consistent predictor of anti-Black, anti-Hispanic, anti-nonwhite, and 
anti-Jewish hate crime even when considering social disorganization and economic threat. 
Unlike previous studies, this study also investigates anti-white hate crime as an outcome 
of defended neighborhoods.  Given the use of NYPD data, the current study examines whether 
demographic change related to New York City’s increasing gentrification over the time period of 
the study can account for anti-white hate crime.  While the rest of the significant defended 
neighborhoods models in other contexts provided support for defended neighborhoods, models 
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examining anti-white hate crime contradict that thesis.   Analyses yield no significant results 
when examining defended neighborhoods in the context of Hispanic and nonwhite 
neighborhoods experiencing white in-migration.  Thus such neighborhoods do not react 
defensively as white neighborhoods do to the influx of an “Other” group.  Interesting patterns 
emerge when examining anti-white hate crime in Black neighborhoods.  Though anti-white hate 
crime occur in areas with higher levels of Black populations, Black neighborhoods experiencing 
an influx of white populations actually experience less anti-white hate crime.  Such findings can 
be interpreted in a number of ways. 
Regarding the reduced likelihood of anti-white victimization in Black neighborhoods 
experiencing white in-migration, the benefits of gentrification may protect “invading” white 
residents from victimization.  Gentrification brings increasing access to improved neighborhoods 
accommodations via renovated or new housing and chain retailers, but also increased safety 
through security and policing services, (Anderson, 2012; Gould & Lewis, 2012; Trekson, 2012).  
Areas undergoing gentrification may be viewed as “better” and thus receive more policing. In 
addition to whites possibly making greater use of the police in these neighborhoods, the police 
may be more likely to respond to white concerns.  Further, increasing wealth may lead to greater 
utilization of private security, providing greater guardianship in these changing neighborhoods.  
At the same time, the forces of gentrification may also neutralize a defensive response in Black 
neighborhoods by effectively pushing them out of the neighborhood.  Skyrocketing housing 
costs are a hallmark of gentrifying neighborhoods, where lower socioeconomic ethno-racial 
minorities are either pushed out of their homes that are sold to new owners or they are unable to 
afford exorbitant rents or home prices (DeSena, 2012; Gould & Louis, 2012; Mason, Morlock, & 
Pisano, 2012; Trekson, 2012).  Such adverse effects do not accompany the influx of nonwhites 
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into white neighborhoods thus preserving the ability of white residents to “stand their ground” 
and react defensively against invading minorities.  While white residents may eventually give up 
on their neighborhood and make the choice to flee to the suburbs, white in-migration and 
gentrification in Black neighborhoods forcibly displaces Black residents, rendering a defensive 
reaction impossible. 
In addition to the impact of gentrification accompanying white in-migration, Black 
neighborhoods may not be as motivated to react defensively to the influx of white residents.  
White neighborhoods may perceive more acutely the influx of minorities as threatening.  Perry 
(2001) explains how whites are “doing difference” when they commit hate crime.  Not only do 
white residents perceive threats to their interests (i.e. economic interests), white neighborhoods 
also perceive a threat to white dominance in racial hierarchies when nonwhites move into “their” 
neighborhoods.  In this sense, white neighborhoods have “more to lose” when there is nonwhite 
in-migration whereas Black neighborhoods do not perceive white in-migration as a threat to their 
place in racial hierarchies.  Using hate crime to “do difference,” whites thus reaffirm white 
dominance, of which they benefit, as well as “[coconstruct] the nonwhiteness of the victims, who 
are perceived to be worthy of violent repression either because they correspond to a demonized 
identity, or, paradoxically because they threaten the racialized boundaries that are meant to 
separate “us” from “them” (Perry, 2001, p.58). 
While the results provide no support for anti-white hate crime as an outcome of Black 
defended neighborhoods, there is consistent evidence that anti-white hate crime is associated 
with neighborhoods with higher Black population levels.  One such explanation for this finding 
may be due to white perception and reporting of such victimizations.  Though research has not 
tested this explanation, white victims may be more likely to report perceived racially-motivated 
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victimization compared to minority victims, who are known to underreport such victimizations 
as well as to trust law enforcement less (Lyons, 2007; 2008; Perry, 2002).  Perry (2002) argues 
that whites may perceive their victimization at the hands of Black offenders as “a serious affront 
to their status and authority,” which motivates them to report such victimization (p.73).  Lyons 
(2007) adds that reporting such crimes may similarly act as a defense of the color line by 
soliciting formal social control mechanisms, via law enforcement, in reaction to a perceived 
threat to white dominance. 
Anti-white hate crime also may not operate in a defensive manner.  Lyons (2007; 2008) 
argues that anti-white hate crime may be committed in a retaliatory manner.  McDevitt et al. 
(2002) describe the retaliatory hate crime as those crimes committed in response to an actual or 
perceived hate crime against the offender’s ingroup.  Previous studies (Green, Glaser, & Rich, 
1998; Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; Lyons, 2007; 2008) finding significant positive 
correlations between anti-white and anti-Black hate crime theorize that such a correlation could 
be attributable to retaliatory patterns of hate crime.  The current study similarly finds a 
significant positive correlation between anti-white and anti-Black hate crime (0.46, p<.001).   
Given the established nature of white defended neighborhoods, news of anti-Black hate crime in 
such neighborhoods could induce a retaliatory response against white victims in Black 
neighborhoods.  If this retaliatory situation is true, anti-minority hate crime could lead to a series 
of negative consequences.  Anti-minority hate crime not only harms the immediate victim, but 
the larger community to which the victim belongs, thus eliciting the retaliatory response and 
leading to harm of another victim.  Such retaliatory violence could escalate into a feud in which 
more attacks occur, undermining community relations. 
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While the literature largely examines hate crimes against racial/ethnic minorities when 
testing defended neighborhoods thesis, the current study also investigates anti-Arab/Muslim, 
anti-Jewish, and anti-white hate crime as an outcome of defended neighborhoods.  Although 
defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-Arab/Muslim hate, results reveal several interesting 
patterns in anti-Jewish hate crime.  No prior study of American neighborhoods examines anti-
Jewish hate crime.  Thus, the current study fills this gap in the literature by investigating the 
neighborhood-level determinants of such crimes.  In exploring the nature of anti-Jewish hate 
crime, analyses examine three different defended neighborhoods scenarios: the influx of 
nonwhite populations into white neighborhoods, growing white populations in Black 
neighborhoods, and increasing white populations in nonwhite neighborhoods.  Results provide 
support in all three scenarios.   
Throughout history, people across all races, ethnicities, and religions have blamed Jewish 
people for a host of social problems, including poor economic conditions (Gerstenfeld, 2011; 
Levin & McDevitt, 2002; Rosenfeld, 1995).  Indeed, recent events demonstrate the persistent 
phenomenon of anti-Jewish hate crime.  As news coverage in the past year shows a trend of hate 
crimes against racial and ethnic minorities and Islamophobic hate crime, anti-Jewish hate crime 
also features prominently in such coverage (Hatewatch Staff, 2017; NBC News, 2017; Paybarah 
& Cheney, 2017).  Thus, it follows that anti-Jewish hate crime could reasonably occur in a 
variety of contexts.  Regarding the first scenario, results show that such crimes occur in areas 
with higher levels of white populations, but are less prevalent in areas experiencing increases in 
nonwhite populations over time.  When considering the influx of nonwhite populations into 
white neighborhoods however, anti-Jewish hate crime increases.  Results for the latter two 
scenarios also reveal that anti-Jewish hate crime occurs in areas with lower levels of Black and 
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nonwhite populations and those experiencing increases in the white population over time.  Just as 
anti-Jewish hate crime is more prevalent in white neighborhoods with growing nonwhite 
populations, such crimes also occur where there is a migration of white populations into Black 
and nonwhite areas.  The results however are less strong for the white migration into Black 
neighborhoods compared to the other two scenarios.   
All in all, these findings reveal Jewish victims to be a catch-all target when a minority 
increasingly moves into a majority area.  Indeed, Deutsch (1962) captures this phenomenon in 
his interviews of lower class whites who lashed out against Jewish people even though they were 
largely preoccupied with prejudice against African-Americans.  In an ethnographic study of far-
right extremists, Ezekiel (1995) similarly shows how far-right leaders stress that Jews constitute 
the most dangerous “threat” to the white race, but most far-rightists are driven by their hatred of 
racial and ethnic minorities with less concern for Jewish persons.  The current study evidences a 
reaction against the influx of nonwhites into white neighborhoods that manifests in anti-Semitic 
hate crime.  Such a reaction may be likewise indicative of a frustration with other minorities that 
manifests in targeting Jewish persons further supporting the interchangeability of minority 
targets.  Anti-Semitic hate crime in white neighborhoods may also be a defensive response to the 
influx of nonwhites as both groups signify a threat to the cultural homogeny of the 
neighborhood, i.e. Italian Catholic or White Protestant neighborhoods.   
As for anti-Semitic hate crime in Black and nonwhite neighborhoods experiencing an 
influx of white residents, there could be similar competing explanations.  First, victimization of 
Jewish persons may actually symbolize a frustration with the influx of white residents into Black 
and nonwhite neighborhoods.  Given the results show either a negative or nonsignificant 
association between white in-migration into minority neighborhoods and anti-white hate crime, 
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this explanation may not be sufficient.  Rather, such crimes are more likely purposefully bias-
motivated against Jewish persons.  Research demonstrates anti-Semitism among Black and other 
nonwhite populations, some of which evidences greater anti-Semitic attitudes in nonwhites 
compared to whites (Gerstenfeld, 2011; King & Weiner, 2007).  Anti-Semitic hate crime in these 
contexts may be a reaction of resentment against a group perceived to pose an economic threat as 
well as group taking advantage of Black and nonwhite persons (King & Weiner, 2007; Levin & 
McDevitt, 2002; Levin & Nolan, 2011).  Thus, Black and nonwhite neighborhoods perceive 
more of a threat from Jewish populations, rather than white populations, which manifests in a 
defended neighborhoods response. 
On a final note, the study’s findings revealing a positive association between the presence 
of Jewish buildings, indicative of larger Jewish populations, and anti-Semitic hate crime also 
corroborates Stein and Martin’s (1962) study showing that perpetrators of anti-Semitic crime 
often lived in neighborhoods with larger Jewish populations.  This is similar to Green et al.’s 
(2001) study demonstrating that areas with higher gay populations, and therefore greater gay 
visibility, experience more anti-gay hate crime.  Thus, the static Jewish presence proves key in 
explaining anti-Jewish hate crime.  As shown across a variety of bias types, demographics prove 
very important to explaining hate crime with dynamic in-migration processes accounting for 
patterns of such crimes.  On the other hand, some bias types, specifically anti-Jewish and anti-
gay hate crime, are also explained by static indicators with a large visible presence attracts 
victimization.  This further demonstrates the need for nuance in hate crime research.  While 
static visibility explains anti-Jewish (and anti-gay) hate crime, dynamic processes with 
increasing racial/ethnic minority populations explain anti-Black and –Hispanic hate crime. 
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This study also makes another contribution by investigating defended neighborhoods 
dynamics when it comes to anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime in the context of Black, 
Hispanic, and Asian neighborhoods.  The results generally show that nonwhite neighborhoods do 
not experience the same defended neighborhoods reaction to the influx of outgroups that white 
neighborhoods experience.  When it comes to Asian neighborhoods, Black and Hispanic in-
migration is met with lower levels of anti-Black and –Hispanic hate crime respectively. Analyses 
reveal no significant association between Hispanic neighborhoods experiencing an influx of 
Black and Asian populations and hate crime against either group.  When it comes to Black 
neighborhoods, the results are slightly more mixed.  Analyses provide no support for the 
hypothesis that Black neighborhoods would experience higher levels of anti-Asian hate crime in 
response to Asian in-migration.  When it comes to the influx of Hispanic populations, analyses 
show weak support for defended neighborhoods, but only when economic conditions are 
considered. 
Given the widespread impact of gang activity on hate crime in Los Angeles (Bell, 2013, 
Mock, 2007; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2008; 2009; Terry, 2013), the question arises as to 
whether such an effect is relevant in New York City.  Green and colleagues make no mention of 
gang activity and its impact on hate crime in NYC.  In fact, neighborhood-level studies have yet 
to control for gang activity in their hate crime studies (see NYC in Green, Strolovitch, and 
Wong, 1998; Sacramento in Grattet, 2009; Chicago in Lyons, 2007; 2008).  The lack of other 
evidence suggests that hate crime stemming from gang activity may not be a major issue in NYC 
and is possibly a phenomenon specific to Los Angeles.  Further, the New York State Division of 
Criminal Justice Services (2015) goes as far to provide this question and answer: "Q1: Do 
incidents which involve rival gangs count as hate crimes? A1: Only if race, color or other 
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protected class is the motivation for the incident. Gang rivalry alone does not constitute a hate 
crime" (p. 1).  While this study does not account for gang activity in analyses, future studies may 
want to consider if gang activity may influence hate crime in other research sites (i.e. Los 
Angeles) and how they can handle the impact of such activity on hate crime. 
Taken together, the study provides strong support for defended neighborhoods thesis for 
two broad trends: anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime as an outcome of the influx of people of 
color into white neighborhoods and anti-Jewish hate crime as an outcome of in-migration of an 
“other” group into another group’s neighborhood (i.e. nonwhite population growth in white 
neighborhoods and vice versa).  Defended neighborhoods receives little to no support when 
examining anti-racial/ethnic minority and anti-white hate crime in nonwhite neighborhoods.  
Thus, the defended neighborhoods reaction appears to be a largely white reaction to a perceived 
threat to their “territory.”  Just as major world conflicts have often occurred over a competition 
for territory, so too do neighborhood-level ethnic conflicts.  Previous literature (Green et al., 
1998; Horowitz, 2000) describes the importance of holding onto territory in the face of an 
encroaching “other” threat, so as to preserve the neighborhood’s identity.  This response 
however most strongly occurs in white neighborhoods, evidencing that it is not merely a natural 
reaction by any ethno-racial group, but a reaction largely specific to white communities.  This 
reaction thus acts as an effort to reassert white hegemony at a time when the neighborhood, and 
the city and country at large, are becoming increasingly nonwhite.   
Previous ethnographic work in New York City (Pinderhughes, 1993; Rieder, 1985) also 
highlights white communal efforts to preserve the identity of their neighborhoods through the 
use of violence against those perceived to not belong.  In his case study of Brooklyn youth, 
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Pinderhughes (1993) relates the shared perspectives by the youth who see themselves as 
defending their neighborhood: 
You prove you're a real Bensonhurst Italian who don't take no shit, who don't let 
the wrong kind of people into the neighborhood. 
… 
I did what I had to do. I have a reputation as a tough guy who defends the 
neighborhood and I want to keep it. People know when you've taken care of 
people who don't belong in the neighborhood. You get respect. Especially if it is 
some of the blacks from Marlboro projects.  
When you're hanging out with your partners and you see somebody who don't 
belong on your block, like a black guy or a Dominican, and you do him [beat him 
up], you feel real together. Every- body's together doing what we have to do (p. 
488). 
Such reactions capture a general antipathy against nonwhites being in the neighborhood at all, 
even if they are just walking through the area.  The very presence, however fleeting, rallies the 
white youth, with the approval from the larger community, to “protect” the neighborhood.  
Rieder (1985) similarly captures white aggression in response to Blacks moving into Brooklyn’s 
Canarsie, detailing the firebombing of a home recently sold by a white owner to Black buyers. 
Resident reactions to the firebombing, and similar move-in violence, demonstrate that such 
violence accomplished two things: sending a warning to both white homeowners and nonwhite 
buyers that nonwhites are not welcome in the neighborhood as well as punishing the white owner 
for betraying the segregationist norms of the community and threatening the community’s 
homogenous identity (p. 199-202).  Such violence highlights Tolnay and Beck’s (1995) 
discussion of a popular justice model of anti-Black violence that accomplishes in punishing 
social violations (i.e. Black buyers daring to move into a white neighborhood) and sending a 
message to the larger Black community that such violence awaits them if they attempt the same 
actions.   
Indeed, patterns of move-in violence exemplify this effort within white neighborhoods to 
use violence in the face of nonwhite in-migration (see Bell, 2013; Levin & McDevitt, 2002; 
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Meyer, 2000; Sibbitt, 1997; Surgue, 1996).  In a study of hate crime in London, Sibbitt (1997) 
explains how neighborhood residents often banded together to intimidate new minority residents.  
She also shows that many perpetrators and bystanders perceive nonwhite victims as exploiting 
the resources of “their” country, often asserting that nonwhites should “go back to their country.”  
Such sentiments highlight how white residents claim ownership of neighborhood by virtue of 
their white identity.  White residents not only fear a threat to the homogenous character of their 
neighborhoods; they also fear nonwhites “taking over” the neighborhood and making it their 
own.  Ray et al.’s (2004) interviews with racist offenders in Manchester in the U.K. support this 
view.  One interviewee’s response justifies move-in violence, arguing: 
“[Someone might say] Let's go and get some Pakis out of a house they are moving 
into. And I can understand why. […] what they'll [the Pakistanis] do is they move 
into a bit of an area and they slowly enforce with government help their own way 
of running the thing, and they try and take over our community. So white people 
in that area who are referred to as the majority, are totally oppressed and unable to 
carry on in what they would call their normal life, their normal routine, and enjoy 
their culture. […] And so these people are saying 'Right, there's no point going to 
the Government because they've already stuck the shit on us, we're going to have 
to deal with it ourselves'. So he goes out and stops them moving in. And that's his 
commitment to his community” (p. 360). 
Such an account reveals white paranoia that nonwhites not only plan to take over the 
neighborhood, but that they have the support of the “Government” in doing so.  This casts whites 
as being victimized by the threat of nonwhites moving into their neighborhoods.  Further, 
perpetrators of move-in violence also see themselves as acting on behalf of their community.  
Discussing the evolution of move-in violence since the postbellum era, Bell (2013) argues that 
move-in violence transitioned from being the work of mobs to “small groups of terrorists 
working to keep their neighborhood white, or a barrage of small acts of violence committed 
alone” (p. 57).  She further highlights that contemporary campaigns of individual action often 
have the support of the community that often blames the targets of such violence.  The use of 
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such violence has been highly effective as move-in violence has been repeatedly successful in 
deterring minorities from moving into white neighborhoods and pushing out those who dare to 
do so.   
Beyond the threat to white racial purity, such communities perceive nonwhite in-
migration as a threat to the stability and value of their home and neighborhoods.  Rieder (1985) 
shares the view of one Canarsian: “Those niggers are the marauders of Brownsville.  They ruined 
Brownsville, but I won’t let them ruin Canarsie.  I’ll join a terror squad to keep them out” (p. 
200).  He also recounts how another resident justified the firebombing of prospective home of a 
Black family by proclaiming that the family was a threat to his home and children (p. 199).  
Thus, white neighborhoods view nonwhites threaten not only their white communal identity, but 
their existence via their home and offspring.  Such ethnographic accounts add further insight into 
the current study’s findings by unpacking how white residents interpret the threat of nonwhite in-
migration into their neighborhoods.  Thus for these neighborhoods, hate crime exists as a 
mechanism to express frustration and aggression at the offending minority and reinforce control 
of the minority group through sending a message to the larger community to which the victim 
belongs and instilling fear and thus, keep them out of their neighborhoods. 
Defended and Disorganized Neighborhoods 
In addition to investigating the role of defended neighborhoods, the current study also 
examines the influence of social disorganization on hate crime.  Based on the analyses, the main 
finding is that hate crime for the most part occurs in socially organized communities across bias 
type, which contradicts the hypotheses that socially disorganized communities would experience 
higher levels of hate crime.  As proposed in the theoretical framework, social disorganization 
dictates that socially disorganized communities lack the capacity to control strained individuals 
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from engaging in hate crime, with such strain resulting from patterns of demographic change or 
poor or worsening economic conditions.  In the current study however, baseline and full models 
all generally find that higher levels of hate crime occur in socially organized communities.  
Across all racial, ethnic, and religious bias types, increases in concentrated disadvantage and 
residential instability consistently account for reductions in hate crime.  Thus, communities are 
largely organized in favor of hate crime across a variety of contexts.  These findings corroborate 
Lyons’ (2007) work examining anti-Black hate crime in Chicago; however, they are at odds with 
Grattet’s (2009) investigation in Sacramento, which revealed that higher levels of both 
concentrated disadvantage and residential instability were associated with increases in hate 
crime.  They also contradict Gladfelter et al.’s (2017) findings on the effect of residential 
instability, which showed that instability was associated with higher levels of anti-Black, -
Hispanic, and –white bias-motivated incidents.  Further, defended neighborhoods also proves a 
consistent predictor of anti-minority hate crime when also considering social disorganization 
indicators.  When defended neighborhoods predictors are included in models however, 
concentrated disadvantage remains negatively, albeit no longer significantly, associated with 
anti-Black and –Hispanic hate crime.  For models examining anti-nonwhite hate crime, the 
nonwhite in-migration interaction also loses significance when multiple social disorganization 
predictors are included.  Thus, the conclusion that hate crime occurs in defended and socially 
organized communities is strongest when the outcome is anti-Jewish hate crime.   
The current study generally shows that neighborhoods experiencing increases in hate 
crime are better described as defended and organized, rather than defended and disorganized.  In 
particular, white neighborhoods most often are organized in defense of their neighborhoods 
through the use of bias-motivated violence to keep out “invading” minorities.  As Lyons (2008) 
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states, “under conditions of change, hate crimes against blacks [or other minorities] are a strategy 
for reasserting "order" and maintaining racial division” (p. 378).  Such findings also have 
implications for social disorganization theories as predictors of social disorganization, though 
determinants of higher levels of regular crime, act differently when it comes to hate crime across 
bias types in most cases.  This supports Lyons’ (2007) suggestion that such theories be revised to 
consider the different impact of social disorganization on hate crime.   
Regarding anti-white hate crime, the current study also conflicts with the prior work 
finding that such incidents occur in socially disorganized communities (Gladfelter et al., 2017; 
Lyons, 2007; 2008).  As previously discussed, defended neighborhoods thesis fails to explain 
anti-white hate crime in nonwhite neighborhoods, whether Black, Hispanic, or nonwhite.  While 
anti-white hate crime occurs in socially organized neighborhoods with higher Black population 
levels, white in-migration into Black neighborhoods actually leads to a reduction in anti-white 
hate crime.  Thus, the argument that neighborhoods are organized to defend the community from 
an influx of an “unwanted” group does not extend to the context of Black neighborhoods.  As 
previously stated, anti-white hate crime may be more retaliatory rather than defensive.  Or if they 
are defensive, such crimes may be prevalent in Black neighborhoods in an effort to protect the 
area from whites even though there is no white in-migration.  As mentioned in the initial 
discussion, white residents also may have more resources to thwart anti-white hate crime.  If so, 
this should be investigated in future research.  If it is true that the availability and use of 
community resources can thwart hate crime, it shows that increasing demographic change need 
not lead to hate crime. 
There are a couple caveats to this conclusion, highlighting the importance of 
disaggregating hate crime by bias type.  First, there are mixed findings regarding the role of 
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diversity when considered in social disorganization models.  In the baseline models for anti-
Black hate crime, greater diversity accounts for less anti-Black hate crime; however, this finding 
also disappears when defended neighborhoods is considered.  Diversity also similarly accounts 
for reductions in anti-white hate crime, though this finding disappears when considering 
white/black and white/Hispanic, rather than white/nonwhite, in-migration interactions).  When 
considering anti-Arab/Muslim and –Jewish hate crime however, diversity proves to be a 
significant predictor of higher levels of such crimes.  Prior work (Grattet, 2009; Lyons, 2007) 
usually excludes diversity when testing defended neighborhoods and social disorganization, so 
there is not much consensus on the role of general diversity on hate crime.  Gladfelter et al. 
(2017) however similarly find a negative association between diversity and anti-Black and –
Hispanic bias-motivated incidents.  Second, social disorganization operates differently when 
anti-gay hate crime is considered.  Though the baseline model reveals a similar negative and 
significant association between concentrated disadvantage and anti-gay crime, concentrated 
disadvantage becomes a significant predictor of higher levels of such crimes when gay 
demographic variables are considered.  This finding is further discussed in the section entitled 
“Gay Threat.” 
Defended and Strained Neighborhoods 
Turning to economic threat, the current study tests whether minority group threat 
explains hate crime when there are poor or worsening economic conditions.  Minority group 
threat holds that anti-minority violence is a reaction on the part of disadvantaged persons in 
response to the competition for limited economic resources.  Thus, economically-strained 
neighborhoods are expected to experience higher levels of hate crime.  The current study 
however generally contradicts hypothesized association between poor economic conditions and 
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hate crime.  Across all racial, ethnic, and religious bias types, higher rates of unemployment and 
poverty, when significant, generally account for lower levels of hate crime.  When examining 
anti-Hispanic hate crime however, higher poverty proves to be the only (weakly) significant 
predictor of increases in such crimes when white/Hispanic defended neighborhood predictors are 
considered.  Nevertheless, neighborhoods experiencing poorer economic conditions largely see 
reductions in the majority of racial, ethnic, and religious hate crime.  
While poor economic conditions are generally associated with lower levels of hate crime, 
there are mixed results when it comes to worsening economic conditions over time.  Though 
many models show no significant relationship between worsening economic conditions, some 
interesting findings emerge.  Worsening unemployment over time is significantly associated with 
lower levels of anti-nonwhite and –Arab/Muslim hate crime in white defended neighborhoods 
models.  When considering Hispanic defended neighborhoods predictors, worsening 
unemployment over time is shown to lead to increases in anti-white hate crime; however this 
finding is weakly significant and there is no significant evidence supporting defended 
neighborhoods in Hispanic communities experiencing influxes of white populations.  When 
considering nonwhite defended neighborhoods, worsening unemployment is associated with 
lower levels of anti-Black, -Hispanic, and –Asian hate crime.  Worsening poverty over time also 
proves to impact hate crime differently.  When examining white defended neighborhoods, 
analyses show that worsening poverty over time leads to higher levels of anti-Black, -nonwhite, -
Arab/Muslim, and –Jewish hate crime.  The significant effect on anti-Semitic hate crime 
however disappears when the presence of Jewish buildings is considered.  When considering 
Asian and Black defended neighborhoods, worsening poverty is associated with weakly 
significant increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime.   
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As previously stated, there exists no consensus on the role of poor economic conditions 
on hate crime.  Much of the quantitative work either finds no relationship between the two 
phenomena or the results are consistently mixed.  While much qualitative work (Gadd & Dixon, 
2009; Maxwell & Maxwell, 1995; Pinderhughes, 1993; Ray et al., 2004) reveals white 
resentment of minorities is often attributed to economic conditions, anti-racial/ethnic hate crime 
generally does not occur in neighborhoods actually marked by poor economic conditions.  There 
could be a number of explanations for these findings.   
As previous quantitative work uses indicators of real economic conditions, prior 
qualitative work focuses on perceptions of economic conditions.  Perhaps it is perceptions rather 
than the reality of economic conditions that matters when explaining incidences of hate crime.  
Relevant to a discussion of bias-motivated behaviors, examining white support for presidential 
candidate Donald Trump reveals the similar discrepancy between perceptions of economic 
conditions and reality.  Throughout his campaign, Trump’s rhetoric fed into white resentment of 
people of color and immigrants, often scapegoating these populations as responsible for poor 
economic conditions (i.e. immigrants stealing jobs from deserving whites).  Indeed, a pre-
election Gallup poll shows that Trump supporters, even affluent supporters, expressed higher 
levels of perceived financial insecurity with Rothwell (2016) commenting that “Donald Trump 
has a more positive image among people who worry about their finances, no matter how 
grounded those concerns are in the apparent reality of their circumstances.”  Analyses of 
electoral primary exit poll data also reveal that Trump voters had higher median incomes than 
the average American as well as the average Democratic candidate voter; Trump voters also had 
higher median incomes than their state’s median income (Silver, 2016).  In an analysis by the 
Urban Institute, Elliott and Kalish (2016) demonstrate that counties won by Trump were more 
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financially secure (as measured by credit scores) than counties won by Democratic candidate 
Hillary Rodham Clinton.27  It must be noted that voting is a legal behavior exercised by a large 
proportion of the population while hate crime offending is an illegal behavior committed by a 
much smaller segment of the population.  At the same time, minority group threat literature often 
discusses both informal and formal modes of social control in response to minority group threat.  
Support for a presidential candidate promising the use of formal modes of social control in 
response to minority group threat is an endorsement of such formal modes of social control.  The 
utility of the comparison here is in discussing this disconnect between perceptions of and real 
economic conditions and its implications for the application of formal or informal social control 
against threatening minorities. 
This scenario proves relevant to a discussion of hate crime research as it highlights the 
similar disconnect between perceptions of and real economic conditions.  The common thread in 
prior qualitative work illustrates white anger against people of color, who are blamed for white 
economic misfortune.  Such work also reveals whites casting their bias-motivated actions as 
“protecting,” “defending,” or “saving” the white community.  As previously stated, the majority 
white group views itself as the hardworking victim of a system that they perceive as privileging 
minority groups at their expense even though this is at odds with the reality that the white 
population is generally better off economically compared to people of color.  The qualitative 
work directly appears, and the quantitative work indirectly, to support an evident disconnect 
between perceptions of and the reality of economic conditions.   
The current study’s findings similarly bear out this indirect support as it shows that 
higher levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime occur in neighborhoods that are better off 
                                                 
27 The authors note however that the effect of financial insecurity loses significance when controlling for other economic and demographic 
characteristics as “higher credit scores are located in counties with higher percentages of white residents, and race was an important predictor in 
this election: a 10 percentage point increase in a county’s white residents is associated with an 8 percentage point increase in voting for Trump.” 
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economically.  The results could also speak to the idea that whites see themselves having “more 
to lose” (Freilich et al., 2015).  They may be better off economically speaking, but anxiety about 
their financial security may drive them to lash out violently against a perceived “threat.”  
Previous quantitative work has probably neglected examining the effect of perceptions of 
economic conditions due to the unavailability of data.  Future quantitative research should 
consider the feasibility of investigating the impact of perceptions of economic conditions on hate 
crime.  Survey research could prove useful in addressing this gap in the research. 
There also exists another explanation of the current study’s findings regarding the impact 
of economic conditions, in that there may be a set of other economic considerations that induce 
white anxiety and subsequent hate crime against nonwhites.  In his ethnographic work in 
Canarsie, Rieder (1985) highlights one resident’s justification for the firebombing of a black 
family’s newly purchased home: 
The practitioners of firebombing relied on that passive tolerance of violence. ‘You 
heard about the firebombing of the black family the other day?’ a Jewish member 
of a backlash group asked me. ‘Well, I’m against violence, but they’re 
jeopardizing my home and children, and I will bomb to protect them’ (p. 199). 
Minority group threat often holds that minority presence poses a threat to whites in a competition 
for limited economic resources and much research often focuses the economic resource of 
employment.  The current study however reveals higher unemployment, when significant, to be 
associated with less hate crime.  Perhaps white perceive an influx of minorities into their 
neighborhoods as a threat not to their livelihood, but a threat to their home values and their 
children.  Indeed, the one Canarsian, who said he would join a “terror squad” to keep out the 
Black people who “ruined” Brownsville from ruining Canarsie, follows up that sentiment by 
saying that “we’ve invested everything we have in this house and neighborhood” (p. 200).  
Examining move-in violence, Bell (2013) similarly highlights whites’ perceptions that home 
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values would suffer if Black people starting moving into their neighborhoods.  Bell (2013) 
presents one resident’s reaction to the arson committed after a Jamaican immigrant moved his 
family into an almost all-white Chicago suburb: “I feel bad their house got burned…but real 
estate people should have told him that this is an all-white neighborhood, and they should’ve 
expected it.  I want them to leave.  I don’t want my property value to go down” (p. 69).  Again, 
this highlights the importance of white perceptions of economic misfortune for themselves. 
White anxiety about economic conditions also extends to concern about their children’s 
economic prospects as well.  Rieder (1985) cites Canarsian attitudes toward busing and school 
integration.  Such views highlight white anxiety that the quality of neighborhood schools will 
decline if nonwhites attend the school and vice versa, with their children attending 
predominantly nonwhite schools.  Aside from white perceptions associating nonwhites with 
criminality (Eitle, D'Alessio, and Stolzenberg, 2002; Tolnay and Beck, 1995) and thus a threat to 
their children, white concerns with school quality reflect anxiety about the economic prospects of 
their children (i.e. children attending lower quality schools will fare worse employment- and 
income-wise).  Even when considering economic conditions, the current study shows the 
persistent significant impact of in-migration into white neighborhoods.  The motivations behind 
“defending” neighborhoods from “invading” minorities may be varied from a defense of the 
neighborhood’s homogenous identity to anxieties about the perceived impact of nonwhite in-
migration on home values, crime rates, neighborhood schools, and any other economic 
considerations.  Thus, perceptions of the impact of nonwhite in-migration on other economic 
considerations, rather than indicators of real economic conditions, may be more important in 
explaining hate crime.  As the current study shows, neighborhood experiencing higher levels of 
hate crime have better economic conditions when it comes to unemployment and poverty levels.  
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This finding also applies to anti-Semitic and anti-white hate crime, which occur in 
neighborhoods with higher white population levels. 
Once again, there are a couple qualifications to the current study’s overarching findings 
on economic conditions.  As discussed, the study reveals more mixed findings on the impact of 
worsening economic conditions over time.  Analyses show that worsening unemployment, when 
significant, is generally associated with lower levels of anti-minority hate crime.  On the other 
hand, worsening poverty over time leads to significantly higher levels of anti-
racial/ethnoreligious hate crime.  It may be that residents view impoverishment as more dire than 
unemployment, accounting for a different response.  While poor economic conditions are 
overwhelmingly shown to be associated with less hate crime, worsening poverty generally leads 
to higher hate crime.  Even though the results are weakly significant and unemployment is in the 
other direction in most cases, the study reveals a common thread across defended neighborhoods 
scenario in that worsening poverty leads to a reaction against nonwhites generally, but also 
groups more often perceived as immigrants, namely Arab/Muslim and Hispanic populations.  It 
may be that “things are getting worse” triggers a backlash against perceived immigrants, the 
usual scapegoats, when economic conditions decline.  Lastly, anti-gay hate crime once again 
proves unique when considering the impact of neighborhood-level conditions, specifically 
regarding the effect of poor economic conditions compared to other bias types.  Analyses reveal 
that higher levels of unemployment and poverty are associated with increased incidences of anti-
gay hate crime.  These findings are discussed below under the “Gay Threat” section. 
Political Threat 
The current study makes another contribution by providing the first insights into impact 
of political threat on hate crime on the neighborhood level.  The first political threat hypothesis 
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asserted that communities with higher levels of Republican Party enrollment would experience 
higher levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime.  Analyses support this hypothesis showing 
that higher Republican Party enrollment is associated with increases in anti-Black, -Hispanic, -
Asian, -Arab/Muslim, and –Nonwhite hate crime, though this finding is weakest when it comes 
to anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  Results also provide mixed support when studying anti-gay 
hate crime with Republican enrollment weakly significant with both higher and lower levels of 
such crimes.  On the whole however, the findings reveal that neighborhoods with higher 
Republican enrollment are more likely to experience higher levels of hate crime.  This is in line 
with the premise that conservative neighborhoods would see more hate crime given their 
diminished support for progressive policies that are perceived as benefiting people of color over 
whites.  Such findings add to the mixed results on discriminatory violence as an outcome of 
political threat.   
The second political threat hypothesis claims that communities with greater Republican 
enrollment but also with higher Democrat electoral support in an election in which the 
Republican wins will experience lower levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime.  Using 
the mayoral election in which conservative Mayor Michael Bloomberg won re-election in 2009, 
this study finds evidence refuting this hypothesis, finding that higher Democratic electoral 
support in Republican communities is associated with increases in anti-Black, -Hispanic, -Asian, 
-Arab/Muslim, and –nonwhite hate crime.  Thus more Republican communities still react with a 
backlash against racial and ethnic minorities even when political threat is overcome with a 
Republican political victory.  In light of this, anti-minority hate crime may act as an expression 
of reasserting conservative political power in areas that faced more of a threatening political 
threat via increased Democratic electoral support.  Indeed, recent events demonstrate the 
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occurrence of surges in anti-minority hate crime in the wake of Republican electoral victory.  
Various sources cite reported increases in such hate crime in the wake of Republican candidate 
Donald Trump’s presidential election victory in November 2016, in which he was projected to 
win the Electoral College yet lost the popular vote by over two million votes (Goldman, 2017; 
Hatewatch Staff, 2016; Hatewatch Staff, 2017; La Porte, 2016; Levin, 2017; Miller & Werner-
Winslow, 2016; Toure, 2017).  Such sources attribute the surges in hate crime specifically to 
Trump’s electoral victory. 
The last political threat hypothesis claims that communities with greater Republican 
enrollment but also with higher Democrat electoral support in an election in which the 
Republican loses will experience higher levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime.  This 
analysis uses the 2012 Presidential election in which Democrat President Barack Obama won re-
election as a proxy for 2008.  This study finds evidence supporting this hypothesis, using the 
2012 Presidential election in which Democrat President Barack Obama won re-election as a 
proxy for 2008.  The results show that Democratic electoral support in more Republican 
communities is associated with increases in anti-Asian, -Arab/Muslim, and –Nonwhite hate 
crime.  Thus, there does appear to be a backlash against certain groups in the wake of a 
Republican loss when there is an increasing political threat, via Democratic electoral support, in 
Republican communities.  Such results highlight political competition theories that find that 
political environments where political opponents are more balanced leads to increasing 
mobilization on both sides including violent fringe groups.  Suttmoeller, Chermak, and Freilich 
(2015) find that far-right extremist groups thrive in “purple states” with greater political 
competition, where there may be greater tolerance of more fringe ideologies.  Therefore, more 
“purple” neighborhoods with more Republicans but also greater Democratic support create more 
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of a political threat environment.  Beyond leftist political success, the Democratic victory also 
highlights Black political success with the election of Barack Obama.  Such a victory feeds into 
fears that minorities will “political leverage that threatens existing power balances” that favor 
whites (King & Brustein, 2006, p. 871).  This fear would also be more prevalent among 
conservatives given their lack of support for progressive policies that aim to remedy such 
prevailing power structures.  Surprisingly, this model fails to account for significant increases in 
anti-Black hate crime.  The results prove strongest in explaining anti-nonwhite hate crime.  
Perhaps nonwhites are interchangeable victims when it comes to the expression of conservative 
grievances in response to electoral losses. 
Terrorist Threat 
The current study further contributes to the literature by providing further evidence of the 
impact of the September 11th terrorist attacks on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  Indeed, the 
results show that the post-2000 period accounts for estimates as high as a 50% percent increase 
in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  This finding strengthens the consensus shown in the research, 
demonstrating the effect of the “terrorist threat” on hate crime (see Byers & Jones, 2007; 
Deloughery et al., 2012; Disha et al., 2011; King & Sutton, 2013).  As for defended 
neighborhoods, the influx of nonwhites into white neighborhoods fails to significantly impact 
levels of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime; however, nonwhite population growth over time predicts 
increases in such crimes.  Though not presented in this study’s results, additional analyses, 
investigating the impact of Muslim visibility via the presence of Muslim buildings, failed to 
significantly explain variation in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  This evidence contradicts the 
hypothesis of “terrorist threat;” however, analyses with that indicator have only limited power to 
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detect smaller than large effects as they were limited by data availability to only examine the 
third time period (2006-2010) of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.   
On the whole however, the large and significant effect of the September 11th attacks 
provides substantial support for the “terrorist threat” model.  Using UCR data, Byers and Jones 
(2007) show that the 9/11 attacks led to a significant increase in anti-Islamic hate crime in the 
weeks that followed, but no such immediate increases occurred in New York City or Washington 
D.C.28  The current study however shows that the years following the 9/11 attacks saw 
demonstrably higher levels of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime, evidencing a long-term reaction to 
the so-called “terrorist threat.”  Further, it evidences the persistent vicarious retaliation against 
the Arab/Muslim community in response to the 9/11 attacks and throughout a time period 
marked by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq which kept the attacks in the forefront of national 
consciousness.  Such a trend exemplifies McDevitt et al.’s (2002) “retaliatory” offender type 
with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime presenting as an ongoing exercise in revenge in response to 
the triggering event of the 9/11 attacks.   
In the aftermath of 9/11, the presence of less dramatic triggering events (i.e. anthrax 
letters, the kidnapping and murdering of Americans in Iraq, including the highly publicized 
beheading of Nicholas Berg, etc) ensures the continued retaliatory reaction to the attacks on 
September 11th.  Disha et al. (2011) note that “9/11 created a climate in which many Americans 
felt united against a ‘new enemy’ and in which acts of hatred against Arabs and Muslims became 
‘normalized’ behaviors” (p. 40).  Lickel et al. (2006) highlights the tendency of ingroup 
members to respond attacks against other ingroup members with a process of dehumanization 
that facilitates vicarious retribution against the perceived offending outgroup.  In viewing Arabs 
                                                 
28 Byers and Jones note that New York City reported zero anti-Islamic hate crime in the three and a half months after September 11, 2001.  This 
could be attributed to a reporting error or to the classification of anti-Islamic hate crime as some other category, i.e. anti-Arab, or more broadly, 
anti-Ethnic or -Religion). 
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and Muslims as representatives of a larger enemy responsible for the death and destruction on 
September 11th, hate crime perpetrators dehumanize such groups as they find all members 
equally responsible and thus interchangeable targets worthy of retaliation.  At the same time, 
ingroup members view themselves in a positive light when they more strongly identify with their 
ingroup and when they perceive their ingroup more favorably than other outgroups; this 
facilitates greater conformity to their norms of their ingroup (Cohrs & Kessler, 2013; Federico, 
2013; Louis & Taylor, 2002; Lyons, Kenworthy, & Popan, 2010).  In the aftermath of 9/11, the 
United States government framed itself as leading a “crusade” in a “war on terrorism” that 
Americans would win (Office of the White House Press Secretary, September 16, 2001).  In 
addition to assuming American superiority, such sentiments occurred in a historical moment 
when Americans associated the Muslim world with terrorism, leading to an “us against them” or 
rather, “U.S. versus Arab/Muslim world” mentality.  Indeed, Lyons et al.’s (2010) study uses a 
sample of U.S. citizens and finds that the interaction of ingroup identification and mean and 
high-level group narcissism is associated with increases in negative attitudes and behaviors 
toward Arab immigrants.  Seeing themselves as protecting their neighborhoods, perpetrators of 
anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime thus cast themselves as “true Americans,” reinforcing their ingroup 
identity as superior to the terrorist enemy, which they perceive as all Arab and Muslim persons.  
While the terrorist threat research mainly addresses the effect of 9/11 or completed terrorist acts, 
future studies may want to look to the impact of foiled and failed terrorist plots.  Plots could also 
serve as triggering events that induce perpetrators to suspect and attack those they perceive to be 
associated with Islamic extremism to both retaliate for these potential attacks and to defend 




The current study also adds to the literature by further scrutinizing the neighborhood-
level determinants of anti-gay hate crime as well as extending previous work by using improved 
gay demographic measures.  Regarding demographics, analyses reveal that an increase in the gay 
population is associated with more than twice as much anti-gay hate crime.  This finding 
corroborates Green et al.'s (2001) work finding a positive association between gay presence and 
anti-gay hate crime.  Capturing changes over time, gay population growth is also shown to be 
associated with large increases in such crimes as well.  Though the percent of same-sex partner 
households is not a perfect measure for capturing gay populations, the results still support the 
notion that visibility acts as an important predictor of anti-gay hate crime. Perpetrators of anti-
gay hate crime often do so in pursuit of thrills, traveling to known gay areas or “gayborhoods,” 
where there is greater opportunity to victimize a gay person (Franklin, 2000; Levin & McDevitt, 
2002).  Areas with higher gay populations, and thus greater visibility, not only provide greater 
opportunity to victimize gay persons, but also amplify the perceived “threat” to heterosexist 
social norms.    
The threat to such heterosexist social norms can also be exacerbated by other threats.  
Aside from gay demographics, concentrated disadvantage and poor economic conditions 
influence levels of anti-gay hate crime differently compared to anti-racial and –ethnoreligious 
hate crime.  While all other bias types occur in neighborhoods that are generally more socially 
organized and with better economic conditions, anti-gay hate crime proves more prevalent in 
neighborhoods experiencing greater concentrated disadvantage as well as higher levels of 
unemployment and poverty.  This contradicts Green et al.’s (2001) previous work showing no 
association between economic conditions, via white unemployment specifically, and anti-gay 
hate crime.  Such results are also at odds with Alden and Parker’s (2005) study which found a 
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negative relationship between poverty and anti-gay hate crime.  These differences could be 
attributable to Green et al. solely testing the effect of economic conditions while not accounting 
for gay population indicators.  Alden and Parker’s study also uses a different unit of analysis, 
conducting a city-level analysis. As demonstrated in the lit review, research on the effect of 
economic conditions is decidedly mixed.   
The results however are in line with Ryan and Leeson’s (2011) national-level study, 
which found weak support for the positive relationship between unemployment and hate crime.  
As previously discussed, anti-gay hate crime serves as an avenue to respond to the perceived 
threat to masculinity and heterosexist norms given the relationship between gay population levels 
and anti-gay hate crime.  Poor economic conditions compound the threat to masculinity as men 
perceive their personal economic failures to extend to failures to uphold “hegemonic 
masculinity” in providing for themselves and their families (Goffman, 1963 as cited in Perry, 
2001).  The findings thus evidence this context where gay visibility and poor economic 
conditions aggravate threats to masculinity, leading to efforts to reassert masculinity which 
translates into higher levels of anti-gay hate crime. 
 
Implications for Criminal Justice Policy and Practice in the United States 
 The current study’s results add to the current body of research on hate crime, contributing 
valuable insight into the determinants of hate crime offending.  Such insights offer an 
opportunity to inform policy and practice in the United States in several ways.  First, the results 
can help inform the NYPD’s HCTF in their efforts to prevent and respond to hate crime.  As the 
HCTF is one of the oldest and most influential bias units in the nation, any influence on their 
strategies could serve as a model for other bias crime units in the country, especially as cities 
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across the country are grappling with their response to surges in hate crime in recent months 
(Goldman, 2017; Hatewatch Staff, 2016; Hatewatch Staff, 2017; La Porte, 2016; Levin, 2017; 
Miller & Werner-Winslow, 2016; Toure, 2017).  Clearly, efforts should focus on those 
neighborhoods experiencing an influx of minorities into white neighborhoods.  Law enforcement 
should be careful to look for anti-Jewish crimes when any neighborhood experiences changing 
demographics.  Attention should also be paid to those neighborhoods with a greater presence of 
Jewish buildings in combination with changing neighborhood demographics.  When it comes to 
white neighborhoods seeing increasing racial/ethnic minority populations, the evidence shows 
that law enforcement should be prepared to respond to a variety of bias types.  Such 
neighborhoods may experience more anti-Jewish hate crime, but also anti-Black or –Hispanic 
hate crime as well.  Additionally, the findings on anti-white hate crime have interesting 
implications.  If the availability and use of community resources can thwart anti-white hate 
crime, then the same efforts could similarly stop other types of hate crime.  The findings show 
that increasing demographic change need not lead to hate crime.  Anti-gay crime prevention 
strategies and responses should also focus on neighborhoods with greater and growing gay 
populations as well as focusing on those neighborhoods with poorer economic conditions.  On 
the whole, the study emphasizes the need to track hate crime trends and community-level traits, 
particularly change over time in such indicators. 
Beyond law enforcement responses, the evidence reinforces the need for policymakers 
and practitioners to grapple with the effects of entrenched segregation in the United States.  Bell 
(2013) highlights how the average white or Black person lives in majority white or Black 
neighborhoods respectively.  She further adds that evidence demonstrates that African-
Americans would prefer to live in more racially integrated neighborhoods, yet they are the 
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nation’s most segregated demographic (p. 2).  The current study demonstrates the pervasive 
nature of anti-integrationist violence, particularly in white neighborhoods.  Persistent segregation 
ensures that such neighborhoods will continue to experience such responses.  Thus policies 
should focus on promoting housing integration.  As for the escalation in anti-Arab/Muslim hate 
crime in the post-9/11 era, government officials and policymakers should avoid using rhetoric 
and enacting policies that perpetuate the stigmatization of Arab and Muslim communities.  For 
example, travel bans designated against certain Arab countries only serves to not only portray 
such targets as “Other,” but also as potential threats to national security, further contributing to 
the “racing” of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists.  Further, government officials and policymakers 
should desist in crafting legislation that discriminates against LGBTQI persons and in rolling 
back protections against discrimination for such persons.  Such efforts further “institutionalize 
difference” (see Perry, 2001) by maintaining power structures across the contexts of sexuality 
and gender.  Institutionalization of difference thus reinforces hierarchies that allow for the 
continued oppression of the LGBTQI community.  Thus the government’s continued 
discrimination of such groups sends a message that makes anti-gay hate crime permissible. 
Given the greater understanding of neighborhood dynamics effect on group conflict as 
expressed through hate crime, this study’s findings may aid community relations groups in 
developing strategies that best remedy neighborhood conflicts.  The study could aid the 
Community Relations Service (CRS) of the U.S. Department of Justice, which handles 
"community conflicts and tensions arising from differences of race, color, national origin, 
gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, and disability" (U.S. Department of Justice, 
Community Relations Service).  Other community stakeholders, such as schools, victims’ 
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services, and other community and mediating services stand to benefit from the study given their 
investment in better understanding, and thus more ably respond, to hate crime. 
Importantly, the current study demonstrates need for nuance when dealing with hate 
crime.  The current study shows that there is no “one size fits all” explanation of hate crime.  
Rather, this study demonstrates the importance of work that disaggregates hate crime by bias 
type as different types of hate crime occur in varying contexts.  For example, static visibility 
explains anti-Jewish and anti-gay hate crime, but dynamic processes (i.e., increasing racial/ethnic 
minority populations) prove significant in accounting for anti-Black and –Hispanic hate crime.  
If there are different explanations for different types of hate crime, policymakers and 
practitioners should also investigate different responses to different types of hate crime. 
 
Limitations 
Given the study’s focus on one American city, questions of generalizability arise 
concerning whether the findings will hold in other national and international settings.  The 
reporting and recording of hate crimes in the United States continues to be inadequate given that 
the criminalization of hate crimes remains a relatively new phenomenon, resulting in under-
reported and under-prosecuted crime, as well as differential compliance with investigating, 
recording, and reporting hate crimes (King, 2007; King et al., 2009).  The NYPD, however, 
possesses one of the longest-standing Bias Crimes Units demonstrating vastly superior reporting 
of hate crimes (Freilich & Chermak, 2013; Levin & Amster, 2007; Martin, 1996).  Therefore, 
New York serves as one of the best possible avenues to study hate crime offending in the United 
States.   
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While the NYPD HCTF is one of the best hate crime units in the country, underreporting 
remains an important issue with hate crime data.  There may exist differential reporting across 
victims targeted for different bias crimes.  Victims of hate crime may similarly refrain from 
reporting their victimization to law enforcement due to fear or a lack of trust of law enforcement.  
For example, victims of anti-gay hate crime often fear reporting their victimization to law 
enforcement, fearing being “outed” by their victimization or fearing how the police will respond 
to their reports (Herek & Berrill, 1990a; 1990b; 1990c; 1992; Swank et al., 2013). 
Undocumented immigrants who are the victim of bias-motivated crimes may similarly fear 
reporting their victimization to law enforcement over fears of arrest and deportation.  There are 
also documented concerns over underreporting of victimization among Asian-Americans 
(Donachie, 2016; Fuchs, 2016).   
Other limitations also include a few of the analyses' statistical power.  A power analysis 
shows that analyses with a sample size of 55 or 59 have enough power to detect large effects, but 
not medium or small effects.  To address this, most analyses use a long form dataset to increase 
the sample size to 177 with each community district’s hate crime divided into three separate time 
periods (1995-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010); however, a long form dataset could not be used 
for all models.  All but one of the anti-gay models use a sample size of 59 community districts 
for the 2006 to 2010 time period due to the limited availability of gay demographic measures.  
Though the models only have enough power to detect large effects, this did not pose a problem 
as the models were still capable of uncovering strongly significant results.  All of the political 
threat models also only include a small sample size (n=55 PUMAs) for the 2006 to 2010 time 
period due to earlier electoral data being unavailable at this time.  While these models could only 
detect large effects, analyses still find significant results. 
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As noted previously, the NYPD did not specify anti-Arab or anti-Muslim hate crime in 
the data they provided.  Thus, the study follows Disha et al. (2011) in developing a proxy 
measure using anti-Ethnicity and anti-Religion hate crime as these categories are expected to 
largely include anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.  This measure also includes those offenses labeled 
as anti-American Indian due to the sudden and dramatic appearance of such crimes in 2001, 
presumably after the September 11th attacks in 2001.  The NYPD notes that it was possible that 
they were not recording anti-American Indian hate crimes as such before 9/11.  It remains 
possible however that those crimes labelled as anti-American Indian may actually be capturing 
crimes that were committed against perceived Arab and/or Muslim persons and property.  Thus, 
the anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime counts also include anti-American Indian hate crime.  Analyses 
were run with and without the anti-American Indian hate crime and the results remained largely 
the same with the exception of the post-2000 indicator failing to reach significance in the 
analyses without anti-American Indian hate crime.  In an effort to be as inclusive as possible and 
not miss any potential anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, the study presents analyses including the 
anti-American Indian hate crimes in the anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime counts. 
While the models generally rely on race-specific population data to match to the outcome 
hate crime variable (i.e. Non-Hispanic Black population data in models with anti-Black hate 
crime), analyses are limited to use of the general non-Hispanic white (and nonwhite) population 
data for anti-Jewish hate crime models and nonwhite population data for anti-Arab/Muslim hate 
crime models.  Though the analyses include no similar demographic-specific indicators for 
Jewish and Arab/Muslim populations, the use of the current demographic indicators proves 
suitable.  The analyses also account for Jewish visibility by including data on the presence of 
Jewish buildings, which the study shows is consistently associated with higher levels of anti-
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Jewish hate crime.  Another measurement limitation also includes the conceptual overlap 
between variables in some models, specifically models containing race/ethnicity measures with 
the diversity index and as well as models with percent non-Hispanic Black, concentrated 
disadvantage, and the diversity index.  This study’s concentrated disadvantage index measure 
includes the percent non-Hispanic Black.  The diversity index also includes either the same or 
similar racial population measures in computing the index as well.  While Grattet (2009) uses the 
similar concentrated disadvantage and diversity measures in his models, he does not include 
diversity in his full models or use percent non-Hispanic Black as a separate measure as he was 
not interested in nonwhite defended neighborhoods.  The current study however investigates 
nonwhite defended neighborhoods and opts to use a consistent measure of concentrated 
disadvantage across all models.  Using a different measure of concentrated disadvantage, Lyons 
(2007) notes that he does not incorporate racial measures into the measure in an effort to separate 
race from economic conditions.  This illustrates the conceptual overlap in the current study’s use 
of percent non-Hispanic Black as both a part of the concentrated disadvantage measure and as a 
separate group presence indicator in using race as part of an indicator of economic conditions.  
Though there is conceptual overlap in these measures, it is not expected that the measures would 
change much if percent non-Hispanic Black were removed from the concentrated disadvantage 
index.  Furthermore, this issue is isolated to only some models. 
Limitations also exist with the Political Threat models, largely due to possible temporal 
issues with the political threat indicators.  Given the limited availability of data, the analyses are 
limited to last time period of 2006 to 2010 using the 55 Public Use Microdata Areas.  Though 
limited to the last “stack” of data, the political threat indicators are either at the tail end of the 
time period or after due to the unavailability of earlier voting data.  The data on registered 
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Republicans (and other conservatives) comes 2012 registration data; however, it is assumed that 
political party affiliation would be fairly stable throughout the time period.  The mayoral election 
data also comes from the 2009 mayoral election toward the end of the 2006 to 2010 time period.  
The mayoral election results however prove somewhat similar to the 2005 mayoral election data, 
although the Democratic candidate, William Thompson, fared a little better than the 2005 
candidate with six percent more of the vote and winning the majority of the Brooklyn vote 
(Bloch, Fessenden, Tse, 2016; Chen & Barbaro, 2009).  Lastly, it has already been noted that the 
2012 presidential election data is a proxy for the 2008 presidential election, but the same 
temporal issue remains. 
Lastly, this study’s analyses do not account for situational characteristics (i.e. the race of 
the perpetrator).  Thus, it is not clear what interracial dynamics are at play during the hate crime 
incidents (i.e. anti-Black hate crimes could be committed by Hispanic, and not white, offenders).  
Regarding other studies using neighborhood data on known offender-victim races, the data 
however either show majorities or greater percentages of anti-minority hate crimes being 
committed by white perpetrators (see Lyons, 2007, where approximately 75 percent of known 
anti-Black offenders were white and vice versa for Black-on-white hate crime in Chicago; see 
also Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998, where the race of the offender was unknown in the 
majority of hate crimes, but white perpetrators were made up the largest percentage of known 
offenders across anti-minority victims in New York City in the period directly preceding the 
current study's time period).  Nevertheless, this study’s analyses do determine what types of 
neighborhoods where certain bias-motivated offenses occur, such as anti-Black hate crimes 





 Examining the neighborhood-level determinants of hate crime, the current study 
subsequent neighborhood analysis presents a fresh look at hate crime in New York City over an 
extended period marked by demographic change.  Hate crime presents a unique threat to society 
by damaging intergroup relations and challenging the equality of citizens in American society 
across lines of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and class.  This work provides an 
important portrait of New York City’s hate crimes that contributes substantially to the 
scholarship on hate crimes and hopefully proves useful in assisting policymakers and 




APPENDIX ONE: HYPOTHESES 
Defended Neighborhoods 
 
H1: Communities with higher levels of majority presence will be associated with higher levels of 
hate crime (static). 
 
H1(a): Communities with a higher white population will be associated with increases 
 in anti-minority hate crime. 
H1(b): Communities with a higher Black population will be associated with increases in 
 anti-white hate crime. 
H1(c): Communities with a higher Black population will be associated with increases in 
 anti-Jewish hate crime. 
H1(d): Communities with a higher Black population will be associated with increases in 
 anti-Asian hate crime. 
H1(e): Communities with a higher Black population will be associated with increases in 
 anti-Hispanic hate crime. 
H1(f): Communities with a higher nonwhite population will be associated with increases 
in anti-white hate crime. 
H1(g): Communities with a higher nonwhite population will be associated with increases 
in anti-Jewish hate crime. 
H1(h): Communities with a higher nonwhite population will be associated with increases 
in anti-Asian hate crime. 
H1(i): Communities with a higher Hispanic population will be associated with increases 
in anti-white hate crime. 
H1(j): Communities with a higher Hispanic population will be associated with increases 
in anti-Jewish hate crime. 
H1(k): Communities with a higher Hispanic population will be associated with increases 
in anti-Asian hate crime. 
H1(l): Communities with a higher Hispanic population will be associated with increases 
in anti-Black hate crime. 
H1(m): Communities with a higher Asian population will be associated with increases in 
anti-Hispanic hate crime. 
H1(n): Communities with a higher Asian population will be associated with increases in 
anti-Black hate crime. 
 
H2: Communities with increasing levels of minority presence will be associated with higher 
levels of hate crime (dynamic).   
 
H2(a): Communities with an increasing nonwhite population over time will be associated 
 with increases in hate crime. 
H2(b): Communities with an increasing Black population over time will be associated 
 with increases in hate crime. 
H2(c): Communities with an increasing Hispanic population over time will be associated 
 with increases in hate crime. 
H2(d): Communities with an increasing Asian population over time will be associated 
 with increases in hate crime. 
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H2(e): Communities with an increasing white population over time will be associated 
 with increases in hate crime.  
 
H3: Predominantly majority communities seeing an influx of minority residents will experience 
increases in hate crime (dynamic). 
 
H3(a): Predominantly white communities seeing an influx of nonwhite residents will  
 experience increases in hate crime. 
H3(b): Predominantly white communities seeing an influx of Black residents will   
 experience increases in hate crime. 
H3(c): Predominantly white communities seeing an influx of Hispanic residents will 
 experience increases in hate crime. 
H3(d): Predominantly white communities seeing an influx of Asian residents will 
 experience increases in hate crime. 
H3(e): Predominantly Black communities seeing an influx of white residents will 
 experience increases in hate crime. 
H3(g): Predominantly Black communities seeing an influx of Hispanic residents will 
 experience increases in hate crime. 
H3(i): Predominantly Black communities seeing an influx of Asian residents will 
 experience increases in hate crime. 
H3(j): Predominantly Hispanic communities seeing an influx of Black residents will 
 experience increases in hate crime. 
H3(l): Predominantly Hispanic communities seeing an influx of Jewish residents will 
 experience increases in hate crime. 
H3(m): Predominantly Hispanic communities seeing an influx of Asian residents will 
 experience increases in hate crime. 
H3(m): Predominantly Asian communities seeing an influx of Hispanic residents will 
 experience increases in hate crime. 
H3(m): Predominantly Asian communities seeing an influx of Black residents will 
 experience increases in hate crime. 
 
H4: Communities with more synagogues will experience more anti-Jewish hate crime (static). 
 
Economic Threat, Social Disorganization, and Strain 
 
H5: Poor economic conditions will be associated with higher levels of hate crime (static). 
 
H5(a): Higher levels of unemployment will be associated with increases in hate crime 
 (across all bias motivations separately). 
 H5(b): Higher levels of poverty will be associated with increases in hate crime (across all 
  bias motivations separately). 
 
H6: Communities experiencing worsening economic conditions will be associated with higher 




H6(a): Growing unemployment over time will be associated with increases in hate crime 
 (across all bias motivations separately). 
 H6(b): Growing poverty over time will be associated with increases in hate crime (across  
  all bias motivations separately). 
 
H7: Socially disorganized communities will experience higher levels of hate crime (static). 
  
 H7(a): Concentrated disadvantage will be positively associated with hate crime (across  
  all bias motivations separately). 
 H7(b): Residential instability will be positively associated with associated hate crime  
  (across all bias motivations separately). 
 H7(c): Diversity will be positively associated with hate crime (across all bias motivations 




H8: Communities with higher levels of Republican Party enrollment will experience higher 
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static). 
 
H9: Communities with higher levels of Republican enrollment, yet higher Democratic electoral 
votes, in their voting district in an election in which the Republican wins will experience lower 
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static). 
 
H10: Communities with higher levels of Republican enrollment, yet higher Democratic electoral 
votes, in their voting district in an election in which the Democrat wins wills experience higher 
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static). 
 
"Other" Terrorist Threat 
 
H11: Communities with higher numbers of Islam-associated buildings will see increases in anti-
Arab/Muslim hate crime (static). 
 




H13: Communities with higher gay populations are associated with increases in anti-gay hate 
crime (static). 
 
H14: Communities experiencing an increase in gay populations are associated with increases in 
anti-gay hate crime (dynamic). 
 





H16: Communities with worsening economic conditions will experience higher levels of anti-















































APPENDIX TWO: POWER ANALYSES 
 





















APPENDIX THREE: BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS 
 








Black % Hispanic 
% Non-
Hispanic 







% Non-Hispanic White 
       % Non-Hispanic Black 
       % Hispanic 
       % Non-Hispanic Asian 
       % Nonwhite 
       Change Nonwhite Pop. 0.412*** 
      Change Non-Hispanic Black 
Pop. 0.321*** 
      Change Hispanic Pop. -0.030*** -0.047 
     Change Non-Hispanic Asian 
Pop. 0.435*** -0.448*** 
     Change Non-Hispanic White Pop. 0.379*** 0.206** -0.278*** 0.4115*** 
  % Gay 
       Change Gay Pop. 
       Concentrated Disadvantage -0.888*** 0.724*** 0.563*** -0.544*** 0.888*** -0.456*** -0.312*** 
Residential Instability 0.096 -0.256*** 0.113 0.137⁺ -0.096 -0.226** -0.103 
Diversity Index -0.137⁺ -0.335*** 0.444*** 0.366*** 0.137⁺ 0.169* 0.101 
Unemployment Rate -0.820*** 0.556*** 0.665*** -0.493*** 0.820*** -0.460*** -0.348*** 
Change in Unemployment -0.026 0.082 -0.075 0.016 0.026 0.171* 0.114 
Poverty Rate -0.751*** 0.409*** 0.715*** -0.399*** 0.751*** -0.532*** -0.375*** 
Change in Poverty 0.308*** -0.131⁺ -0.334*** 0.187* -0.308*** 0.651*** 0.383*** 
Synagogues 0.541*** -0.321*** 
  
-0.541*** 0.112 
 Post-2000 -0.095 
    
-0.183* 
 Total Population 0.071 -0.046⁺ -0.141 0.210** -0.071 0.151* 0.225** 
 
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
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% Non-Hispanic White 
       % Non-Hispanic Black 
       % Hispanic 
       % Non-Hispanic Asian 
       % Nonwhite 
       Change Nonwhite Pop. 
       Change Non-Hispanic Black 
Pop. 
       Change Hispanic Pop. 
       Change Non-Hispanic Asian Pop. 
      Change Non-Hispanic White Pop. 
      % Gay 
       Change Gay Pop. 
   
0.636*** 
   Concentrated Disadvantage 0.020 -0.528*** 0.456*** -0.393** -0.401** 
  Residential Instability -0.091 -0.049 0.226** 0.486*** 0.407** -0.132⁺ 
 Diversity Index 0.113 0.121 -0.169* -0.003 -0.159 -0.077 0.095 
Unemployment Rate 0.033 -0.491*** 0.460*** -0.259* -0.291* 
  Change in Unemployment 0.197** -0.051 -0.171* 0.053 0.019 
  Poverty Rate -0.067 -0.459*** 0.532*** -0.243⁺ -0.253⁺ 
  Change in Poverty 0.285*** 0.226** -0.651*** -0.061 -0.107 






     
0.050 0.327*** 
Total Population -0.056 0.140⁺ -0.151 -0.301* -0.194 -0.196** -0.285*** 
 



















% Non-Hispanic White 
     % Non-Hispanic Black 
      % Hispanic 
      % Non-Hispanic Asian 
      % Nonwhite 
      Change Nonwhite Pop. 
      Change Non-Hispanic Black Pop. 
     Change Hispanic Pop. 
      Change Non-Hispanic Asian Pop. 
     Change Non-Hispanic White Pop. 
     % Gay 
       Change Gay Pop. 
      Concentrated Disadvantage 
     Residential Instability 
      Diversity Index 
      Unemployment Rate 
      Change in Unemployment -0.179* 
     Poverty Rate 
      Change in Poverty 
  
-0.530*** 
   Synagogues -0.014 -0.484*** 0.028 -0.382*** 0.245*** 
  Post-2000 0.139⁺ 0.061 -0.118 0.045 -0.222** 
  Total Population 0.061 -0.323*** 0.042 -0.296*** 0.293*** 0.265*** 0.094 
 






































          Change 
Nonwhite Pop. 0.388** 
         Change Non-
Hispanic Black 
Pop. 0.365** 
         Change Hispanic 
Pop. 0.013 
         Change Non-
Hispanic Asian 
Pop. 0.257⁺ 
         % Gay 
          Change Gay 
Pop. 
     
0.614*** 
    % Republican 0.829*** 0.555*** 0.384** 0.223 0.344* -0.121 0.071 
   % Democrat 
Mayoral Vote -0.918*** -0.513*** -0.42** -0.032 -0.439*** -0.126 -0.196 -0.826*** 
  % Democrat 
Presidential 
Vote -0.839*** -0.481*** -0.365** -0.129 -0.372** 0.171 -0.003 -0.906*** 0.866*** 
 Total Population 0.097 0.215 0.333* -0.082 0.124 -0.427 -0.397 0.078 -0.154 -0.127 
 
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
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APPENDIX FOUR: STATEMENT ON DATA ATTRIBUTION  
 
This data was provided by and belongs to the New York Police Department. Any further use of 
this data must be approved by the New York City Police Department.  Points of view or opinions 
contained within this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the 
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